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war-weariness and therefore downgrade their estimates of a country’s reputation for resolve. I test my
theory using a multi-method research design that includes survey experiments conducted on the general
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election manifestos and militarized interstate disputes; and historical case studies of World War I and the
First Iraq War. My analysis yields four key findings. First, the experience of a previous conflict can harm a
state’s future resolve. Second, backing down, all else equal, does undermine a state’s reputation for
resolve. Third, choosing to fight can also erode a state’s reputation for resolve if signs of war-weariness
develop. Fourth, the reputation for resolve costs associated with war-weariness can equal or outweigh the
reputation for resolve benefits of not backing down. This means states do not always enhance or
maintain their reputations for resolve by engaging in military conflict rather than backing down. The most
important implication of this project is that the benefits of using military force are lower than the common
wisdom suggests.
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ABSTRACT
DOVISH REPUTATION THEORY:
WHEN FIGHTING TO DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BACKFIRES
Joshua A. Schwartz
Alexander R. Weisiger
According to traditional, hawkish reputation theory, states inevitably harm
their reputation for resolve by backing down and enhance or maintain it by choosing
to stand firm and engage in military conflict. This logic has been used, at least in
part, to justify consequential interventions like the Vietnam War, which resulted in
tens of thousands of deaths and hundreds of billions of dollars spent. However, is
it always true that states maximize their reputation for resolve by refusing to back
down? In other words, is fighting to demonstrate resolve always a logical reason to
go to war? I advance a new theory of reputation—dovish reputation theory—that
argues the answer is no. My theory can be summarized in two steps. In the first
step, choosing to fight rather than back down in the past can lead to war-weariness
that reduces a country’s future level of resolve. In the second step, foreign actors
can observe the signs of war-weariness and therefore downgrade their estimates of
a country’s reputation for resolve. I test my theory using a multi-method research
design that includes survey experiments conducted on the general public and members
of the United Kingdom Parliament; large-N statistical analyses of political parties’
election manifestos and militarized interstate disputes; and historical case studies of
World War I and the First Iraq War. My analysis yields four key findings. First, the
experience of a previous conflict can harm a state’s future resolve. Second, backing
down, all else equal, does undermine a state’s reputation for resolve. Third, choosing
iv

to fight can also erode a state’s reputation for resolve if signs of war-weariness develop.
Fourth, the reputation for resolve costs associated with war-weariness can equal or
outweigh the reputation for resolve benefits of not backing down. This means states do
not always enhance or maintain their reputations for resolve by engaging in military
conflict rather than backing down. The most important implication of this project is
that the benefits of using military force are lower than the common wisdom suggests.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
US aims [in Vietnam]:
70% — To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).
20% — To keep [South Vietnam]...territory from Chinese hands.
10% — To permit the people of [South Vietnam] to enjoy a better, freer
way of life.
— John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Perhaps the most fundamental question in international politics is for what
reasons should countries be willing to go to war, risking the lives of thousands or even
millions? Despite the centrality of this question to the welfare of states, no consensus
exists and many wars are labeled “unnecessary,” “dumb,” or “stupid” in hindsight.
So, what are good reasons to go to war and what are bad reasons? Assuming a
state has sufficient military capabilities to win a war at reasonable cost, a logical
reason to engage in conflict is when they have large intrinsic interests in its outcome.
For example, the United States cared intrinsically about defeating the British in
the Revolutionary War and the Nazis in World War II because doing so directly
enhanced its security and autonomy. In other words, the tangible issues at stake
in these conflicts were incredibly and directly valuable to the United States (Snyder
1961, 31; Jervis 1979, 314; Kertzer (2016, 36). However, scholars and policymakers
alike often justify military intervention based on a different type of interest: extrinsic,
reputational interests (2018). For example, the United States primarily fought the
Vietnam War not because it had a significant intrinsic interest in the outcome of a
1

conflict involving a small, poor, and strategically insignificant country halfway around
the world, but because it was worried that backing down from the conflict would harm
America’s reputation for resolve in the eyes of others and thus embolden communist
forces around the world. In fact, John McNaughton—who was Assistant Secretary
of Defense under President Lyndon Johnson and a close advisor of Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara—calculated that the most important rationale, by far, for the
Vietnam War was to maintain the United States’ reputation (Humphrey, Landa, and
Smith 1996). Is this always a good reason to go to war, and if not, then under what
conditions is it ill-advised?
Many prominent leaders and scholars have echoed McNaughton’s emphasis on
reputation in order to justify hawkish policies. Harry Truman warned that failure
to fight in Korea “would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere”
(Mercer 1996, 2). Lyndon Johnson, when debating whether to send the first group
of American troops to Vietnam, said: “If the Communist world finds out we will
not pursue our commitments to the end, I don’t know where they will stay their
hand” (Khong 1992, 128). Bill Clinton cautioned that “our own credibility with
friends and allies would be severely damaged [if we abandoned Somalia]...And all
around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way
to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on
Americans” (Reuters 1992). On the night of 9/11, Donald Rumsfeld said, “We need
to bomb something else [other than Afghanistan] to prove that we’re, you know, big
and strong and not going to be pushed around by these kinds of attacks” (Glain 2012,
379). Finally, famed game-theorist Thomas Schelling (1966, 124) went even further
and claimed that reputation for resolve is, in fact, “one of the few things worth fighting
over.” He also said that “We lost thirty thousand dead in Korea to save face for the
United States and the United Nations, not to save South Korea for the South Koreans,
2

and it was undoubtedly worth it” (Schelling 1966, 124-125). Resolve generally refers to
an actor’s “firmness or steadfastness of purpose” (Kertzer 2016, 8), and I specifically
define resolve as the willingness of an actor to risk and endure costs in order to
achieve an objective, holding constant material capabilities. Given this definition,
the logic of the preceding arguments appears compelling: backing down from a fight
communicates to current and future enemies that you do not highly value the issue at
stake in the conflict relative to the costs of fighting for it, suggesting your resolve is
relatively low (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015, 474). Consequently, this view suggests
that countries that back down from disputes should be more likely to be challenged to
similar disputes by other states than if they had demonstrated resolve by fighting, as
a state perceived as less resolved should be a more attractive target. The implication
is that fighting can be justified based on extrinsic concerns about reputation, even
if a country does not have significant intrinsic interests in the outcome of a conflict.
However, is it always true that states enhance their reputation for resolve by fighting?
Under certain circumstances, can fighting actually undermine a state’s reputation for
resolve?
The literature on this subject has carefully examined the benefits states may receive from fighting in order to acquire a reputation for resolve and questioned whether
past actions actually influence future conflicts at all (e.g., Mercer 1996; Hopf 1997;
Tang 2005; Press 2015; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015; Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth
2018; Lupton 2020). However, no one has systematically examined the possible
negative consequences of attempting to boost your reputation for resolve by fighting.1 I address this gap in the literature by proposing a novel theory of reputation:
dovish reputation theory (DRT). DRT posits that one potentially serious disadvan1

Crescenzi (2018) is a prominent exception, though his focus is on how fighting can cause a state to
develop a reputation for aggression, rather than how fighting can undermine a state’s reputation for
resolve.
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tage with fighting in the present is that it can lead to public and policymaker backlash against a conflict, which may ultimately undermine your own future resolve and
thus cause other states to downgrade their assessments of your future resolve. For
example, Stephen Walt (2015) has argued that “exaggerated worries about US credibility...sometimes made a war-weary American public even less interested in far-flung
foreign adventures.” Robert Jervis (1991, 38, emphasis added) took this argument a
step further and claimed that a paradox of reputation arguments is that “a successful
effort to prevent a local defeat can be so costly that it undermines support for the
policy, thus leading others to doubt that the state will undertake similar actions in
the future.” Essentially, what presidents like Johnson and scholars like Schelling miss
is that the decision to fight or back down and a state’s future resolve are not independent. Resolve is a variable rather than a constant, and, under certain conditions,
fighting can undermine a state’s resolve compared to backing down or not getting
involved in a conflict in the first place, which can then undermine its reputation for
resolve. In these cases, fighting may diminish or have no positive effect on a state’s
reputation for resolve, bringing into question the initial decision to fight. For this
reason, fighting primarily for reputation may not always be a good reason to go to
war.
This dissertation aims to demonstrate the validity of these claims and establish
the conditions under which they are most likely to hold. In the remainder of this
introductory chapter, I briefly outline the two dominant theories of reputation for
resolve in the literature today, my new theory of reputation, the evidence I bring to
bear to support this new theory, and the contributions of my argument to scholarly
and policy debates.

4

The Existing Theories
There are two primary theories of reputation for resolve in the current literature. The first—what I classify as hawkish reputation theory (HRT)—embraces the
arguments of Schelling (1966) and contends that fighting enhances states’ reputation
for resolve compared to backing down (e.g., Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015; Renshon,
Dafoe, and Huth 2018; Lupton 2020). In other words, HRT contends that (a) a
state’s past actions matter for its future reputation, and (b) backing down in the past
is harmful to a state’s future reputation for resolve. Past actions allegedly matter
for future reputation because State A’s actual level of resolve is unknown to State
B given imperfect information and the incentive states have to exaggerate their own
level of resolve in order to enhance their bargaining position (Fearon 1995). But State
B can learn about A’s true level of resolve by analyzing its past behavior, which can
reveal genuine preferences (Nalebuff 1991, 320; Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1998, 453;
Sechser 2010, 634-635). Backing down is then harmful to a state’s reputation for resolve because it communicates to current and future enemies that you do not highly
value the issue at stake in the conflict relative to the costs of fighting for it, suggesting
your resolve is relatively low. The most important policy implication of this theory
is that states should be relatively more willing to fight wars and unwilling to back
down in order to avoid the reputation for resolve costs of choosing not to fight.
The second major theory of reputation for resolve in the current literature is
what I term skeptical reputation theory (SRT). In contrast to HRT, SRT argues that
(a) a state’s past actions do not matter for its future reputation, and therefore (b)
backing down in the past is not harmful to a state’s future reputation for resolve.
Scholars adhering to this school of thought make varied arguments, but two of the
most prominent are that the current balance of power and interests at stake in a crisis

5

are much more important to State B’s calculus than State A’s past actions (Press
2015), and that State A backing down in the past is discounted by State B due to
psychological (Mercer 1996) or structural reasons (Tang 2005). The most important
policy implication of this theory is that states should not worry about their reputation
for resolve much at all.

The Argument
DRT breaks from the existing theories of reputation in two principal ways.
First, in contrast to SRT, DRT contends that past actions do matter for future interactions and thus states should worry about their reputation. Second, in contrast to
HRT, DRT argues that fighting does not necessarily enhance a state’s reputation for
resolve relative to backing down and can potentially undermine it.
There are several weaknesses associated with SRT and HRT that lay the foundation for DRT. With respect to SRT, if the argument that reputation for resolve
does not matter in international politics is true, then why do so many leaders appear to conclude that it does matter? Prior experimental, large-N statistical, and
historical research also demonstrates that past actions do impact a state’s reputation
for resolve, in contrast to SRT (Huth 1988; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015; Renshon,
Dafoe, and Huth 2018; 2020; Dafoe, Zwetsloot, and Cebul 2021; Kertzer, Renshon,
and Yarhi-Milo 2021).
With respect to HRT, it makes two key simplifying assumptions that are problematic. The first is to focus the analysis only on, what I term, the “moment of
decision,” which is the specific point in time when a state chooses whether to back
down or to stand firm and fight. Although choosing to back down rather than fight
in this moment, all else equal, may indeed diminish a state’s reputation for resolve,
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focusing only on this moment is misleading because refusing to back down is not the
end of the story but often leads to war. As I will argue, it is the dynamics of war
that can ultimately harm a state’s reputation for resolve. The second key simplifying
assumption HRT makes is that a state’s actual resolve is not impacted by its choice
of whether to fight or back down in the moment of decision. I will instead argue that
a state’s actual level of resolve is a variable rather than a constant, and choosing to
fight in the moment of decision can undermine a state’s future resolve.
Given these limitations, the primary logic of DRT can be summarized in two
steps:
Fighting Relative to Not Fighting → Can Reduce a State’s Actual Resolve →
Can Reduce a State’s Reputation for Resolve.
In the first step, choosing to fight rather than back down can reduce a state’s
actual level of resolve because backlash to the war among a state’s citizens and/or
leaders can lead to war-weariness, which is a reduced willingness to risk a costly conflict in the future. This dynamic can materialize if fighting increases the perceived
costs of war among leaders and members of the public and decreases the perceived
benefits of war, thereby making war a less attractive proposition in the future. Psychological factors can also lead to or amplify war-weariness. For example, negativity
bias, which is the well-established “inclination [of people] to learn from failures more
than successes” (Johnson and Tierney 2019, 138), can cause a costly and unsuccessful
previous war to stick in people’s minds as a reference point, inflating perceptions
of a subsequent war’s likely costs and deflating perceptions of its benefits, thereby
reducing resolve (Roskin 1974; Khong 1992). As discussed above, this argument contradicts an assumption of HRT, which is that a state’s actual resolve is not impacted
by its choice of whether to fight or back down. Although previous research on what I
and others term the War-Weariness Hypothesis has yielded mixed results, I contend
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that prior null findings were due to limitations in research design (Garnham 1986;
Levy and Morgan 1986; Pickering 2002; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Stapleton
2014, 2015; DiCicco and Fordham 2018). Building on previous research, I also argue
that backlash to a previous conflict and war-weariness that reduces a state’s future
resolve are relatively more likely when one or more of the following conditions holds:
when the policy objective of the prior conflict is internal political change rather than
restraining foreign policy aggression; the war involves a low degree of direct security
interests; the human and monetary costs of the conflict are high; and the engagement
ends in defeat rather than victory. In other words, these are the conditions that make
DRT relatively more or less likely to hold.
In the second step of my argument, I contend that since a reduction in State
A’s actual resolve should be observable to other states via public opinion polls, leader
statements, laws passed etc., then that necessarily undermines A’s reputation for
resolve as well. Specifically, I posit a War-Weariness Reputation Costs Hypothesis,
which holds that wars that lead to significant backlash and signs of war-weariness
should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve relative to those that do not. By comparison, SRT does not believe past actions will matter at all and HRT does not consider
this dynamic and the possibility that fighting could undermine a state’s reputation
for resolve. Nonetheless, DRT does agree with HRT about a key point: backing down
in the moment of decision, all else equal, should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve relative to fighting. I term this the Backing Down Reputation Costs Hypothesis.
While choosing to fight in the moment of decision may unambiguously bolster or,
at worst, not affect a country’s reputation for resolve, the fighting that results from
choices made in the moment of decision could potentially undermine a country’s reputation for resolve if fighting leads to signs of backlash and war-weariness. Hence the
War-Weariness Reputation Costs Hypothesis.
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Overall, then, there are reputational advantages associated with fighting—
avoiding backing down costs—and reputational disadvantages—possibly incurring
war-weariness costs. Therefore, in cases where fighting leads to backlash and warweariness, the net impact of fighting comes down to which of the following countervailing effects are greater: (1) the positive reputation for resolve signal of choosing
to fight in the initial moment of decision, or (2) the negative reputational signal of
backlash and war-weariness. The weak version of my argument—the War-Weariness
vs. Backing Down Weak Hypothesis—is that the effects will countervail each other
such that fighting has no reputation for resolve advantages relative to backing down.
The strong version of my argument—the War-Weariness vs. Backing Down Strong
Hypothesis—is that (2) outweighs (1) such that backing down is actually preferable
to fighting from a reputation for resolve perspective. In either case, the central implication of DRT is that logic of going to war or staying in a war to maintain or
enhance your reputation for resolve is weaker than HRT suggests. DRT is therefore
“dovish” in comparison to HRT; it suggests conflict and an aggressive foreign policy is
less desirable than many adherents of HRT assume. Still, DRT is not unconditionally
dovish or pacifistic since it argues there are benefits to fighting: avoiding backing
down reputation costs.2 In one respect, the policy implications of DRT and SRT are
quite similar and relatively dovish: states should think twice about using force for
the purpose of enhancing or maintaining their reputations for resolve. On the other
hand, DRT is more dovish in one sense than SRT: while the former suggests that,
under certain circumstances, engaging in conflict can be actively harmful to a state’s
reputation for resolve, the latter simply believes that neither fighting nor backing
down has much impact on reputation for resolve, meaning SRT is more agnostic in
2

There are other reasonable labels besides “dovish” that could communicate the more complicated and
conditional nature of DRT relative to HRT. For example, Dynamic Reputation Theory, Conditional
Reputation Theory, or Contingent Reputation Theory.
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general about the utility of using force. Moreover, the mechanisms of the two theories
are entirely different since DRT argues that a state’s past actions can indeed impact
a state’s future reputation for resolve whereas the strongest argument of SRT is that
they cannot. SRT is therefore more “skeptical” about reputation theory altogether
than it is a “hawkish” or “dovish” variant of it. I expound on these points in Part I
(Chapter 2) of this dissertation, which focuses on theory-building.

The Evidence
In order to test DRT and the above hypotheses, I adopt a multi-method approach. I do so because each empirical method has its advantages and disadvantages.
While survey experiments allow researchers to randomly assign treatments and directly examine counterfactuals that are impossible to observe in real life (e.g., what
would have happened if the US chose to back down rather than fight in X conflict?),
making causal inference feasible, they also take place in artificial settings and make
certain elements of a scenario extremely salient, perhaps leading to inflated treatment
effect sizes. Historical case studies help address these two concerns about survey experiments, but it is difficult to control for potentially confounding variables in this
context and individual historical episodes at a specific point in time may not be externally valid to the larger universe of cases. Large-N statistical analysis helps address
concerns about external validity and controlling for confounding factors is easier than
in historical case studies, but internal validity is a concern since treatments are not
randomly assigned. By utilizing several different methods, I can leverage the advantages of each method while mitigating the disadvantages (e.g., Lieberman 2005). If a
theory holds in experimental, large-N, and historical case study analyses, then that
should increase our confidence in its internal and external validity relative to if it only
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held in a subset of these methods.3
In order to test DRT, I split the empirical chapters of this dissertation into
two parts. Part II of the dissertation (which follows Part I on theory) tests the key
mechanism of DRT: the impact that fighting has on resolve. Specifically, it utilizes
resolve as a dependent variable and answers the following question: Can fighting
in the past rather than backing down lead to war-weariness and thus undermine a
state’s future resolve? This is the key mechanism of DRT because if fighting in the
past rather than backing down can undermine a state’s actual resolve, then it could
reasonably undermine its reputation for resolve as well. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address
this possibility. Part III of the dissertation then tests the main argument of DRT:
the impact that fighting has on reputation for resolve. Specifically, it employs resolve
as an independent variable and answers the following question: Can a reduced level
of resolve as a result of a state’s decision to fight rather than back down in the past
undermine its reputation for resolve? Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 address this query. This
structure follows Kertzer’s (2016) study on resolve, which first analyzes resolve as a
dependent variable before utilizing it as an independent variable.
Starting with Part II, Chapter 3 tests the War-Weariness Hypothesis utilizing
a survey experiment on a representative sample of the American public. Despite the
internal validity benefits of experiments, they have not been used by previous literature to test this hypothesis. As discussed in more depth in Chapter 2, I argue that
the views of the general public are critical given the impact they can have on a country’s foreign policy, especially in democracies. The experimental scenario presented
to respondents proceeds in two steps. In the first step, subjects are confronted with a
terrorist attack that took place in the United States. In response to this attack, the

3

Of course, these are not the only methods that can be utilized to test a theory, though they are
some of the most prominent ones.

11

US government either (1) declines to take military action in response to the attack
(i.e., backs down from using force); (2) launches a war in response to this attack that
results in a least-likely case for backlash and war-weariness (the goal of the war is
restraining foreign policy aggression, the costs are relatively low, and the outcome
is victory); or (3) launches a war in response to this attack that results in a mostlikely case for backlash and war-weariness (the goal of the war is internal political
change, the costs are relatively high, and the outcome is defeat). In the second part
of the experiment, respondents are presented with a subsequent international crisis
and asked to what extent they would support US military intervention to resolve the
situation, holding the United States’ relative military capabilities constant. Per the
expectations of DRT and the War-Weariness Hypothesis, I find that choosing to fight
in the past can reduce a state’s future resolve compared to backing down. In cases
where the US decided to launch a war in response to the terrorist attack and backlash
and war-weariness were most likely to occur, I find an over 11 percentage point drop
in support for military action in the subsequent international crisis compared to when
the US backed down in response to the terrorist attack. This finding contradicts the
assumption of HRT that resolve is fixed and demonstrates that choosing to fight in
the moment of decision rather than back down can undermine a state’s resolve.
Chapter 4 then tests the War-Weariness Hypothesis using a large-N statistical
analysis. The independent variable in this analysis is the expected backlash from war.
It varies from 0 to 4 where 0 means a country has not participated in an interstate
war in the near past and 4 means they have participated in an interstate war in the
near past and backlash to the war is expected to be extremely high. To code expected
backlash, I consider whether the purpose of the war was internal political change or
restraining foreign policy aggression, whether direct security interests were involved,
whether the costs of the war were high or low, and whether the war ended in defeat
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or victory. The dependent variable in this analysis is a measure of the hawkishness
of political parties in North America and Europe that is constructed from political
manifestos published by those parties prior to elections (Volkens et al. 2020). Given
that prior research shows this measure accurately predicts how aggressively leaders
will act once in office (Heffington 2018), I argue it is a valid measure of resolve.
Utilizing a variety of estimation strategies to enhance internal validity, such as fixed
effects, I find that political parties—including those in the highest positions of power—
adopt less hawkish foreign policy positions following wars that are more likely to lead
to backlash. This finding bolsters the external validity of the experimental results
from Chapter 3 and demonstrates that the War-Weariness Hypothesis holds among
political elites in addition to the general public.
Rounding out Part II of this dissertation, Chapter 5 tests the War-Weariness
Hypothesis in a historical case study about the impact World War I had on the US’
resolve. I choose this case primarily because, on many dimensions, it is a leastlikely case for the War-Weariness Hypothesis to hold since the primary objective of
the war was to restrain foreign policy aggression rather than enact internal political
change, the conflict involved at least a medium level of direct security interests for
the US, and the outcome of the conflict was victory for the US. Therefore, if my
theory holds in this relatively hard test, then that would suggest it should also hold
in other cases that are easier tests for the theory (Eckstein 1975; Levy 2008). By
tracing public opinion polls, private and public statements made by leaders, and laws
passed by Congress, I show that the experience of World War I did reduce American
resolve in the interwar period between the two world wars. The most salient sign of
reduced American resolve was the Neutrality Acts of the 1930’s, which changed the
US’ historic policy of neutrality in order to reduce the risk of the US being dragged
into another costly war.
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To summarize, in Part II of this dissertation I utilize an experiment, large-N
statistical analysis, and historical case study to establish that fighting in the past
rather than backing down can undermine a state’s resolve. This contradicts HRT’s
assumption that resolve is not impacted by the decision made in the moment of
decision. These findings also provide evidence for the key mechanism of DRT. If
fighting in the past rather than backing down can undermine a state’s actual resolve,
then it could reasonably undermine its reputation for resolve as well.
Moving on to Part III, in Chapter 6 I test the Backing Down Reputation Costs
Hypothesis, the War-Weariness Reputation Costs Hypothesis, and the War-Weariness
vs. Backing Down Hypotheses in two survey experiments conducted on representative
samples of the US public. Although political leaders and national security elites may
play the biggest role in evaluating a foreign country’s resolve, studies on the public
are valuable for at least two reasons. First, given that prior research demonstrates
that public opinion can impact foreign policy, the views of the public are directly
important (e.g., Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Chu and Recchia 2021). Second,
prior research suggests that elite-public gaps are generally small, meaning that these
experiments may also shed light on how leaders would think about reputation for
resolve (Kertzer 2020). The two experiments I conduct are based on seminal studies
by Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth (2018) and Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon (2018).
In both experiments, I randomize whether a country backs down in a past dispute or
chooses to fight and shows signs of war-weariness.4 I then ask respondents to assess
that country’s resolve in a current dispute.
Three primary results emerge from these tests. First, in accordance with DRT,
HRT, and the Backing Down Reputation Costs Hypothesis, but in contrast to SRT,
I find that backing down does undermine a state’s reputation for resolve all else
4

I also include control conditions.
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equal. Second, per DRT and the War-Weariness Reputation Costs Hypothesis, I find
evidence that signs of backlash and war-weariness in response to a previous conflict
also undermines a state’s reputation for resolve all else equal. The substantive size
of this effect is also large: between 10 and 37 percentage points. This establishes a
key contention of DRT, which is that choosing to fight in the moment of decision can
also lead to reputation for resolve costs. Third, contrary to HRT, but in line with the
War-Weariness vs. Backing Down Weak Hypothesis, I generally find that conditional
on fighting leading to signs of backlash and war-weariness, standing firm does not
have a significant effect on a state’s reputation for resolve compared to backing down.
In combination, these findings show that fighting does not unambiguously bolster a
state’s reputation for resolve given the possibility of war-weariness reputation costs.
This brings into question the key argument of HRT proponents, which is that states
should fight wars in order to enhance their reputations for resolve.
Chapter 7 probes the external validity of my experimental findings on the public
by conducting an identical follow-up experiment on a sample of political elites: United
Kingdom (UK) members of parliament (MP). Although Kertzer (2020) shows that
elite-public gaps are generally small, some studies theorize and find evidence for large
gaps between leaders and citizens, suggesting studies conducted on the public may
not always be externally valid (e.g., Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 2006; Hafner-Burton,
Hughes, and Victor 2013; Sheffer et al. 2018; Dellmuth et al. 2021). The results from
this experiment mirror and, in some cases, are even stronger than for the experiment
conducted on the US public. First, I find evidence for the Backing Down Reputation
Costs Hypothesis. Although prior experimental studies have found support for this
contention as well (Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2018), this is the first to do so among
political elites. Second, I also find support for the War-Weariness Reputation Costs
Hypothesis. The substantive size of this effect is also large: a reduction in a state’s
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reputation for resolve (their probability of standing firm in this case) by almost 18
percentage points. Finally, among UK MPs I find support for the strong version of
the War-Weariness vs. Backing Down Hypothesis, as a state’s reputation for resolve
is lower when states fight and show signs of war-weariness than when they back
down. In other words, backing down in the moment of decision is actually beneficial
for a state’s reputation for resolve compared to fighting. Despite the fact that elite
experiments are rare in political science (Kertzer and Renshon 2022), I leverage one
in Chapter 7 to demonstrate the robustness and strength of DRT.
In Chapter 8, I conduct an extension of the large-N statistical results from Chapter 4. In that previous chapter, I established that conflicts that are more likely to lead
to backlash reduce a state’s actual resolve, which is measured using the hawkishness
of political party manifestos. This provided evidence for one of the key mechanisms
of DRT, as a reduction in a state’s actual resolve could reasonably reduce a state’s
reputation for resolve. In Chapter 8, I complete the second step of this analysis by
testing whether it is indeed true that a reduction in a state’s actual resolve (using the
manifesto measure) reduces their reputation for resolve. I assess reputation for resolve
in a large-N context by utilizing a measure of whether states’ threats are reciprocated
by foreign countries in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). If, all else equal, a
state has a lower reputation for resolve, then its threats will be seen as less credible
and thus target states should be less fearful of reciprocating them (e.g., Schultz 2001;
Weeks 2008; Horowitz et al. 2018; Post and Sen 2020). I find strong evidence for
the expectations of DRT in this analysis, as a one standard deviation decrease in my
hawkishness measure is associated with a 25% to 30% increase in the probability that
a country’s threats will be violently reciprocated. Since the evidence presented in
Chapter 4 and Part II established that fighting in the past can reduce a state’s future
resolve, and the results in this chapter show that a reduction in a state’s resolve can
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also undermine its reputation for resolve, this provides evidence for DRT’s contention
that choosing to fight can ultimately reduce its reputation for resolve.
Concluding Part III of the dissertation is Chapter 9, where I employ a historical
case study to demonstrate the negative effect fighting can have on a state’s reputation
for resolve. This case study analyzes the impact the Vietnam War had on America’s
reputation for resolve in the eyes of Saddam Hussein on the eve of the First Iraq War
(also known as the Gulf War and Operation Desert Storm) in 1990–1991. I choose to
study this case for two principal reasons. First, captured Iraqi government documents
from the Second Iraq War (also known as Operation Iraqi Freedom) provide a unique
view into Saddam Hussein’s private beliefs about US resolve. Given that leaders may
have incentives to understate their true perceptions of an opponent’s resolve in public in order to gain a more favorable bargaining position, the availability of private,
internal Iraqi government discussions can enhance our confidence about the US’ true
reputation for resolve in Saddam’s eyes. Second, there are good theoretical reasons
to think that each of the three principal reputation theories might hold for this case.
SRT may be likely to hold because the lag in time between the end of the Vietnam
War and the First Iraq War combined with the differences in principal policy objective and geographic region between the two conflicts should mean America’s past
actions in Vietnam will be less likely to influence Saddam’s thinking during the First
Iraq War. HRT may be likely to hold because the US clearly backed down at the end
of the Vietnam War, even though we chose to fight for many years. DRT may also
be likely to hold because the Vietnam War was a most-likely case for backlash and
war-weariness given that the conflict aimed at internal political change, involved few
intrinsic security interests, was costly, and resulted in defeat. That there are strong
theoretical reasons to expect each of the three theories to hold in this case offers a useful test of these theories since all can be “steel manned” rather than “straw manned.”
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My analysis demonstrates that despite the US’ almost 20 years of costly commitment
in Vietnam, the backlash to the conflict and (at least perceived) war-weariness that
developed in response to it undermined America’s reputation for resolve. In particular, Saddam believed that the US’ experience in Vietnam caused a crippling aversion
to casualties that he could exploit. While McNaughton and other adherents of HRT
believed fighting in Vietnam would enhance or, at least, maintain the US’ reputation
for resolve, it actually did the opposite.

The Contribution
Overall, this project makes several contributions to scholarly and policy debates. First, I develop a novel theory of reputation. Prior theories outline the potential reputation for resolve benefits of fighting rather backing down (HRT) or question
whether past actions matter at all for future disputes (SRT). However, no one has systematically examined the possible negative consequences of attempting to boost your
reputation for resolve by fighting, even though prominent scholars like Jervis (1991)
and Walt (2015) have noted that their intuition is that these negative consequences
exist. DRT addresses this gap in the literature by arguing that fighting rather than
backing down can actually undermine a state’s reputation for resolve. I also outline
the conditions under which DRT is most and least likely to hold. As discussed by
Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler (2021), this kind of analysis helps move the literature
on reputation forward by going beyond debates about if reputation matters at all
and instead considering under what conditions it will matter and how it will matter.
Second, this project makes an empirical contribution by bringing a range of
different types of evidence to bear in order to test and validate DRT. The elite experiment conducted on UK MPs is particularly noteworthy given the rarity of elite
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experiments in political science (Kertzer and Renshon 2022). Although previous experiments testing HRT and SRT have been conducted on members of the general
public, these theories, along with DRT, have not been experimentally tested on policymakers until now (e.g., Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2018; Lupton 2020; Dafoe,
Zwetsloot, and Cebul 2021; Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2021). Additionally,
given the mixed results in prior literature regarding the War-Weariness Hypothesis,
the evidence supporting it in this dissertation provides an important empirical contribution (Garnham 1986; Levy and Morgan 1986; Pickering 2002; Mullenbach and
Matthews 2008; Stapleton 2014, 2015; DiCicco and Fordham 2018).
Third, this project helps address the opening question in this chapter: for what
reasons should countries be willing to go to war? This is, of course, one of the most
fundamental questions in international politics, and proponents of HRT argue that one
answer is “for reputation.” As Schelling (1966, 124) said, reputation for resolve is “one
of the few things worth fighting over.” Nevertheless, this dissertation concludes that
fighting to demonstrate resolve can actually backfire. Choosing to fight can lead to
all the normal costs of war—death, destruction, and a shift in resources from butter
to guns—but not bring the expected benefits in terms of enhanced reputation for
resolve. This is not to say that fighting is always detrimental to a state’s reputation for
resolve or that it never makes sense to go to war primarily for extrinsic, reputational
reasons. But this project does suggest that scholars, policymakers, and members of
the public should be much more skeptical about wars that are primarily fought for
extrinsic concerns about reputation rather than because the outcome of the conflict
is intrinsically important. Ignoring this advice can lead to colossal humanitarian
and strategic disasters like the Vietnam War, where people wonder years into the
conflict what they were fighting for in the first place. In short, one of the reasons
for the existence of “unnecessary,” “dumb,” and “stupid” wars is the HRT-based “cult
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of reputation” (Tang 2005), “credibility addiction” (Walt 2015), and “obsession with
credibility” (Posen 2014, 33) that exists among many policymakers and scholars.
Finally, this dissertation also has broader implications for grand strategy. Although there are many definitions of grand strategy, Barry Posen (2014, 1) offers the
most succinct formulation: “A grand strategy is a nation-state’s theory about how
to produce security for itself.” In general, grand strategy involves long-term thinking
and the utilization of military, economic, and diplomatic tools in order to achieve the
state’s central objectives (Silove 2018). The question of what a state’s grand strategy
should be is thus broader than the question of when should countries go to war. There
are many dimensions on which individual grand strategies differ, but a key axis of
debate is how activist and interventionist a country’s foreign policy should be. Some
grand strategies—such as restraint, selective engagement, and isolationism—advocate
for the US and other countries to generally do less in world affairs and specifically use
military force sparingly, whereas other grand strategies—such as liberal hegemony,
deep engagement, cooperative security, and primacy—promote the opposite (Posen
and Ross 1996/1997; Avey, Markowitz, and Reardon 2018). For example, a grand
strategy of liberal hegemony calls for a relatively high willingness to use force in
order to prevent human rights catastrophes, promote democracy, counter terrorism,
and inhibit nuclear proliferation compared to a grand strategy of restraint (Posen
2014). Even though DRT does not come close to definitively answering the question
of what grand strategy a state should adopt, it does at least suggest that the benefits of more activist and interventionist grand strategies are lower than is commonly
believed. In particular, adopting these types of grand strategies can backfire in two
ways. First, if engaging in military intervention today reduces a state’s actual resolve
tomorrow, then that means proponents of activist and interventionist grand strategies may undermine their ability to get their way in the future by supporting their
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preferred policy in the present. They should therefore choose their battles carefully
and wisely. Second, more activist grand strategies often adopt a form of domino logic,
which holds that a defeat or retreat on one issue will directly lead to challenges on
other issues (Jervis 1991, 22; Posen 2014, 61). This philosophy was paramount to
justifying the Vietnam War and is often a rationale for using military force in order
to prevent a humanitarian disaster, nuclear proliferation, etc. If we do not intervene
to stop these bad things from happening, then the forces of evil around the world
will be emboldened. However, if choosing to fight today hurts a country’s reputation
for resolve tomorrow, then that might embolden malign actors and thus lead to the
bad outcomes in the future the intervention was designed to prevent. Paradoxically,
grand strategies of restraint may actually enhance a country’s resolve and reputation
for resolve compared to more activist and interventionist grand strategies. As the
US and its allies ponder how to respond to a rising China and revanchist Russia,
they should consider these ways in which fighting can impact a state’s resolve and
reputation for resolve.

21

Part I: Theory
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Chapter 2: Dovish Reputation
Theory
Prior theories of reputation argue that backing down can harm a state’s reputation for resolve or that past actions have little to no impact on a state’s reputation for
resolve. But is there a third possibility where standing firm can actually undermine
a state’s reputation for resolve? In this chapter, I argue the answer is “yes” by outlining in greater depth what I term Dovish Reputation Theory (DRT). If true, then
this would significantly complicate a common justification for using military force
advocated by scholars and policymakers.
This chapter begins by defining the two key terms of this dissertation: resolve
and reputation for resolve. I argue resolve is the willingness of an actor to risk and
endure costs in order to achieve an objective (holding constant material capabilities),
and reputation for resolve is the beliefs that others hold about this dynamic. Second,
I describe the two most prominent theories of reputation for resolve in the literature:
what I term Hawkish Reputation Theory (HRT) and Skeptical Reputation Theory
(SRT). The core argument of HRT is that (a) past actions matter and (b) backing
down is harmful for a state’s reputation for resolve. By contrast, the core argument
of SRT is that (a) past actions do not matter and therefore (b) backing down is not
harmful for a state’s reputation for resolve. Third, I discuss the limitations associated
with HRT and SRT, which are precursors for building a new theory of reputation. In
particular, HRT assumes that the story stops after an actor chooses to stand firm or
back down at the onset of a conflict and that a state’s resolve is not affected by that
decision. Fourth, I outline DRT by explaining how (a) fighting rather than backing
down can lead to backlash to the conflict among policymakers and the public; (b)
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backlash can ultimately undermine a state’s actual resolve; and (c) backlash and/or
a reduction in a state’s actual resolve can undermine its reputation for resolve. In
other words, I argue that—in contrast to SRT—past actions can matter for future
interactions. However, I also contend that—in contrast to HRT—fighting does not
necessarily enhance a state’s reputation for resolve relative to backing down This
discussion yields several hypotheses, which are tested empirically in the following
chapters.
Overall, this chapter outlines a new theory of reputation—DRT—that should
change the way scholars and policymakers think about reputation for resolve.

Defining Key Terms
The two key terms that must be defined for this dissertation are resolve and
reputation for resolve. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, resolve is “firmness or steadfastness of purpose” (Kertzer 2016, 8). This is helpful, but how exactly
do we know when an actor is steadfast in their purpose? We know an actor is steadfast in their purpose and thus resolved when they are willing to endure some kind
of costs in order to achieve their goals. For example, a parent is highly resolved in
their goal of getting their child to do their homework when they are willing to endure
screaming or the silent treatment and still not back down. A firm is highly resolved
to complete a merger when they are willing to pay the legal costs of an anti-trust
lawsuit rather than give up. More relevant to the context of international relations,
a state is highly resolved when they are willing to risk war and its potential costs
in blood and treasure in order to achieve some purpose. I therefore define resolve as
the willingness of an actor to risk and endure costs in order to achieve an objective,
holding constant material capabilities. This follows very closely from Yarhi-Milo’s
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(2018, 5) definition: “...[the] willingness [of an actor] to pay high costs and run high
risks...”.5
On the other hand, my definition differs somewhat from the definition utilized
by Mercer (1996, 1-2) and others (e.g., Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015, 474): “The
extent to which a state will risk war to achieve its objectives.” Nevertheless, I believe
my definition provides a few marginal advantages compared to Mercer’s (1996). First,
while Mercer’s (1996) definition of resolve is only relevant in the context of armed
conflict, my definition is sufficiently broad that it can apply to disciplines besides
political science, such as psychology and economics, and issue-areas besides armed
conflict, such as parenting. Second, Mercer’s (1996) definition implicitly suggests
that resolve is only relevant in a pre-war context because if war breaks out, then
the definition does not precisely explain how a state’s resolve can be assessed. By
contrast, since my definition includes the willingness to risk and endure costs, it is
clear that resolve could be evaluated after a war breaks out depending on how willing
a state is to endure pain during the conflict.
Third, my definition helps analytically separate resolve and material capabilities by explicitly noting that this factor should be held constant. The relationship
between resolve and capabilities is debated in the literature. One group of scholars
view resolve as partially a function of capabilities (Kroenig 2018), a second believes capabilities are partially a function of resolve (Morgenthau 1985), and a third considers
them as the same concept (Slantchev 2010). However, many scholars consider resolve
and capabilities two separate concepts. For example, Maoz (1983) explains the outcomes of interstate military disputes by contrasting a “balance of resolve” model with
a “balance of capabilities” model. Similarly, Fearon’s (1995) seminal model positing

5

It is also quite similar to one of the ways in which Lupton (2020, 3) explains resolve: “Resolute
actors are those that are willing to incur costs in the pursuit of their goals.”
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a rationalist explanation for war considers resolve and capabilities separate concepts.
From a historical perspective, they were also considered analytically distinct (Kertzer
2016, 12). Intuitively, it is easy to imagine materially weak actors that are highly
resolved and materially strong actors that are irresolute. For example, despite their
disadvantage in material capabilities, insurgent groups like the Boer, Vietcong, Mujahideen, and Taliban were able to beat major powers like Britain, the Soviet Union,
and the United States due to their superior resolve (Mack 1975; Arreguín-Toft 2001).
A similar logic holds for non-war contexts as well. We might still consider a firm
highly resolved to complete a merger even if their legal resources are minimal. Consequently, although capabilities could reasonably be considered an element of resolve,
I make the choice to analytically separate the two concepts.
While resolve is often thought of in binary terms, in reality it can lie on a
spectrum (Lupton 2020, 3). If on one end of the spectrum is an actor that is totally
resolved and on the other end of the spectrum is an actor that is totally irresolved,
then there are many shades of gray in between these two extremes. For instance,
some actors may only be willing to run a 10% risk of war, whereas others would run
a 25% or 50% risk of war. My definition of resolve thus does not imply that it is an
“either or” phenomenon.
There is also debate about whether resolve should be defined in situational
terms, dispositional terms, or a mixture of both (Mercer 1996; Kertzer 2016). Situational factors are those that vary based on context, whereas dispositional factors
relate to the nature or character of an actor. Resolve might vary situationally because
an actor’s willingness to risk and endure costs in order to achieve an objective could
differ based on the context. For example, we might reasonably expect an actor’s
resolve to risk nuclear war will be less than an actor’s resolve to risk lower levels of
violence. On the other hand, to the extent that different actors placed in the same
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situation might have different levels of resolve, then we might consider resolve as a
dispositioal factor motivated by something within. Democracies, for instance, may
be dispositionally less resolved than autocracies (Reiter and Stam 2002). Ultimately,
I adopt the view developed by Kertzer (2016), which holds that resolve is a combination of both situational and dispositional factors. In other words, resolve involves
both material factors (which are often associated with situational factors) and psychological factors (which are often associated with dispositional factors), and factors
related to both structure (which are often associated with situational factors) and
agency (which are often associated with dispositional factors).
What factors determine whether an actor is more or less resolved? There are
many possibilities, but I posit resolve is largely a function of two (somewhat related)
factors: interests and risk/cost sensitivity.6 As the depth and breadth of an actor’s
interests increase, their resolve should increase as well (Nalebuff 1991; Huth 1997;
Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1998; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015; McManus 2017). When
an actor asks themselves whether doing X is in their interests, they must consider
whether the benefits of achieving X are high compared to the expected costs. If
they are, then an actor should be more willing to risk and endure costs in order to
achieve their objective. Though it is easy to imagine a materially weak actor (like
the Taliban) having high levels of resolve, it is harder to conceive of an actor that
has very low interests—or, at least, perceived interests—in a conflict having a high
level of resolve. After all, it is precisely because groups like the Taliban had a greater
interest in the fate of Afghanistan than the United States that they were able to
defeat a global superpower (Mack 1975; Arreguín-Toft 2001). Although interests are
closer to the situational end of the spectrum since they vary based on context, they
may have a dispositional component as well to the extent that interests can become
6

See Kertzer (2016) for the most comprehensive discussion of what determines resolve.
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relatively stable dispositions of an actor. In other words, if an actor views something
as an interest that applies in most or all circumstances—for example, democracy
promotion—then we might consider that interest as at least a quasi-dispositional
feature of that actor’s character. In the realm of war, a state’s interest in risking or
prosecuting a conflict will likely be determined by the expected benefits of winning
the conflict—that is, the stakes of the conflict—relative to the human and economic
costs of fighting (Kertzer 2016). In other words, when an actor is deciding whether
they are willing to risk and endure costs in order to achieve an objective, they will
likely ask themselves two questions. First, what are the benefits of achieving the
objective? Second, what is the nature and extent of the costs?
An actor’s risk and cost sensitivity should also impact its level of resolve (e.g.,
Huth 1997; Kertzer 2016). We can think of this factor as relating to an actor’s stomach
or nerve. “Victory will go to him who has the best nerves,” said German general
Paul von Hindenburg in 1916 (Van Evera 1984, 61). Even if an actor has a strong
interest in taking some risk and a cost-benefit analysis suggests the benefits exceed
the costs, actors could still flinch due to a low risk or cost tolerance. For instance, a
critical concept in international relations is brinksmanship, or the manipulation of risk
(Schelling 1966). In the nuclear context, this could mean taking steps like authorizing
launch-on-warning nuclear alerts that raise the risk of a disastrous outcome. Even
if the expected benefits of such a course of action outweigh the costs, actors with a
low risk tolerance may nevertheless be unwilling to go down that pathway. Similarly,
imagine a poker player that must bet $10,000 in order to keep playing a hand, the
total pot is $200,000, and the player’s chance of winning the hand is 10%. Basic
probability suggest the player should make the bet because their expected value of
playing the hand is greater than the costs, but a risk averse player may nevertheless
still prefer to fold. This factor leans more to the dispositional end of the spectrum
28

than interests, but might still vary from situation-to-situation and thus is somewhat
a mix of both.
What, then, is reputation for resolve? Reputation for resolve is the beliefs that
others hold about the willingness of an actor to risk and endure costs in order to
achieve an objective, holding constant material capabilities. For example, this would
correspond to the beliefs a child holds about a parent’s willingness to endure costs
in order to get them to do their homework. In the international relations realm,
this could correspond to beliefs about how willing another state is to stand firm and
risk war in order to achieve their objectives. Since this involves making an inference
about what is in another actor’s head or heart, beliefs about reputation for resolve
are necessarily subjective rather than objective, and actors cannot fully control their
own reputations for resolve (Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler 2021).

Literature Review: Two Prominent Theories
Theory I: Hawkish Reputation Theory
Traditional reputation theory, what I classify as hawkish reputation theory
(HRT), contends that State A enhances its reputation for resolve by fighting or continuing to fight, and harms its reputation by backing down. HRT starts with the
assumption that State A’s resolve is, at least partially, private information that State
B is not privy to (Nalebuff 1991, 320; Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1998, 453; Sechser
2010, 634-635). State B may know that A’s resolve lies along some continuum, but it
does not know the exact value of A’s resolve. As a result, State B can learn about A’s
resolve by analyzing its past behavior. For example, if State A refuses to back down
from a conflict, then State B can surmise that A highly values the issue at stake in the
conflict relative to the costs of fighting for it. In other words, State A has relatively
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high interests in the conflict, which is a determinant of resolve. Expecting State A’s
future behavior will resemble its past behavior, State B may then revise upward its
beliefs about A’s resolve.
According to HRT, the main benefit associated with enhancing or maintaining
your reputation for resolve by refusing to back down is improved deterrence efficacy
(Schelling 1966, 55; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015, 481). Thus, states with higher
reputations for resolve should be less likely to be challenged to disputes by other
states. The reason is that if State A has a relatively high reputation for resolve
and is more willing to risk war in any potential crisis situation and to fight more
intensely if armed conflict does occur, then it will be a less appealing target from
the perspective of State B. By contrast, if State A backs down from a dispute and
gains a low reputation for resolve, then it will be a more attractive target and will
be more likely to be challenged in the future. During the Cold War, this argument
contributed to a belief in domino logic, which holds that a defeat or retreat on one
issue will directly lead to challenges on other issues (Jervis 1991, 22). As explained
by President Dwight Eisenhower:
“Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you
would call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes
set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one
is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences”
(Petersen and Glennon 1982).
This logic implies that acquiring a reputation for irresolve can lead to a cascade
of foreign policy disasters and thus must be avoided at all costs. Domino logic was
paramount to justifying the Vietnam War (as well as the Korean War), as there was
fear that if Vietnam fell to communism, then all of southeast Asia might quickly
follow.
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Several studies find evidence in accordance with HRT’s predictions. Huth and
co-authors analyze deterrence and extended deterrence dynamics (primarily among
great powers) and find that backing down in a previous dispute is associated with a
greater chance of deterrence failure in a subsequent dispute (Huth 1988; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993).7 Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo
(2015) analyze militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and find that countries that
backed down in a previous MID were more likely to be challenged to a subsequent
dispute than states that demonstrated resolve by achieving victory in a past dispute. In an experimental study on the American public, Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth
(2018) find that countries that backed down in their last two international disputes
with Country B were viewed as more likely to back down in a current dispute with
Country B than countries that stood firm in their last two disputes with Country B.
Specifically, a whopping 45 percentage points less likely. Dafoe, Zwetsloot, and Cebul
(2021) were able to replicate this basic result on a quasi-elite sample of respondents
that read Stephen Walt’s Foreign Policy blog.8 Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo
(2021) find similar results in a conjoint experiment conducted on members of the
American public. Lupton (2020), arguing that leaders themselves establish personal
reputations for resolve separate, in some cases, from the reputations of their states,
finds evidence for the deleterious effect of backing down in experimental research and
historical case studies.
In summary, HRT contends that (a) past actions matter and (b) backing down
is harmful for a state’s reputation for resolve.

7

See Fearon (1994b) and Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo (2015) for a critique of these studies.
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Respondents in this sample were disproportionately well-educated and informed about foreign policy.
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Theory II: Skeptical Reputation Theory
A second school of thought on reputation for resolve, which I categorize as
skeptical reputation theory (SRT), holds that past actions have little causal effect
on future conflicts, and thus standing firm or backing down in the past is usually
irrelevant for future deterrence. Scholars adhering to this school of thought make
varied arguments, but typically question the contention that commitments are interdependent and thus past actions are informative in future scenarios. If State A’s past
behavior is not relevant to its future behavior due to changing circumstances across
time and space, then no reputation can form.
In support of SRT, Mercer (1996) argues that leaders attribute an out-group’s
desirable behavior–—like backing down–—to situational rather than dispositional factors, and situational factors do not affect a state’s reputation because they are not
predictive of future situations where the context is likely different. The reason an
out-group’s desirable behavior is attributed to situational factors is because humans
are psychologically predisposed to see out-groups in a negative light, and thus explain
away desirable behavior by out-groups as conditional and transient. Making a different argument but coming to the same general conclusion, Press (2015) contends that
leaders do not estimate their opponent’s resolve by examining their past actions, but
by estimating the current balance of power and interests at stake in a given crisis.
After all, these latter factors may be more immediately relevant to a crisis scenario.
Mercer (1996) and Press (2015) find support for their respective arguments in a series of historical case studies. For example, Press (2015) examines the Berlin and
Cuban Missile Crises and finds that although Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had
backed down several times in the past, his threats were perceived as quite credible.
Support for SRT is also found by Hopf (1997), who examined a series of American
interventions in the third world and found, after a review of Soviet documents, that
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the results of these interventions did not affect Soviet estimates of America’s resolve
in Europe or Asia.
Other scholars have also generally questioned how often the assumption of interdependent commitments is met by arguing that past actions taken in one region
might not be relevant for states in different regions (Huth 1997); that past actions
might not be relevant after a certain amount of time (Khong 1992, 35-37); that past
actions involving one set of issues might not be relevant for a different set of issues
(Mercer 1996, 37-38; Crescenzi 2007); that past actions involving one set of countries
might not be relevant for a different set of countries (Huth and Russett 1984); and
that past actions taken by one leader may not be relevant once a different leader
takes power (Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2018; Lupton 2020). Finally, Tang (2005)
offers an even more fundamental critique of reputation arguments by asserting that
reputations for resolve cannot form at all because of the anarchic nature of international politics. His argument, which follows from neorealist theory (Waltz 1979), is
that anarchy incentivizes states to prepare for the worst possible scenario in order to
protect themselves in a dangerous world with no true international government that
can guarantee their security. Consequently, to be safe and avoid unwelcome surprises,
states should assume that their adversaries are highly resolved and that their allies
are irresolute.
In summary, SRT contends that (a) past actions do not matter and (b) backing
down is consequently not harmful to a state’s reputation for resolve.
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A New Theory of Reputation: Dovish Reputation
Theory
Overview of Dovish Reputation Theory
Building on the insights of Jervis (1991) and Walt (2015), this dissertation
develops a third theory on reputation for resolve: dovish reputation theory (DRT).
While SRT argues that fighting has no or very little effect on future deterrence and
HRT argues that fighting enhances future deterrence, DRT makes three key contentions:
1. Past actions do often matter for future interactions, in contrast to SRT.
2. Fighting does not necessarily enhance a state’s reputation for resolve relative
to backing down, in contrast to HRT.
3. Fighting can undermine a state’s reputation for resolve relative to backing down,
in contrast to HRT.
In order to make this argument, it is necessary to first discuss some of the
weaknesses associated with the arguments of SRT and HRT.

Weaknesses of Skeptical Reputation Theory
There are several criticisms that can be made regarding the view that reputation
for resolve does not matter in international politics.9 First, if reputation for resolve
truly is irrelevant, then why do so many leaders appear to conclude that it does
matter? American Presidents from Lyndon Johnson and Bill Clinton to Richard
Nixon and George H.W. Bush have publicly and privately expressed a belief that
reputation for resolve matters. Even the recent “red line crisis,” where President
9

Most of which are also made by Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo (2015, 477-478).
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Obama failed to uphold his threat to punish the Syrian regime for using chemical
weapons, led to frenzy and dismay in Congress and in the media out of concern
that America’s reputation for resolve was in doubt. One possibility, of course, is
that leaders are mistaken in their belief that their own reputation matters. Perhaps
leaders believe that their own reputation for resolve matters, but do not actually
make inferences about other states’ resolve based on their past actions. As Tang
(2005) argues, there may simply be a “cult of reputation” among leaders that is
unjustified. Nevertheless, it seems odd that leaders would widely believe that their
own reputation for resolve matters, but not utilize other states’ past actions, at least
to some extent, to better understand their resolve. Moreover, that reputations for
a broad range of factors have been shown to matter—from aggression (Crescenzi
2018) and honesty (Sartori 2005) to sovereign debt (Tomz 2007) and international
law compliance (Downs and Jones 2002; Simmons 2010)—suggests that reputation
for resolve likely matters as well.
A second criticism is that Mercer (1996) denies that, and Press (2015) underestimates the extent to which, a state’s past actions affect others’ assessments about
their interests. As discussed previously, resolve is a function of interests, as well as
risk/pain-tolerance. Consequently, one of the central mechanisms by which State A’s
past actions matter is by affecting State B’s estimates of A’s interests (Nalebuff 1991;
Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1998; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015, 477). Nonetheless,
Mercer (1996) contends that interests are a situational rather than dispositional factor because they can vary over time and space, and thus they cannot be part of a
state’s reputation for resolve. Yet, he understates the extent to which interests can
be enduring characteristics of a state that can be used to predict and explain future
behavior. For example, Hopf (1997, 155) finds that the Soviets believed “the American governmental elite was disposed to counter perceived Soviet expansion.” So, the
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Soviets believed that the United States’ interest in countering Soviet expansion was a
relatively stable disposition of the US that could be used to predict future behavior.
Mercer’s (1996) finding, then, that decisions to back down are attributed to what
he considers situational factors like interests, does not rule out past actions affecting a state’s future ability to deter since interests have a dispositional component.
Moreover, as Kertzer (2016) demonstrates, reputation for resolve has a situational
component as well, meaning even if interests are largely situational they can still
have an impact.
While Press (2015, 21) acknowledges, theoretically, that past actions might matter by affecting State B’s estimates of State A’s interests, in practice, he does little to
investigate this possibility empirically. The problem is that Press (2015, 3) contrasts
“current calculus” theory with “past actions” theory and argues that “decisionmakers
assess the credibility of their adversaries’ threats by evaluating the balance of power
and interests—and not the adversaries’ history for keeping or breaking commitments.”
However, since an adversaries’ history for keeping or breaking commitments can communicate information about its interests, it is not easy to analytically distinguish
between current calculus and past actions theory, and Press (2015) does not make
much of an attempt to do so. Compounding this problem is that leaders may focus
their crisis discussions on new information, having already updated their beliefs about
a state’s interests and therefore resolve based on past actions (Weisiger and YarhiMilo 2015, 478). Consequently, the impact of past actions on a state’s reputation for
resolve may be hard to discern in the type of case studies analyzed by Press (2015),
as leaders may not explicitly discuss past actions during or immediately before a crisis. In his empirical analysis, Press (2015) also only examines historical cases where
countries backed down and then analyzes how backing down impacted those states’
reputation for resolve. Because he does not analyze cases where countries fought, he
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cannot assess how a past decision to fight impacts a country’s reputation for resolve,
which is critical to the argument of DRT (and HRT). Reputations may also be more
likely to form in early interactions between states or when a new leader takes power,
as these may be formative experiences and create sticky expectations (Copeland 1997;
Lupton 2020). Therefore, examining later interactions (like crises in the middle of
the Cold War) may be misleading because reputations have already formed and are
difficult to change.
Third, Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo’s (2021) conjoint experiment conducted on members of the American public provides empirical evidence against Press’
(2015) argument. While respondents did view interests and capabilities as important
determinants of an actor’s resolve, past actions also impacted perceptions of resolve.
Similarly, contra Press (2015), Trager (2017) finds evidence that Britain’s past actions
did impact their reputation for resolve in the eyes of German leaders.
A fourth limitation relates to methodological weaknesses associated with Mercer
(1996) and Hopf’s (1997) studies. While Mercer (1996) finds that backing down is often explained in situational rather than dispositional term, he does not directly assess
whether backing down impacts a state’s future credibility, which is the key question of
interest (Miller 2011, 36; Press 2015, 16). Although Hopf (1997) finds that American
interventions in the third world did not affect Soviet estimates of the United States’
resolve in Europe or Asia, he did not ascertain what Soviet views were of American resolve before they engaged in various conflicts in the third world. Therefore,
his study cannot determine whether Soviet assessments of US resolve changed after
their interventions (Press 2015, 16). Empirically, Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo’s
(2021) study also provides empirical evidence against Mercer’s (1996) argument. In
contrast to his expectations, respondents view allies who stood firm in the past as
more resolved and adversaries who backed down in the past as less resolved.
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A fifth criticism relates to Tang’s (2005) argument about how the systemic condition of anarchy prevents reputations for resolve from forming. Although he is correct
that neorealist logic suggests that states should think in terms of the worst-case scenario, in reality, it is more plausible that leaders make assessments and decisions
based off of probabilities (e.g., Wendt 1992). If decision-makers simply assume that
their adversaries are highly resolved and that their allies are irresolute, then why do
governments have their intelligence agencies spend time and money estimating the
intentions of other states?
In an interview with the New York Times, Mercer asserted, “As the record
shows, reputations do not matter” (Fisher 2017). DRT is in agreement with HRT
that this maximalist position is incorrect. Nevertheless, the aforementioned criticisms
do not imply that past actions always matter in future crisis scenarios or that they
are more important than near-term factors like the balance of power. For example, it
stands to reason that past actions related to one issue or under one leader would be
less likely to matter for different issues or under a different leader. And it is certainly
possible that psychological and structural factors predispose decision-makers to see
the worst in enemies and competitors.
In some ways, the policy implications of DRT and SRT are quite similar: states
should think twice about using force for the purpose of enhancing or maintaining their
reputations for resolve. On the other hand, DRT is more dovish in one sense than SRT:
while the former suggests that, under certain circumstances, engaging in conflict can
be actively harmful to a state’s reputation for resolve, the latter simply believes that
neither fighting nor backing down has much impact on reputation for resolve, meaning
SRT is more agnostic in general about the utility of using force. Additionally, the logic
of each theory is quite different. While SRT asserts that reputation for resolve does
not matter and thus is “skeptical” about the whole enterprise of reputation theory,
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DRT argues that reputation for resolve does matter and is affected by past actions.

Weaknesses of Hawkish Reputation Theory
HRT makes two key simplifying assumptions that are problematic. The first
assumption is to focus the analysis only on, what I term, the “moment of decision.”
The moment of decision is the specific point in time when a state chooses whether
to back down or to stand firm and fight. Of course, if State A chooses to back down
in this moment, then HRT argues that State B will downgrade its estimate of A’s
resolve, and the opposite if they stand firm. In their analyses, hawkish reputation
theorists do their best to try and examine the effect of State A’s decision in the
moment of decision all else equal. Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with this
approach, as we may simply be interested in understanding the isolated effect of A’s
choice in this key moment. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that State A refusing
to back down in the moment of decision could do anything other than increase, or,
at least, maintain, its reputation for resolve.10 Thus, DRT agrees with HRT that
backing down in the moment of decision, all else equal, should undermine a state’s
reputation for resolve. However, this all else equal criterion can be misleading because
refusing to back down in the moment of decision is not the end of the story, but often
has direct consequences: namely fighting and war. While choosing to fight in the
moment of decision may unambiguously bolster or, at worst, not affect a country’s
reputation for resolve, the fighting that results from choices made in the moment of
decision could potentially undermine a country’s reputation for resolve. For example,
if fighting causes backlash among a nation’s population and/or leaders, then foreigners

10

Though State A refusing to back down could have unintended consequences like causing it to gain a
reputation for aggression, which could lead to negative deterrence outcomes in the future (Crescenzi
2018; Brutger and Kertzer 2018).
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may assess that a country is relatively unlikely to be resolved in the future because
the state’s underlying preferences have changed in response to the conflict.
Relatedly, the second key simplifying assumption that HRT makes is that State
A’s actual resolve is fixed (Nalebuff 1991, 320; Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1998, 451;
Sechser 2010, 635).11 Although State B can learn about State A’s resolve in these
models and thus State A’s reputation for resolve can vary, A’s actual resolve does
not vary. This assumption certainly makes sense when analyzing only the moment
of decision, as a state’s actual resolve seemingly would not shift up or down simply
based off of its decision in this moment. On the other hand, if fighting results from
the choice State A makes in the moment of decision, then that could certainly lead
to a negative change in A’s actual resolve given that wars can be a formative process.
Assuming that a change in A’s resolve can be observed, at least partially, by other
states, a decrease in a state’s actual resolve should also undermine its reputation for
resolve.
Third, a strong belief in HRT implies that it is very difficult to distinguish
between minor and vital interests (Snyder 1991, 3). The reason being that a state
will only be able to enhance its reputation for resolve when its actions are costly
signals that run counter to expectations and reveal new information about its resolve
(Snyder 1961, 36-37; Nalebuff 1991, 323-325; Huth 1997, 87-88). If it is relatively
cheap for State A to act tough and A is expected to do so given the circumstances,
then acting tough will not greatly enhance A’s reputation for resolve because such
behavior is not very revealing.12 For example, State A defending its homeland from
invasion is expected given the high intrinsic interests involved, and therefore would
not do much to bolster State A’s credibility. On the other hand, State A deciding to
11

More precisely, that resolve is exogenous to the interactions in the model.

12

Though backing down would be a strong signal of a state’s lack of resolve.
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fight in a costly and difficult-to-win conflict it has few intrinsic interests in would be a
strong signal about its willingness to fight and should—according to HRT—enhance
its reputation for resolve. As argued by Snyder (1961, 36-37):
“On the other hand, it could be argued that a determined and costly
response to an attack on an objective which the enemy thinks means little
to us in strategic and intrinsic terms is likely to give him greater pause
with respect to his future aggressive intentions...The enemy would reason
that if the United States were willing to fight for a place of such trivial
intrinsic and strategic value to itself, it must surely be willing to fight for
other places of greater value. Thus, the deterrent value of defending any
objective varies inversely with the enemy’s perception of its value to us
on other accounts.”
There are two potentially serious problems with this logic. First, if adopted as
public policy, it has the potential to lead to severe overextension, where major powers engage in costly, difficult-to-win conflicts in an effort to boost their reputation for
resolve, thereby draining a country’s financial and physical resources (Gilpin 1981;
Kennedy 1987; Jervis 1991, 3; Snyder 1993). This can, in turn, make a country more
vulnerable to future attacks and undermine its standard of living. Especially in the
era of nuclear weapons where most major powers are highly unlikely to be invaded
or massively and directly attacked, states should distinguish between minor and vital
interests in order to avoid overextension. As George Kennan (1976) said, “It is important to recognize that not all places...are of equal importance.” More relevant to
DRT, engaging in costly, difficult-to-win conflicts that involve relatively low intrinsic
interests are more likely to lead to backlash among the public and decision-makers,
potentially undermining a country’s willingness to use force in the future and, in turn,
reducing its reputation for resolve.
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The Argument in Detail
By looking beyond the initial moment of decision and allowing a state’s resolve
to vary, I argue that under certain conditions, fighting does not maximize a state’s
reputation for resolve relative to backing down. Figure 1 lays out a causal map that
explains how choosing to fight in the initial moment of decision can ultimately degrade
a state’s actual resolve, as well as its reputation for resolve. I will now proceed to
discuss each element of this map in turn.
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Figure 1: Causal Map of Dovish Reputation Theory
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Backlash
A necessary (though not sufficient) condition for my argument to operate is
the presence of backlash (i.e., significant disapproval) to a past war among the public
and/or decision-making elites.13 If backlash does not occur, then HRT (or SRT, under
certain circumstances) is more likely to be correct. Given that the public and leaders
play a significant role in my theory, I am breaking from the neorealist assumption
that the state is a unitary actor (Waltz 1979). There are two important questions
related to backlash I will discuss in this section. First, what are the indicators that
suggest backlash has occurred? Second, when is backlash more likely to occur? Previous literature provides good answers to these questions, which I will summarize and
synthesize here.
Beginning with the indicators that backlash has occurred, backlash among the
public is measured by scholars primarily through public opinion polls that indicate disapproval with War Z (e.g., Jentleson 1992; Eichenberg 2005). Among decision-making
elites, indicators of backlash include (a) public statements,14 (b) private statements,
(c) official policy documents or party platforms, and (d) laws passed that indicate
disapproval with War Z.
With respect to when backlash is more likely to occur, there are four central
and interrelated factors that the literature has found affect support for a war. These
factors are summarized in Table 1.
One factor that makes backlash more likely is defeat. Unless a state is forced
to go to war by an opponent, defeat brings into question the wisdom of going to

13

Elites for the purpose of this dissertation primarily include politicians (e.g., presidents and members
of parliament) and key foreign affairs officials (e.g., the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.). They do not include the wealthy or intellectual elites.

14

Since elites may have incentives to misrepresent their true views in public, private discussions can
provide more accurate accounts of an elite’s view.
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Table 1: Factors that Make Backlash More or Less Likely
Factor

Backlash More Likely

Backlash Less Likely

Outcome of the War

Lose

Win

Costs of the War

High

Low

Policy Objective of the War

Internal Political Change

Restraining Foreign Policy Aggression

Direct Security Interests in the War

Low

High

war in the first place. Why fight a war you cannot win or are unlikely to? Feaver
and Gelpi (2005) conduct survey experiments and analyze public opinion data and
find that that “the public is defeat phobic.” Eichenberg (2005), analyzing 22 episodes
of the use of force by the United States, also finds that the most important factor
that affects public support for war is whether the conflict results in a victory or
defeat. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2006) find similar results specifically for the Second
Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom), as support was high early on when Saddam
Hussein was successfully deposed, but decreased as the insurgency developed and the
public became less confident that a successful outcome was in reach. No one likes
losing, especially when lives are lost and money is spent in the effort. Nevertheless,
while victory significantly decreases the likelihood of backlash, it does not render it
impossible. For example, while the US clearly won World War I, the war resulted in
significant backlash and led to an era of American isolationism (McDougal 1997, 149;
Mead 2002, 58-59; 205-206).
Backlash is also more likely to occur when a war is more costly.15 For example, Mueller (1985) finds that support for the Vietnam war declined as casualties
increased. This finding is echoed by Koch and Nicholson (2016), who find that in15

It is also possible that backlash is more likely when a war is more costly relative to initial expectations.
Nonetheless, most research on war costs focuses on them in an absolute sense rather than compared
to initial expectations. Future research should consider this latter possibility.
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creased casualties from war increases turnout in elections, especially among those
least interested in politics. It is also supported by Gartner (2008), who conducts a
survey experiment on 3,000 subjects and finds that rising casualty trends decreased
support for war. Similarly, Johns and Davies (2019) utilize survey experiments (on
the American and British publics) and find evidence for casualty aversion. Studies
have further shown that financial costs depress support for a war and for the president (Geys 2010). Ergo, all else equal, we would predict greater backlash to the costly
Second Iraq War than from the relatively costless US “drone war” in, say, Yemen.
The policy objective of a war also likely affects the chance of backlash. Jentleson
(1992) argues that a crucial factor that affects support for war is the “principal policy
objective” (PPO) of the conflict, which is the “objective for which military force is
being used.” Specifically, he asserts that wars that aim to restrain foreign policy
aggression (RFPA) by another state are much more popular than those whose goal is
internal political change (IPC). For example, Jentleson (1992) would argue that the
First Iraq War (Operation Desert Storm), where the US only wanted to expel Saddam
Hussein and his military from Kuwait, would be much more popular, all else equal,
than the Second Iraq War, where the US’ goal was to depose Saddam and install a
democracy in Iraq. Jentleson (1992) finds support for his argument when analyzing
public opinion data on eight cases of military intervention in the 1980s and early
1990s, as well in six cases from the mid 1990s in a study with Britton (Jentleson and
Britton 1998). This finding was further supported in a study by Eichenberg (2005),
which investigated twenty-two cases of the use or threatened use of military force by
the US from the early 1980s to the mid 2000s. Similarly, Brownlee (2020) analyzed
over 1,000 nationally representative surveys conducted on the American public and
found that wars whose goal was IPC were less popular than those aiming to RFPA.
This pattern likely holds for two reasons. First, because the public understands that
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it is much harder to transform a country’s internal politics than it is to restrain their
foreign policy. For example, it proved much harder to install a liberal democracy in
Iraq than to force the Iraqi military out of Kuwait. Thus, the public likely expects
wars whose goal is internal political change to cost more and to be more likely to
end in failure than those whose goal is foreign policy restraint. Second, intervening
in a country’s domestic politics may be viewed as less legitimate than attempting to
affect their foreign policy given the principle of state sovereignty.
Nevertheless, there is some ambiguity in Jentleson’s (1992) concept, as his
definitions of RFPA and IPC partially conflate the causes of a war and the goals
states adopt in the conflict (Tierney 2018). For example, how do we code a war where
the US is motivated to fight by the external behavior of a state (i.e., foreign policy
aggression), but seeks regime change? This was the case in the Afghanistan War, as
Washington sought regime change in response to the 9/11 attacks perpetrated by alQaeda, who were being harbored by the Taliban. Given that Jentleson (1992) defines
a state’s PPO as the “objective for which military force is being used,” it appears that
the PPO concept is more closely connected to the goals a state adopts in a conflict.
Consequently, that is how it is defined for the purposes of this dissertation. However,
the causes of a war could also have an independent effect on the chances of backlash.
Specifically, the less a conflict involves the direct security interests of a country, the
lower public approval is likely to be. Many studies have found that public support for
war is likely to be lower when intrinsic US interests are not at stake (e.g., Herrmann,
Tetlock, and Viser 1999; Feaver and Gelpi 2005; Kriner and Shen 2014), which is
consistent with realist theory that states have structural incentives to prioritize their
own security in an anarchical world (Waltz 1979). We would thus expect backlash
to a war to be least likely in the case of a direct attack on the US homeland or
against American citizens; most likely in the case of domestic human rights abuses
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that do not directly involve US interests (though may contradict American values);
and somewhere in between when an ally or foreign country important to US interests
is attacked. For example, Davies and Johns (2013) find that public disapproval is
greater when leaders do not combat states developing nuclear weapons that could
directly threaten their own country than when they do not help allies that have been
invaded. Similarly, the attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized the US public to support
entering World War II to a much greater extent than attacks on our allies––like France
and the United Kingdom––and human rights abuses against German Jews.
In summary, war can lead to backlash among the public and decision-making
elites, and there are conditions that make backlash more or less likely.

Resolve
The second part of my argument is that backlash to a previous war can undermine a state’s resolve in future conflicts, thus invalidating the assumption of most
traditional reputation models that A’s actual resolve is exogenous. This is closely related to the “war-weariness” hypothesis that has been proposed by previous literature,
which holds that after enduring a costly war, a state will be less willing to risk war in
the future and will especially be less willing to take part in a costly war in the future
(Richardson 1960, 235). Therefore, while I define backlash as significant disapproval
with a past war, I define war-weariness as a reduction in a state’s future resolve as
a result of a past war.16 It is this argument that extends and makes a contribution
relative to Kertzer’s (2016) wide-ranging analysis of what determines resolve. Al16

Although backlash can lead to war-weariness, it need not. Moreover, there are other factors besides
backlash per se that could lead to war-weariness in theory. For example, exhaustion after a previous
war—even a popular one—could plausibly lead to war-weariness. However, given that backlash is
likely to be a stronger and longer-term signal of a reduction in resolve than exhaustion, I focus on
backlash in this dissertation. In practice, backlash and exhaustion are likely to be highly correlated,
as high costs are a determinant of both.
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though he considers how factors like the costs and benefits of fighting impact resolve,
he does not theorize or test how past actions and experiences impact the situational
and dispositional factors that determine resolve.17 This project’s contribution to the
literature on resolve is consequently about how past actions and experiences affect
how policymakers and members of the public think about the utility of war, which
can, in turn, impact resolve.
One important question when discussing resolve is whose resolve is it that
matters; the state’s, the public’s, or decision-making elites’ ? Ultimately, I argue that
it is the state’s resolve that matters, but the state’s resolve is a function of both
the public’s and decision-making elites’ resolve. Domestic politics, therefore, plays a
critical role in my theory, contra neorealism.
With respect to decision-making elites, their personal resolve has the most direct effect on a state’s aggregate resolve, as they ultimately control a country’s foreign
policy.18 Consequently, if a past war changes decision-making elites’ genuine foreign
policy views in a way that reduces their willingness to risk pain in future conflicts,
then that should directly undermine a state’s aggregate resolve. Indeed, Lupton
(2020) shows that the reputation for resolve of specific leaders has an important effect on international crisis dynamics. As with backlash, indicators of a reduction in
elite resolve include (a) public statements, (b) private statements, (c) official policy
documents or party platforms, and (d) laws passed that signal a lower willingness to
risk and/or endure pain in future conflicts.
More indirectly, public opinion can also affect a state’s resolve. As outlined in
17

Kertzer (2016) also does not analyze reputation for resolve, which is, of course, the key topic of this
dissertation.

18

Decision-making elites generally control a country’s foreign policy because there are no true direct
democracies in the world where voters directly and regularly vote on a country’s foreign policy.
Of course, referendums on important foreign policy issues do occasionally occur, like the United
Kingdom’s vote on whether to leave the European Union.

49

Figure 1 and by Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo (2020), there are two main mechanisms
through which the public can impact a state’s foreign policy: responsiveness and
selection. Responsiveness means that decision-making elites respond to public opinion
and are constrained, to some extent, by it. Though decision-making elites control a
country’s foreign policy, most are, at least partially, motivated by the desire to remain
in office (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Therefore, if backlash reduces the
public’s resolve, then leaders will face political pressure to fall in-line with the public’s
wishes for a more dovish foreign policy. In accordance with this view, much scholarly
research has found evidence that public opinion constrains, to some extent, leaders’
foreign policies, including in non-democracies (e.g., Sobel 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002;
Weeks 2008; 2012; Turbowitz 2011; Baum and Potter 2015; Payne 2019).
The second mechanism––selection––refers to the fact that the public may directly elect more dovish leaders, at least in democracies. In a conjoint experiment
conducted on the Israeli and American publics, Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo (2020)
find strong evidence that a politician’s security policy significantly affects their electoral prospects. Gartner, Segura, and Barratt (2004) also find that incumbent Senators in states that experienced higher casualties in the Vietnam War received a lower
share of the vote—in accordance with the selection mechanism—though this effect
was reduced when the incumbent opposed the war—in line with the responsiveness
mechanism. Karol and Miguel (2007) find a similar effect at the presidential level, as
George W. Bush received a lower percentage of the vote in states that had greater
casualties in the Second Iraq War. Overall, this effect cost Bush 2 percentage points
of the national popular vote. A similar dynamic also hurt Republican Senate (Kriner
and Shen 2007) and House (Grose and Oppenheimer 2007) candidates in the 2006
midterm election. Chu and Recchia (2021) conduct an experiment directly on members of the United Kingdom parliament and find that public opinion impacts the
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foreign policies they are willing to support. Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo (2020) find
a similar dynamic in an experiment conducted on members of the Israeli parliament.
As with backlash, the best direct indicator of reduced resolve among the public is
polling.19
How exactly can backlash to a previous war reduce future resolve? Does it do
so through rational mechanisms––like Bayesian updating––or through psychological
mechanisms? In other words, are decision-making elites and the public rational actors
that carefully conduct cost-benefit analyses in order to learn from past wars (e.g.,
Allison 1971), or do psychological tendencies and shortcuts determine how individuals
learn from past conflicts?20 Although this is an important debate in political science,
both arguments are consistent with my theory that backlash can reduce a state’s
resolve and ultimately its reputation for resolve.
On the rational updating side, the experience of war may reasonably shift the
public and decision-making elites’ view of their interests by impacting their assessments of the benefits and costs of war. Members of the public and decision-making
elites may not truly understand the terrible costs of war until they experience it for
themselves in a vivid manner by seeing their loved ones come home in caskets or
seeing daily death tolls on television. They may thus rationally update their beliefs
about the costs of war and become less willing to engage in future conflicts. Scholars,
for example, have found that traumatic foreign policy events can alter beliefs (e.g.,
Renshon 2008; Blattman 2009; Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015; DiCicco
and Fordham 2018). After a conflict, individuals may also update their beliefs about
when war is “worth it,” and come to the conclusion that they had previously overesti-

19

On the other hand, this indicator potentially becomes less valuable in non-democracies, where the
accuracy of polling may be diminished due to social desirability bias and other factors.

20

See Levy (2013) for an overview of the role of psychology in international relations.
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mated the benefits of war. Utilizing survey experiments, Kertzer (2016) finds that the
costs and benefits of war affect individual-level resolve, as I argue here. Historically,
these dynamics have also ostensibly led to war-weariness. For example, after initially
supporting the Second Iraq War—which may have been motivated, at least in part, by
concerns about the US’ reputation (Butt 2019)—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
concluded in 2011: “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again
send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should
have his head examined.” A strategic guidance document produced by the United
States Department of Defense and approved by the White House said,
“In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States
will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation
to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force
commitments to stability operations...U.S. forces will no longer be sized
to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (Department of Defense 2012, 6).
Jimmy Carter said, “young Americans should never again be sent to die in
battle unless own nation is endangered” in the wake of “the unhappy experience in
Vietnam and Cambodia” (Yarhi-Milo 2018, 128). Even relatively hawkish leaders like
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush believed Vietnam had undermined America’s
resolve. Reagan said,
“Frankly, there was another reason I wanted secrecy [for the Grenada invasion]. It was what I call the ‘post-Vietnam syndrome,’ the resistance
of many in Congress to the use of military force abroad for any reason,
because of our nation’s experience in Vietnam...We were already running
into this phenomenon in our efforts to halt the spread of communism in
Central America, and some congressmen were raising the issue of ‘another
Vietnam’ in Lebanon while fighting to restrict the president’s constitutional powers as commander in chief” (Reagan 2011, 451).
Similarly, President George H.W. Bush proclaimed after the Gulf War, “...by
God, we’ve licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all” (Mueller 2011). There is
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also evidence of war-weariness among elites following the Korean War. In 1954, when
President Eisenhower wanted Congressional authorization to conduct air strikes in
Dien Bien Phu in support of the French, Congressional leaders declined due to the
experience in Korea. As Secretary of State Dulles recounted, “The feeling was unanimous [among Congressional leaders] that we want no more Koreas with the United
States furnishing 90% of the manpower” (Petersen and Glennon 1982, 1224). The fact
that so many leaders either believed in—or were afflicted with—the Korea, Vietnam,
and Iraq “syndromes” provides at least some evidence that it was a real phenomena.
It was also no accident that the relatively dovish Jimmy Carter was elected after
the Vietnam War and Barack Obama was elected after the Second Iraq War, both of
whom campaigned against these “bad” wars. Although there is a situational aspect to
calculating the costs and benefits of war, meaning that this estimate will depend on
the particular circumstances surrounding a potential conflict, calculating costs and
determining whether a war is in the national interest is subjective and changes over
time based on prevailing social norms and ideas (e.g., Finnemore 2004; Kertzer 2016,
33). Therefore, backlash to a past war could cause a longer-term and stable change
in how members of the public and decision-making elites calculate costs and benefits.
On the psychological side, one important reason why a past war can reduce
the public’s and decision-making elites’ future resolve is negativity bias, which is the
well-established “inclination [of people] to learn from failures more than successes”
(Johnson and Tierney 2019, 138). Relatedly, the memory of a costly war may stick
in people’s minds as a reference point and cause them to inflate their estimates of a
subsequent war’s costs (Roskin 1974; Khong 1992). These two dynamics can also be
reinforcing. For example, consider the Ogaden War starting in 1977 between Somalia and Ethiopia, where the Soviet Union supported Somalia. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
President Carter’s national security advisor, believed Soviet intervention was a test
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of American credibility and wanted the US to respond strongly. In one memo written
by Brzezinski where he made the argument the US needed a strong demonstration
of resolve to establish its credibility, Carter caustically wrote in the margins, “Like
Mayaguez???,” along with other critical comments accentuated with three question
marks (Yarhi-Milo 2018, 145-146). Mayaguez refers to an incident where President
Gerald Ford used force against a Cambodian ship in an attempt to enhance the United
States’ credibility in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Carter, a strong opponent
of the Vietnam War, clearly used the Mayaguez incident as a reference point in order
to justify a relatively dovish policy. In other words, the Mayaguez incident seemingly reduced his resolve, and the dynamics of negativity bias may have made this
a particularly salient reference point for Carter. More generally, to this day, people
frequently ask whether a potential conflict is “another Vietnam.”
Psychological mechanisms also ostensibly explain how the First Lebanon War
reduced Israeli resolve in the Second Lebanon War. In what some have called “Israel’s Vietnam,” Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 with grand aspirations to crush the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and install a new regime in Lebanon that
would be willing to make peace with Israel (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 41-43; O’Shea
1998). Although Israel did weaken the PLO and expel it from Lebanon, they were
unable to destroy the PLO as a political force and the attempt at internal political
change was unsuccessful. In 1985, with its military efforts faltering, over 1,200 Israeli
soldiers killed, and domestic and international opposition growing, Israel pulled back
to the so-called “security zone,” which was an over 300 square mile area in southern
Lebanon (Levy 2011). For the next 15 years Israel remained in the security zone and
fought against various militant groups, especially Iranian-backed Hezbollah, which
resulted in over 250 additional Israeli soldiers dying and almost 900 being wounded
(Kaye 2002, 570). In 2000, in part because of domestic protest movements against the
54

continued conflict and in part for other strategic reasons, Israel unilaterally withdrew
from Lebanon in the middle of the night (Hermann 2009, 170-171).
The trauma and backlash to the First Lebanon War reduced Israeli resolve
in the Second Lebanon War. This second conflict was triggered on July 12, 2006,
when Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
immediately promised a “thundering” response, and the cabinet quickly approved
the decision to go to war (Harel and Issacharoff 2008, 76-77). However, Israel’s
trauma from the First Lebanon War caused it to rely overwhelmingly on airpower and
strongly resist a ground operation, which significantly reduced Israel’s performance
in the Second Lebanon War. In a discussion with former Israeli minister of defense
Moshe Arens a few weeks into the war, Olmert reportedly “explained that if the
IDF attempted a ground offensive, the masses would take to the streets in Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv in protest against the government” (Harel and Issacharoff 2008, 172).
Arens’ impression was that Olmert “was scared of returning to the Lebanon 1982
period, when Israeli soldiers got stuck in enemy land for years. The fear of getting
bogged down in the Lebanese quagmire paralyzed him, Arens thought” (Harel and
Issacharoff 2008, 172). In other words, backlash to the First Iraq War among the
Israeli public impacted Israeli resolve via the mechanism of “responsiveness” discussed
above. The Winograd Commission, which was created by the Israeli government
after the end of the Second Lebanon War, also concluded that that the “psychological
effects of the ‘Lebanese quagmire’ images [(from the First Lebanon War)], as well as
the anticipation of a negative public reaction to a deep penetration into Lebanon”,
“were at the heart of the prime minister’s objection to a ground operation” (Siniver
and Collins 2015, 227).
It was not only Olmert whose resolve was negatively affected by the experience
of the First Lebanon War, but also other key members of the Israeli cabinet. Amir
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Peretz, who was the Israeli Defense Minister at the time, said the following in an
interview a few months after the end of the conflict:
“...no one was eager to bring in, to confrontation zones, land forces. Especially, not as the Lebanese trauma is hovering over everybody’s head.
The truth needs to be said. The trauma of exiting Lebanon was hovering over the heads of the Cabinet ministers and some of the leaders of
the Army. It delayed the decision on land intervention...Most [ministers]
reiterated once and again their adamant opposition to a large scale land
intervention” (Merom 2008, 22).
The Winograd Commission summed it up best by saying: “it seems that Israel
went to war without being prepared to pay the price of war” (Siniver and Collins
2015, 227).
Since both the rational and psychological mechanisms can be consistent with my
theory, I am agnostic about which is more accurate and do not attempt to disentangle
these logics in my empirics.21
Another relevant question is whether these dynamics—and thus my theory in
general—can only operate in democratic countries, or can also occur in autocracies.
Given that non-democracies oftentimes do not hold elections, hold only sham elections, or hold elections so tightly regulated they do not give voters much choice at
all, critics might wonder whether public opinion is actually a component of a state’s
resolve in autocracies. Although it is likely the case that public opinion plays a much
more significant role in democracies than autocracies, meaning this mechanism of
DRT is more likely to hold in the former than the latter, public opinion does play a
role in autocracies. After all, if autocrats are not responsive at all to public opinion,
then they risk losing support and triggering violent or non-violent actions against their
regimes. In accordance with this view, a growing body of literature demonstrates that
21

See Kertzer (2016) for a thorough decomposition.
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autocratic regimes do respond to public opinion, even in the realm of foreign policy
(e.g., Weeks 2008; Reilly 2011; Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016; Truex 2016; Meng, Pan,
and Yang 2017; Li and Chen 2021; Lueders 2021). Of course, it should be noted that
misinformation and disinformation presented to the public, especially in autocracies
where the government often controls the media, could reduce the chances of backlash to a war if the state minimizes the amount of negative information presented to
the public. Nevertheless, some costs of war—like dead, maimed, or psychologically
traumatized soldiers—are impossible to fully hide from family and friends. Moreover,
as I will show in Chapter 5 when discussing the impact of the Nye Committee on
American public opinion after World War I, misinformation and disinformation can
also increase rather than decrease the chances of backlash and war-weariness. Finally,
it is also important to note that in autocracies, backlash to a war among leaders can
still reduce a country’s resolve. In fact, while the public opinion pathway of DRT
may be weaker in autocracies than democracies, the leader pathway may be stronger
given the increased power decision-making elites are conferred in non-democracies.
Take Russia for example. Following the shock of the disastrous Crimean War in
the 1850’s, Russia adopted a policy of retrenchment that involved a reduction in military spending and military commitments, a greater focus on domestic development,
and a greater reliance on allies (MacDonald and Parent 2018). For example, Russian
Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov told the Tsar Russia would “have to focus persistently on the realization of [its] internal development and the entire foreign policy
[would] have to be subordinated to this main task” (Splidsboel-Hansen 2002, 380).
One of Gorchakov’s principal advisors similarly said, “The development of [Russia’s]
internal life, her productive resources, her prosperity, her culture, her commerce, her
industry [are] all things which require peace. Her foreign policy should thus be purely
preventative and defensive” (Tuminez 2000, 110). Likewise, scholars have argued and
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provided evidence for the contention that the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan in
the 1980’s undermined is resolve and willingness to intervene in Eastern Europe in
1989, the events of which ultimately led to the USSR’s collapse (e.g., Arnold 1993;
Chafetz 1993; Bennett 2005). While the Soviet government tried to hide the high
casualty numbers as a result of the Afghan war in order to minimize backlash, you
cannot hide tens of thousands of casualties and, ultimately, public opinion turned
against the war (Arnold 1993, 196). The Afghanistan fiasco also changed how policymakers thought about the utility of military force. In discussions about whether
to invade Poland or not in 1989 in response to revolutionary activity, comments such
as “one Afghanistan is enough for us” were made by high-level Soviet officials (Bloom
2004, 291). None of these examples are dispositive, but provide suggestive evidence
that the mechanisms of DRT can operate in autocracies as well as democracies.
In sum, given that backing down can allow a state to avoid the specter of
war-weariness, this discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H1 (War-Weariness Hypothesis): Conditional on there being significant backlash to a war, standing firm in a past crisis can
reduce a state’s future resolve compared to backing down.
Establishing this hypothesis is an important micro-foundation for my larger
argument that fighting does not necessarily maximize a state’s reputation for resolve.
However, existing research on the war-weariness hypothesis has yielded mixed results.
Most large-n statistical studies have found little or no evidence of war-weariness reducing the propensity of states to engage in armed conflicts. Garnham (1986) examined
Britain, France, and the US and found that after experiencing a relatively costly war,
these states were no less likely to be involved in a subsequent war. Levy and Morgan
(1986) surveyed wars between great powers from 1500 to 1975 and found that great
powers who became involved in a war with another great power were no less likely
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to be involved in a subsequent war. Moreover, the likelihood of being involved in a
subsequent war is not affected by the severity of the previous war. Pickering (2002)
studied 66 states from 1946 to 1996 and found evidence that interventions actually increased as states fought more past wars. This provides some evidence for the so-called
“never again” (Mercer 1996, 40) or “reassertion” (Stapleton 2014, 23-25) hypothesis,
which posits that after an unsuccessful war states will be more rather than less likely
to use military force. States may react this way because losing can create a desire for
revenge, like the Germans after World War I (Levy and Morgan 1986, 28), or because
they want to demonstrate their resolve out of fear that other states will try and take
advantage of their possible war-weariness (Jervis 1998, 266-271). Obviously, if states
are more likely to be aggressive after enduring a costly war, then that would contradict H1 . Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) also find no evidence for the contention
that the United States was less likely to intervene in an interstate dispute in the years
following the end of a major war.
On the qualitative side, Stapleton (2014; 2015) analyzed whether the warweariness hypothesis applied to America after the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and
to the Soviet Union after its Afghanistan War. He found that these costly wars did
not diminish the likelihood of the US and USSR becoming involved in a subsequent
military conflict. Nevertheless, he did find that participating in a costly war reduces
a state’s willingness to engage in costly interventions. For example, he finds that
after the Korean War, the US was more likely to utilize relatively cheap airstrikes, as
opposed to boots on the ground, in a potential 1954 intervention in Indochina. That
participating in a costly war reduces a state’s willingness to engage in costly interventions, rather than interventions in general, seems to jibe with America’s experience
after the costly and weariness-inducing Second Iraq War. Under President Obama,
the US employed military force in a plethora of different countries (e.g., Afghanistan,
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Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen), but resisted the temptation to
engage in a new, costly ground war similar to Iraq.22 It also fits with Israel’s overreliance on airpower in the Second Lebanon War.
In a survey of elite opinion (e.g., business executives, lawyers, State Department
officials, etc.), DiCicco and Fordham (2018) found evidence that consistent critics and
converted critics of the Vietnam War (i.e., those alive at the time of the conflict) were
more likely in later years to adopt relatively dovish foreign policy views, providing
some evidence for the war-weariness hypothesis at the individual-level.23 Overall,
the mixed findings in previous literature suggest more work is needed in order to
adjudicate the war-weariness hypothesis.

Reputation for Resolve
The third and final element of my argument relates to reputation for resolve. As
noted previously, I agree with HRT that backing down in the moment of decision–all
else equal —should undermine a state’s reputation for resolve:
H2 (Backing Down Reputation Costs Hypothesis): Backing down
in a past crisis should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve
relative to fighting, all else equal.
In other words, there are reputation costs associated with declining to fight. I
call these “backing down reputation costs.” Unlike audience costs, which are costs to
a leader’s domestic approval, backing down costs are costs to a country’s reputation
for resolve (Tomz 2007; Kertzer and Brutger 2016). By contrast, SRT would expect
backing down to have no significant effect.
22

Although President Obama did approve the surge in Afghanistan, this was a pre-existing conflict
and the public announcement of a withdrawal date was a signal that the US was not willing to bear
the same level of costs that it did in Iraq.

23

This effect dissipates by the end of the Cold War.
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Yet, unlike HRT, I argue that there can also be reputation costs associated
with fighting. Specifically, wars that lead to significant backlash and war-weariness
among the public and/or leaders should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve relative
to those that do not. As illustrated in Figure 1, backlash to a war can undermine
a state’s reputation for resolve through two mechanisms. First, even if backlash
does not lead to war-weariness (i.e., a reduction in Country A’s resolve), it can still
degrade its reputation for resolve if other states observe this backlash and interpret
it as a negative signal of State A’s resolve. After all, disapproval with a previous
war may reasonably suggest that State A will be less likely to risk and endure costs
in the future. Second, if backlash does lead to war-weariness, and this reduction
is observed, at least partially,24 then that should necessarily lead to a reduction in
A’s reputation for resolve. McManus (2017), for example, demonstrates that the
presence of more dovish veto players among the policy-making elite—perhaps due to
war-weariness—will make statements of resolve by leaders less effective at influencing
adversaries.
However, a skeptic might ask why would a foreign country—and especially an
adversary—view public statements, official policy documents/platforms, or private
statements indicating backlash and/or war-weariness as credible? Isn’t talk cheap?
Not necessarily. First, prior literature demonstrates that public statements by leaders
can be credible due to the prospect of “inconsistency costs” (Kertzer and Brutger
2016). These are the domestic political costs leaders pay for saying one thing at time
t and then doing a different thing at time t + 1. For example, if a leader promises
they will stay out of a specific conflict or a general type of conflict, then breaking
this promise could lead to domestic political punishment among citizens that dislike

24

While public polls, public statements by elites, etc. are clearly observable, the true views of a
country’s principal decision-makers may differ from these proxies.
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inconsistency.25 These kinds of promises may thus tie leaders’ hands, at least to some
extent, since they will face costs if they break their commitments (Fearon 1997). Even
in non-democracies, leaders can face domestic political costs for saying one thing and
doing another (Weeks 2008). If this dynamic holds, then the public statements made
by leaders could be viewed as credible by foreign audiences because deviating from
them is costly for leaders. In line with this view, Heffington (2018) shows that the
statements made by political parties in their election manifestos accurately predicts
how aggressively they will act once in office.
Second, prior work demonstrates that leaders can tie their hands “behind closed
doors;” in other words, when statements are made privately rather than publicly
(Yarhi-Milo 2013). When assurances are made to adversaries privately—for example,
a promise not to use force—then that statement may be viewed as credible by the
foreign state because if they were to leak this assurance, then that could lead to
political costs for the leader making the assurance among domestic audiences that
oppose this policy.26 A similar dynamic may hold when a leader makes private
statements to domestic elites. If these statements are leaked, then that could result
in political costs. For instance, then vice president Joe Biden privately cautioned
President Obama against carrying out the operation that ultimately killed Osama
Bin Laden, and when this private statement was leaked it was used as a political
weapon against Biden during the 2020 presidential campaign.
Third, Sartori (2005) establishes that talk can be costly rather than cheap not
just due to the prospect of political costs among domestic audiences, but also because

25

Traditionally, inconsistency costs are associated with threatening to engage in a specific conflict and
then deciding to back down, but the logic could reasonably apply to the opposite as well.

26

Leaders may attempt to deny these leaks, though not all audiences will necessarily believe these
denials and the leak could be corroborated by other domestic actors that are privy to the secret
negotiations, such as diplomatic or intelligence officials.
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of costs among international audiences. Specifically, if states develop a reputation for
dishonesty, then their threats will be viewed less credibly than if they develop a reputation for honesty. For example, because China had previously made lots of dishonest
threats—that is, bluffs—regarding Taiwan, the United States did not believe the Chinese government’s (sincere) threat that they would enter the Korean War if American
and allied forces crossed the 38th parallel. Consequently, the incentives states have
to develop reputations for honesty may make public or private statements indicating
backlash and/or war-weariness more credible.
Finally, the bargaining model of war suggests that states have incentives to lie
about their resolve, and, in particular, exaggerate their resolve (Fearon 1995). Doing
so enhances states’ bargaining positions and may enable them to more effectively
coerce their adversaries. Therefore, when states indicate publicly or privately that
their resolve is actually relatively low, then that may be a particularly credible signal
that they are telling the truth since they are foregoing the aforementioned benefits of
exaggerating their resolve.
Skeptics might also question whether foreign governments will pay attention to
public opinion in their adversaries in order to assess resolve. Nevertheless, empirical
studies suggest that they do, at least in some circumstances. For example, North
Vietnamese leaders followed public opinion quite closely in the United States during
the Vietnam War and often viewed it as a constraint on America’s resolve (McManus
2017, 181-182). In a meeting in 1965, the Communist Party Central Committee
concluded, “The American imperialists are the strongest economic and military power
in the imperialist camp...the domestic situation in the United States, however, will
not allow them to fully utilize their economic and military power in their war of
aggression” (Military History Institute of Vietnam 2002, 171).
In sum, while HRT assumes State A’s resolve is exogenous to the choice about
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whether to fight or back down in the initial moment of decision, my key intervention is
to endogenize resolve into my theory and treat it as a variable rather than a constant.
This logic suggests the following hypothesis:
H3 (War-Weariness Reputation Costs Hypothesis): Wars that
lead to significant backlash/war-weariness should reduce a state’s
reputation for resolve relative to those that do not.
In other words, under certain conditions, there are reputation costs associated
with deciding to fight. I call these “war-weariness reputation costs.” HRT, by comparison, does not analyze this possibility when considering the efficacy of choosing
to fight or back down, and SRT would not expect this hypothesis to hold given the
alleged irrelevance of past actions to a state’s future reputation.
Overall, then, there are reputational advantages associated with fighting—
avoiding backing down costs—and reputational disadvantages—possibly incurring
war-weariness costs. Therefore, in cases where fighting leads to backlash and warweariness, the net impact of fighting comes down to which of the following countervailing effects are greater: (1) the positive reputation for resolve signal of choosing
to fight in the initial moment of decision, or (2) the negative reputational signal of
backlash and war-weariness. As Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler (2021, 170) said, “It
is plausible, for example, to argue that although the Vietnam War may have revealed something about the American type, it also changed it and made the United
States less likely to behave similarly in the future, even under similar circumstances.”
The first signal about America’s type—not backing down—is what HRT focuses on,
whereas the second signal about America’s type—war-weariness that developed in
response to the conflict—is central to the argument of DRT. The weak version of
my argument is that the effects will countervail each other such that fighting has no
reputation for resolve advantages relative to backing down:
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H4,W eak (War-Weariness vs. Backing Down Weak Hypothesis):
Conditional on fighting leading to backlash/war-weariness, standing firm should have no significant effect on a state’s reputation
for resolve compared to backing down.
The stronger version of my argument would hold that (2) outweighs (1) such
that backing down is actually preferable to fighting from a reputation perspective:
H4,Strong (War-Weariness vs. Backing Down Strong Hypothesis): Conditional on fighting leading to backlash/war-weariness,
standing firm should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve compared to backing down.
If either hypothesis were to hold, then that would significantly bring into question the central implication of HRT, which is that states should stand firm in conflicts
in order to enhance their reputation for resolve. Of course, HRT and SRT would expect different hypotheses to hold. HRT would expect the positive signal of fighting
in the moment of decision to enhance a state’s reputation for resolve, regardless of
whether backlash and war-weariness to a conflict occurs. SRT would expect that past
actions have little to no effect on a state’s reputation for resolve, meaning the whole
enterprise of reputation theory is suspect. Though this means that H4,Strong would be
inconsistent with SRT, H4,W eak would actually be observationally equivalent to the
predictions of SRT. Nonetheless, the logic leading to an aggregate null effect of past
actions on future reputation for resolve (H4,W eak ) is quite different for DRT than it
is for SRT. For the former, the null effect is driven by countervailing reputation for
resolve costs (the positive impact of not backing down and the negative impact of
war-weariness), whereas for the latter it is driven by the fact that past actions do not
have any significant impact on a state’s reputation for resolve. How can we determine
which of these two different stories is more accurate if empirical support is found for
H4,W eak ? If empirical evidence is found for H2 and H3 , which are clearly inconsistent
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with the logic of SRT, then we’ll know H4,W eak is driven by the logic of DRT rather
than SRT.
A final implication of DRT is that conditional on significant backlash and/or
war-weariness occurring, standing firm should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve
relative to avoiding getting into a dispute at all. If states can avoid getting into
a dispute by refraining from making promises or threats to intervene, then they
can avoid the negative reputational costs of backing down and war-weariness costs.
Since avoiding getting into a dispute is neutral, it should thus be preferable from a
reputation for resolve perspective.
H5 (War-Weariness vs. No Dispute Hypothesis): Conditional on
fighting leading to backlash/war-weariness, standing firm should
reduce a state’s reputation for resolve compared to avoiding getting into a dispute at all.
For example, if the US government had not made any commitment to prevent communist forces from gaining control over Vietnam, then it may have paid no
reputation costs for not getting involved in the conflict.27

Conclusion
To summarize, DRT involves a two-step argument. In the first step, fighting
rather than backing down can lead to war-weariness and thus a reduction in a state’s
actual resolve.28 This step, in which resolve is treated as a dependent variable, can
be thought of as the mechanism of DRT. In the second step, a reduction in resolve
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Of course, if adversaries perceive an implicit commitment, then not getting involved in a conflict
may still result in reputation costs. In any case, official and public commitments should heighten
these costs (Snyder 1961, 37).

28

Or, more modestly, fighting may only lead to backlash, but not war-weariness.
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undermines a state’s reputation for resolve.29 This step, in which resolve is treated
as an independent variable and reputation for resolve a dependent variable, can be
thought of as the main effect of DRT. This two-stage argument and structure follows
from Kertzer’s project (2016), where resolve is first treated as a dependent variable
and then an independent variable. The subsequent chapters will test this argument,
starting with step one and then moving on to step two.
While DRT differs from SRT and HRT in important ways, it does not invalidate
or fully contradict either of them. In contrast to SRT, DRT does not assert that past
actions have no impact on estimates of a state’s future resolve. On the other hand,
DRT does not dispute SRT’s (at least implicit, if not explicit) contention that there
are certain circumstances where past actions may have a smaller impact on a state’s
credibility in a current crisis (e.g., after longer periods of time, when the issue-areas
differ, etc.). Contrary to HRT, DRT argues that the reputation for resolve benefits
of standing firm rather than backing down are much more uncertain. Yet, DRT also
concedes that backing down, all else equal, does harm a state’s reputation for resolve.
Moreover, while the reputation costs of backing down are universal (though their size
may vary), the reputation for resolve costs associated with fighting are conditional
on backlash and/or war-weariness occurring. Consequently, while DRT, HRT, and
SRT can be considered distinct theories with their own set of predictions, they also
overlap and can be (somewhat) complementary.
I now turn to Part II of my argument, which involves testing the mechanism of
DRT by analyzing the impact fighting can have on a state’s actual resolve.
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Alternatively, backlash alone may reduce a state’s reputation for resolve.
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Part II: Testing the Mechanism of
Dovish Reputation Theory – The
Impact of Fighting on Resolve
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Chapter 3: Experimental Evidence
Among the Public
In order to establish the key mechanism of my argument, this chapter analyzes
whether backlash to a past war can reduce a state’s future resolve (War-Weariness
Hypothesis). As discussed in Chapter 2, previous quantitative and qualitative research
on this topic has yielded mixed results (Garnham 1986; Levy and Morgan 1986;
Pickering 2002; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Stapleton 2014, 2015; DiCicco and
Fordham 2018). This means that support for the argument that participation in past
wars can reduce a state’s future resolve would be an important contribution on its
own right, in addition to bolstering my larger argument about DRT.
To begin analyzing this question, I utilize an experimental approach, which has
never been used previously to test the war-weariness hypothesis. Following Kertzer
(2016), this experiment is conducted on the public given the important connection
between public opinion and a state’s aggregate level of resolve, especially in democracies. I opt for an experimental test rather than an analysis of public polling data
because the latter entails significant causal identification challenges. War, obviously,
cannot be randomly assigned due to feasibility and ethical concerns. Since the circumstances of a past war are fixed in real-life, it is difficult to identify whether individual
resolve would be greater if the war had not taken place or involved a different set of
circumstances. There are also a plethora of confounders in real-world scenarios that
are difficult to observe and control for. By contrast, in an experimental setting the
circumstances of a past war can be randomly varied in order to analyze how different
types of conflicts or the lack of conflict affects future resolve, and salient factors can
be controlled for to rule out confounding.
69

The results of the experiment support my hypothesis: standing firm in a past
crisis can reduce a state’s future resolve compared to backing down. As expected,
this effect is large—over 11 percentage points—in cases where backlash is most likely
(the goal is internal political change, the costs are high, and the outcome is defeat)
and null in cases where backlash is least likely (the goal is restraining foreign policy
aggression, the costs are relatively low/moderate, and the outcome is victory).
Overall, these results mean that in contrast to the assumptions of HRT that
resolve is fixed, choosing to fight in the moment of decision rather than backing
down can undermine a state’s resolve. They also build on and extend Kertzer’s
(2016) work by demonstrating that past actions and experiences can impact how
individuals assess the costs and benefits of a future war, which Kertzer identifies
as components of resolve. Policymakers should consequently consider two potential
downsides associated with engaging in conflicts. First, fighting may make it harder for
your state to engage in conflict in the future, as public opinion can provide political
constraints on using force. In other words, resolve may be somewhat of a scarce (even
if replenishable) resource that is diminished by prior conflicts. Choosing your battles,
then, is a concept that applies to war-making as well as parenting. Second, and more
closely related to DRT, if fighting in the past reduces a state’s actual resolve, then
it could reasonably reduce its reputation for resolve as well. If we consider war as
a kind of two-level game that takes place at the domestic and international level,
then choosing to fight rather than back down in the moment of decision can lead to
difficulties at both levels of the game in the future.

70

Experimental Design
In order to test the war-weariness hypothesis, I designed and administered a 3 x
3 between-subjects experiment on a representative sample of 716 Americans recruited
via Lucid in April 2020.30 Lucid generates representative samples based on age, gender, ethnicity, and region, and has been shown to perform well replicating previous
studies (Coppock and McClellan 2019; Peyton, Huber, and Coppock 2020). I also
block on respondent party identification to ensure approximately equal numbers of
Democrats and Republicans in each experimental condition.31 I conducted this experiment on members of the American public given the United States’ outsized role in
foreign affairs, which makes the views of American citizens substantively meaningful.
All respondents are presented the following introduction:
The following article describes a situation the United States could face in
the future.
Read the article carefully and imagine how you would feel about these
events if they were happening today.
Remember to read closely and pay attention, as you will be asked questions
to check your memory and comprehension.
In accordance with prominent experimental studies in international relations
conducted by Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013), Sagan and Valentino (2017), and
others (e.g., Jones 2019), respondents are then presented with a mock newspaper
article written by the Associated Press in order to make the experimental scenario
more realistic. The opening paragraphs of the article is the same for all respondents:
Three years ago today—on October 7, 2026—the Islamic State attempted
to set off a bomb in the Wilshire Grand Center building in downtown
30

See the appendix for the full survey instrument.

31

About 49.7% of respondents identified as Democrats and 49.3% as Republicans.
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Los Angeles. Luckily, the bomb failed to detonate, and no one was hurt.
After the attack, President John Richards (R) announced that, according
to U.S. intelligence, the dictatorial government of Yemen was providing
funding to the Islamic State.
The survey scenario takes place several years in the future after a hypothetical
second term by Donald Trump in order to distance the experiment from the current
political moment.32 I include the name and the partisan identification of the US
president in order to control for leader gender and political party across experimental
conditions (Schwartz and Blair 2020). The Wilshire Grand Center is an actual building in Los Angeles, increasing the realism of the survey scenario. The Islamic State
conducts the attack because it is widely known as a terrorist group and could plausibly carry out such an operation. Yemen is chosen as the source of the attack because
the Islamic State has a presence there and because the country is relatively unstable,
making it credible that a future government could indeed support the Islamic State.
In the remainder of the article, I experimentally vary whether the United States
government (1) declines to take military action in response to the attack (i.e., backs
down from using force); (2) launches a war in response to this attack and faces a
least-likely case for backlash; or (3) launches a war in response to this attack and
faces a most-likely case for backlash. In the first condition, survey subjects are told
that President Richards:
was imposing tough sanctions on Yemen. However, he declined to take
any military action against the country.
After three years, U.S. intelligence believes that the Yemeni government
continues to fund terrorists.

32

Besides noting that the scenario takes place in 2026, I also explicitly state that the president’s
name is “John Richards,” which should further distance the scenario from the Trump presidency in
respondents’ minds.
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Since it is implausible the US would have zero response to this attempted attack,
in the “backing down” condition sanctions—a commonly used foreign policy tool—
are imposed on Yemen, but no military action is taken. In other words, the US does
respond to the terrorist attack, but backs down from using military force, which LinGreenberg (2019) calls “backing up.” That the US backed down from a conflict over
the terrorist attack is further primed by the title of the article: “Should the U.S. Have
Responded More Forcefully to Attempted Los Angeles Terrorist Attack?” Consistent
with backing down conditions in other experimental studies (e.g., Renshon, Dafoe,
and Huth 2018), the US does not achieve its objectives as the Yemeni government
continues to fund terrorists.
By contrast, in the second condition the US launches a war in response to
the terrorist attack and faces a least-likely case for backlash because the objective
of the war is restraining foreign policy aggression, the costs of the war are low, and
the outcome of the war is victory. Restraining foreign policy aggression is primed
by telling respondents that “President Richards declared war on Yemen in order to
punish them for their support of the Islamic State and coerce them to break off all
relations with terrorists.” In other words, the goal of the intervention was not to
overthrow the regime, but to change their foreign policy. Low costs are primed by
informing respondents that the war leads to 400 dead US soldiers and $100 billion
spent, which are about the costs of the First Iraq War (Daggett 2010; DeBruyne
2018). Finally, victory is primed by telling subjects that:
After three years of fighting, the military operation was a success and is
now ending. Yemeni military targets were successfully destroyed, the government agreed to break off all relations with terrorists, and they turned
over valuable intelligence to the United States about the Islamic State.
The title of the article is also “Military Operation is a Huge Success” and a
picture is included of US soldiers returning home to applause.
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In the third condition, the US also launches a war, but faces a most-likely case
for backlash. Specifically, the objective of the war is internal political change, the
costs of the war are high, and the outcome of the war is defeat. Internal political
change is primed because President Richards “declared war on Yemen in order to
overthrow their government and install a democratic regime in its place.” The costs
of the war are high: 40,000 US soldiers die—similar to the Korean and Vietnam
Wars—and $1 trillion is spent—similar to the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Second
Iraq Wars (Daggett 2010; Trotta 2013; Mufson 2017; DeBruyne 2018). Lastly, defeat
is primed by telling respondents: “With the U.S. now leaving Yemen without having
been able to establish a stable democracy, many Americans are questioning whether
the war was really worth it. To further prime defeat and high costs, the title of
the article is “40,000 Dead and $1 Trillion Spent. But for What?” A picture is also
included of US soldiers returning home in a casket.
Overall, the treatments for the least-likely and most-likely case for backlash
condition are relatively strong. However, given the context of this experiment, I
believe it is appropriate to have relatively strong treatments. It is quite difficult to
experimentally prime the emotions associated with a war involving a most-likely case
for backlash. Such a conflict would likely involve months or years of television and
newspaper coverage of the war and its costs, and for some members of the public
personal connections to dead, injured, or traumatized soldiers. Thus, while strong
relative to a more bland survey vignette, these treatments are likely weak compared
to the equivalent real-world treatments.
Of course, it is also important to note that the real world is a more informationrich environment than survey experiments, which often make particular pieces of
information extremely salient. In this case, for example, the experiment makes the
costs or benefits of war especially vivid. In a real life version of, say, the most74

likely case for backlash condition, there would likely be more debate about whether
the military intervention was worth it, with some actors making an affirmative case
for the utility of the conflict. Given this general weakness associated with survey
experiments, I also demonstrate that the War-Weariness Hypothesis is robust to a
large-N statistical analysis of actual political manifestos in Chapter 4 and a historical
case study in Chapter 5. Future research could also see how effects change in the
presence of both pro and con arguments for the conflict. Still, these treatments can,
at the very least, establish whether it is plausible that past actions and experiences
cause a decrease in resolve under certain conditions.
After reading the article, respondents are presented with a subsequent international crisis and asked to what extent they would support US military intervention to
resolve the situation. Since support for engaging in a military intervention implicates
respondents’ willingness to risk and endure costs to achieve their objective, it can be
considered a measure of resolve. I also hold constant the US’ military capabilities in
all experimental conditions in order to analytically separate resolve and capabilities
per my definition of resolve.
Following Herrmann, Tetlock, and Viser (1999), as well as Flores-Macias and
Kreps (2017), there are three different types of international crises that subjects
are randomly assigned to: (1) a humanitarian crisis involving ethnic cleansing; (2)
a foreign country invading an ally of the US; and (3) the discovery of a clandestine
nuclear facility possessed by a country hostile to the US. These three scenarios cover a
range of different types of missions on the interest-values continuum and thus should
increase the external validity of the experiment by allowing me to probe whether
backlash from a past conflict can reduce resolve for a variety of different types of
future conflicts.
Overall, the experiment is a fully crossed 3 x 3 between-subjects design, and
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the experimental conditions are summarized in Table 2. Per the War-Weariness Hypothesis (H1 ), I expect that respondents assigned to the most-likely case for backlash
condition will be less resolved than those in the backing down condition. In other
words, backlash to an unpopular war can reduce a state’s actual resolve in the future
relative to backing down. Since H1 is conditional on significant backlash to a war, I do
not expect subjects in the least-likely case for backlash condition to be less resolved
than those in the backing down condition. In fact, they may be more resolved.

Table 2: Summary of Experimental Design
Crisis I

Crisis II

Backed Down

Humanitarian Crisis

Fought; Least-Likely Case for Backlash

Territorial Integrity Crisis

Fought; Most-Likely Case for Backlash

Nuclear Proliferation Crisis

Main Results
Table 3 displays respondents’ support for military action in Crisis II based on
the US’s action in Crisis I and the outcome of that crisis. In accordance with previous
studies, I collapse the 7-point measure of support for military action into a binary
measure in order to more clearly illustrate substantive effects. Substantively identical
results emerge with the full seven-point measure.33 In accordance with H1 , I find that
respondents assigned to the most-likely case for backlash condition are less resolved
than those in the backing down condition. Specifically, they are 11.2 percentage

33

See Table 5.
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points less likely to support subsequent military action (p < 0.01). In line with the
expectation that H1 will only hold conditional on there being significant backlash to
a war, I find no significant difference in resolve between subjects in the backed down
condition and subjects in the least-likely case for backlash condition.

Table 3: Evidence for the Existence of War-Weariness Among the Public
Action in
Previous
Conflict

Support for
Subsequent
Military Action (%)

Difference from
Backed Down
(Percentage Points)

Backed Down

44.1%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

43.2%

-0.9

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

32.9%

-11.2***

Note: Results depict percentage support for engaging in military action to alleviate
a humanitarian crisis, protect an ally, or combat a nuclear weapons program. * =
p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is
statistically different than 0.
Do results vary based on the nature of the follow-up mission? I analyze this
question in Table 4 and utilize the full 7-point scale because it is more representative
of the results than the binary measure.34 I find that respondents assigned to the mostlikely case for backlash condition are less resolved than those in the backing down
condition when Crisis II involves a humanitarian crisis or the invasion of an ally. There
is no significant difference—though the results are in the expected direction—when
Crisis II involves a nuclear proliferation crisis. Given that this condition involves a
34

Substantively similar results emerge when the binary measure is employed. See the appendix.
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more direct security threat to the US than a humanitarian crisis or the invasion of an
ally, it makes sense that respondents would be more willing to support military action
regardless of the outcome of a previous crisis. As expected, Table 4 also demonstrates
that there is no significant difference in resolve between subjects in the backing down
condition and subjects in the least-likely case for backlash condition, regardless of the
nature of the follow-up mission.

Table 4: Does War-Weariness Vary with the Nature of the Follow-Up
Mission?
Action in
Previous Conflict

Support for Subsequent
Military Action

Difference from
Backed Down

Backed Down

4.03

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.88

-0.15

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.69

-0.34*

Backed Down

4.35

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

4.43

0.08

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.82

-0.53**

Backed Down

4.12

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.79

-0.33

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.95

-0.17

Humanitarian Crisis

Invasion of an Ally

Nuclear Proliferation Crisis

Note: Results depict support for engaging in military action on a 7-point scale to
alleviate a humanitarian crisis, protect an ally, or combat a nuclear weapons program.
* = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support
is statistically less than 0.
78

Robustness & Internal Validity
To ensure the robustness of these findings, I take several steps. First, in Table
5 I show that the results hold when the full 7-point measure of resolve is utilized.

Table 5: 7-Point Measure of Support for Military Action
Action in
Previous Conflict

Support for Subsequent
Military Action

Difference from
Backed Down

Backed Down

4.17

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

4.05

-0.16

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.82

-0.34**

Note: Results depict support for engaging in military action on a 7-point scale to
alleviate a humanitarian crisis, protect an ally, or combat a nuclear weapons program.
* = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support
is statistically different than 0.
Second, I demonstrate in Table 6 that the results remain robust to dropping
respondents that failed the attention check. Third, I also show in Table 6 that the
results hold when weighting the sample to population demographics (Hainmueller
2012; Hainmueller and Zu 2012).35

35

Although Lucid samples are representative based on age, gender, ethnicity, and region, in this
analysis I also weight the data to be representative on education and income.
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Table 6: Dropping Manipulation Check Failures & Weighting Data to
Population Demographics
Action in
Previous
Conflict

Support for
Subsequent
Military Action (%)

Difference from
Backed Down
(Percentage Points)

Backed Down

45.7%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

46.5%

-0.8

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

32.0%

-13.6***

Backed Down

46.9%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

41.1%

-5.8

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

33.1%

-13.8***

Dropping Manipulation Check Failures

Weighting Data to Population Demographics

Note: Results depict percentage support for engaging in military action to alleviate
a humanitarian crisis, protect an ally, or combat a nuclear weapons program. * =
p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is
statistically different than 0.
Finally, Table 7 illustrates that the results remain robust in a regression context when controlling for other factors like respondent party identification, militant
assertiveness, gender, education, age, income, and race. Specifically, the negative and
statistically significant coefficients in Models 1 and 2 mean that respondents assigned
to the most-likely case for backlash condition are less willing to engage in military
action than those assigned to the backing down condition. There is no similar effect
for subjects assigned to the least-likely case for backlash condition.
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Table 7: Holding Other Factors Constant

Most-Likely Case for Backlash
Least-Likely Case for Backlash
Militant Assertiveness
Republican
Female
Education
Age
Income
White
Black
Perceived Chance of Victory
Constant
Observations
Note: ∗ p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

7-Point
DV
(1)

Binary
DV
(2)

−0.33∗∗
(0.14)

−0.57∗∗∗
(0.21)

7-Point
DV
(3)

Binary
DV
(4)

−0.05
(0.20)
0.73∗∗∗
(0.15)
0.10
(0.22)
−0.02
(0.20)
−0.02
(0.06)
−0.11
(0.08)
0.10
(0.07)
−0.71∗∗
(0.28)
−0.77∗
(0.40)
0.46∗∗∗
(0.12)
−3.74∗∗∗
(0.67)
494

0.70∗∗∗
(0.09)
0.03
(0.15)
−0.10
(0.14)
−0.0000
(0.0002)
−0.07
(0.05)
0.02
(0.04)
−0.29
(0.21)
−0.48∗
(0.27)
0.27∗∗∗
(0.07)
1.30∗∗∗
(0.41)

0.85∗∗∗
(0.15)
0.15
(0.22)
−0.20
(0.20)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.03
(0.08)
0.06
(0.07)
−0.36
(0.30)
−0.82∗
(0.42)
0.41∗∗∗
(0.12)
−4.33∗∗∗
(0.67)

−0.08
(0.14)
0.76∗∗∗
(0.09)
0.08
(0.15)
0.001
(0.14)
−0.0003
(0.0003)
−0.09
(0.06)
0.05
(0.05)
−0.35∗
(0.19)
−0.51∗
(0.27)
0.14∗
(0.08)
1.50∗∗∗
(0.41)

517

517

494

p<0.01
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I also control for the extent to which respondents believe the US is likely to
achieve its military objectives if it decided to involve itself in Crisis II. Although I hold
constant military capabilities across all of the experimental conditions, one potential
concern is that respondents assigned to the most-likely case for backlash condition
will believe that the US is less likely to achieve its military objectives in a subsequent
military conflict, leading to a lack of information equivalence across experimental
conditions (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018). If that is the case, then it could
be perceptions about the US’s chance of victory rather than respondent resolve per
se driving the results. Promisingly, there is no systematic evidence of confounding.
Respondents in the most-likely case for backlash condition were only slightly less
likely than those in the backing down condition to believe the US would achieve its
military objectives in a conflict with Country A (ρ ≈ -0.11). More importantly, the
results are robust to holding this factor constant in a regression.
Another potential concern is experimenter demand effects, which occur if respondents surmise researchers’ hypotheses and adjust their behavior to validate those
expectations. If respondents intuited that my focus was on whether a disastrous previous conflict reduces support for subsequent military intervention, then perhaps they
modified their behavior to validate that expectation. Although impossible to rule out,
prominent research by Mummolo and Peterson (2019) suggests respondents are often
unable to adjust behaviors to conform with researchers’ expectations. Thus, demand
effects are unlikely to bias my results.

Heterogeneous Effects
I now analyze whether the results vary based on respondent partisan identification and militant assertiveness, which have been shown to be key moderators
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in previous research (e.g., Herrmann, Tetlock, and Viser 1999; Kertzer and Brutger
2016; Brutger and Kertzer 2018). A priori, we might expect that individuals high in
militant assertiveness and Republicans would be less susceptible to war-weariness, as
they may be predisposed to discount information that clashes with their worldview;
for example, that war may be less beneficial and more costly than previously thought.
However, as shown in Tables 8 and 9, the basic results hold among both Democrats
and Republicans, as well as those high and low in militant assertiveness.36 There is
also no significant interactions between these variables and the treatments of interest
in a regression context. Thus, war-weariness in response to a costly and ineffective
war is not a phenomenon restricted solely to Democrats and those low in militant
assertiveness.

36

I utilize the median split to categorize respondents as low or high in militant assertiveness.
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Table 8: Does War-Weariness Vary by Level of Militant Assertiveness?
Action in
Previous
Conflict

Support for
Subsequent
Military Action (%)

Difference from
Backed Down
(Percentage Points)

Backed Down

24.2%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

28.0%

3.9

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

10.1%

-14.1***

Backed Down

58.5%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

53.8%

-4.6

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

45.5%

-13.0**

Low in Militant Assertiveness

High in Militant Assertiveness

Note: Results depict percentage support for engaging in military action to alleviate
a humanitarian crisis, protect an ally, or combat a nuclear weapons program. * =
p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is
statistically less than 0.
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Table 9: Does War-Weariness Vary by Party Identification?
Action in
Previous Conflict

Support for Subsequent
Military Action

Difference from
Backed Down

Backed Down

3.88

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.77

-0.11

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

3.54

-0.34**

Backed Down

4.47

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

4.35

-0.11

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

4.10

-0.37*

Democrats

Republicans

Note: Results depict support for engaging in military action on a 7-point scale to
alleviate a humanitarian crisis, protect an ally, or combat a nuclear weapons program.
* = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support
is statistically less than 0.
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Mechanisms
Finally, after measuring the dependent variable, I asked respondents several
questions in order to probe the mechanisms underlying my findings. The questions
primarily ask respondents about the costs and benefits of fighting in Crisis II, and
the results are displayed in Table 10.

Table 10: What are the Mechanisms of War-Weariness?
Agreement with
the statement that...

Most-Likely Case
for Backlash (%)

Backed Down
(%)

Difference
(Percentage Points)

The costs of intervening
outweigh the benefits

52.3%

39.3%

12.9***

It would cost a substantial
or enormous amount to win

56.8%

44.4%

12.3***

Intervening is slightly or not
at all in the American interest

39.2%

31.5%

7.7**

Backing down would harm America’s
reputation for toughness little or not at all

29.7%

24.1%

5.7*

Victory is unlikely if
America intervenes

14.4%

6.4%

8.0***

Note: Results depict percentage support for the statements. * = p<0.10, ** =
p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is statistically
greater than 0.
Per Kertzer (2016) and my definition of resolve, a greater estimate of the costs
and a lower estimate of the benefits of fighting should reduce individual-level resolve.
As expected, involvement in a previous war that is a most-likely case for backlash
increases estimates of a subsequent conflict’s costs and reduces estimates of its benefits
relative to backing down. For example, while just 39.3% of respondents assigned
to backed down condition agree that the costs of intervening in Crisis II outweigh
the benefits, 52.3%—a majority—of individuals in the most-likely case for backlash
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condition believe the costs outweigh the benefits. Similarly, respondents in the mostlikely case for backlash condition increase their estimates of how costly a subsequent
intervention would be and decrease their assessments of how much intervening is in the
American interest. Thus, involvement in a past war can shift the public’s estimates
of a future conflict’s costs, benefits, and the relative balance of the two.
Interestingly, respondents are also more likely to believe that backing down
would not harm America’s reputation for toughness in the most-likely case for backlash condition than in the backed down condition. In other words, the reputational
costs of backing down in Crisis II are seen as lower for those in the most-likely case for
backlash condition than the backed down condition. The implication being that fighting is more attractive to those in the backed down condition than in the most-likely
case for backlash condition. The explanation may be, at least partially, a reflection
of the never again hypothesis, as individuals may not want to back down twice for
fear of being perceived as less resolved. Finally, respondents in the most-likely case
for backlash condition believe that victory is less likely in Crisis II than those in the
backed down condition. Since the perceived chance of victory may also be related to
capabilities, I show that the main results are robust to controlling for this factor in a
regression, and I also controlled for relative capabilities in the scenario itself.
Finally, utilizing a regression approach to conduct causal mediation analysis, I
show in Tables 11 and 12 that the above factors do indeed help explain why experiencing a conflict involving a most-likely case for backlash reduces future resolve relative to
backing down in a previous conflict (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010; Imai, Keele, and
Yamamoto 2010; Hicks and Tingley 2011). Odd-numbered models in Table 11 analyze
the relationship between the key independent variable of interest—whether respondents were assigned to the most-likely case for backlash condition or the backed down
condition—and each respective mediator. Even-numbered models then analyze the
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relationship between each mediator and the dependent variable: support for military
action in Crisis II. For example, Model 1 shows that respondents in the most-likely
case for backlash condition were more likely than those in the backed down condition
to believe that the costs of intervening in Crisis II outweigh the benefits. Model 2
then shows that respondents who believed the costs outweighed the benefits were less
likely to support military action in Crisis II.37 These results illustrate the contribution of this project relative to Kertzer (2016). While he establishes that the costs
and benefits of war can impact a state’s resolve, he does not consider whether or how
past actions and experiences—such as war—affect these estimates. I show that the
experience of a prior war can increase estimates of future conflict’s cost and decrease
estimates of its benefits, thereby reducing an individual’s resolve.

Table 11: Mediation Analysis
Most-Likely Case for Backlash
Costs Outweigh Benefits

Costs Outweigh
Benefits
(1)
0.298∗∗∗
(0.0975)

High Costs

Mil
Action
(2)
-0.262∗∗
(0.130)
-0.456∗∗∗
(0.0588)

High
Costs
(3)
0.290∗∗∗
(0.0900)

Lower Interests

Mil
Action
(4)
-0.332∗∗
(0.136)
-0.227∗∗∗
(0.0666)

Low Reputation Interests

Low
Interests
(5)
0.117
(0.0934)

Mil
Action
(6)
-0.357∗∗∗
(0.133)

Low Reputation
Interests
(7)
0.122
(0.0956)

-0.348∗∗∗
(0.0631)

Republican
Female
Education
Age
Income
White
Black
Constant
Observations

-0.375∗∗∗
(0.0635)
-0.188∗
(0.106)
-0.185∗
(0.0971)
-0.000227
(0.000178)
-0.0481
(0.0391)
0.0168
(0.0324)
0.257∗
(0.149)
0.314
(0.196)
4.529∗∗∗
(0.264)
517

0.639∗∗∗
-0.160∗∗∗
(0.0869)
(0.0586)
-0.00636
-0.126
(0.140)
(0.0975)
-0.256∗∗
0.143
(0.129)
(0.0896)
-0.0000955 0.0000266
(0.000236) (0.000164)
-0.0969∗
-0.0734∗∗
(0.0519)
(0.0361)
0.0327
-0.0139
(0.0429)
(0.0299)
-0.196
-0.00970
(0.197)
(0.137)
-0.381
-0.0194
(0.260)
(0.181)
4.026∗∗∗
4.207∗∗∗
(0.439)
(0.243)
517
517

0.773∗∗∗
(0.0886)
0.0509
(0.146)
-0.140
(0.135)
0.0000141
(0.000246)
-0.0917∗
(0.0544)
0.0219
(0.0449)
-0.315
(0.206)
-0.528∗
(0.272)
2.916∗∗∗
(0.460)
517

-0.414∗∗∗
0.666∗∗∗
(0.0608)
(0.0902)
-0.114
0.0397
(0.101)
(0.144)
-0.0241
-0.181
(0.0930)
(0.132)
-0.000108 -0.0000294
(0.000170) (0.000242)
-0.0531
-0.0935∗
(0.0375)
(0.0533)
-0.0289
0.0150
(0.0310)
(0.0441)
-0.00767
-0.316
(0.142)
(0.202)
-0.221
-0.601∗∗
(0.188)
(0.267)
4.755∗∗∗
3.616∗∗∗
(0.253)
(0.468)
517
517

Victory
Unlikely
(9)
0.267∗∗∗
(0.0808)

Mil
Action
(10)
-0.326∗∗
(0.136)

-0.421∗∗∗
(0.0526)
-0.167∗
(0.0875)
0.250∗∗∗
(0.0804)
-0.0000828
(0.000147)
0.0209
(0.0324)
-0.0343
(0.0268)
0.0699
(0.123)
0.154
(0.163)
3.566∗∗∗
(0.219)
517

-0.270∗∗∗
(0.0741)
0.696∗∗∗
(0.0931)
0.0342
(0.146)
-0.105
(0.135)
-0.0000143
(0.000246)
-0.0694
(0.0541)
0.0158
(0.0448)
-0.294
(0.205)
-0.482∗
(0.271)
2.926∗∗∗
(0.450)
517

-0.250∗∗∗
(0.0625)

Victory Unlikely
Militant Assertiveness

Mil
Action
(8)
-0.368∗∗∗
(0.135)

-0.477∗∗∗
(0.0622)
-0.316∗∗∗
(0.103)
0.0944
(0.0951)
0.000218
(0.000174)
0.0427
(0.0383)
-0.0163
(0.0317)
0.0618
(0.146)
0.118
(0.192)
4.271∗∗∗
(0.258)
517

0.691∗∗∗
(0.0925)
0.000419
(0.147)
-0.149
(0.134)
0.0000624
(0.000246)
-0.0644
(0.0540)
0.0210
(0.0447)
-0.298
(0.205)
-0.494∗
(0.271)
3.029∗∗∗
(0.451)
517

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01

37

Note that while the mediators in Models 5 and 7 fall just short of conventional levels of statistical
significance (p < 0.21), both are significantly associated with lower support for military action.
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Table 12 then shows the average mediation effect and the percent of the total
effect mediated by each variable. The most important mediator was a respondent’s
cost-benefit analysis of participating in Crisis II, as this mediated approximately 34%
of the total effect.

Table 12: Average Causal Mediation Effects
Cost-Benefit
Analysis

Expected
Costs

Perceived
Interests

Reputational
Interests

Chance of
Victory

Average
Mediation Effect

-0.14

-0.07

-0.04

-0.03

-0.07

Total Effect

-0.40

-0.40

-0.40

-0.40

-0.40

Percent of Total
Effect Mediated

34.0%

16.5%

10.3%

7.7%

18.2%

Conclusion
In summary, this chapter makes two important contributions. First, although
previous research on the topic has yielded mixed—and frequently null—results, using
an experimental approach I show that a past war can lead to war-weariness and reduce
future resolve (Garnham 1986; Levy and Morgan 1986; Pickering 2002; Mullenbach
and Matthews 2008; Stapleton 2014, 2015; DiCicco and Fordham 2018). Given the
significant inferential challenges associated with of testing the War-Weariness Hypothesis with observational data, this test provides relatively strong evidence for this
hypothesis. This is especially the case because an online survey experiment should
be a hard-case for finding evidence of war-weariness, as replicating the experience of
wartime is extremely difficult. Second, these results provide important microfoundations for my larger argument that fighting may not maximize a state’s reputation for
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resolve relative to backing down. If fighting reduces a state’s actual resolve relative to
backing down under certain conditions, and this reduction in resolve can be observed,
at least partially, by foreign actors, then that means there exists negative reputation
for resolve costs associated with fighting.
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Chapter 4: Large-N Statistical
Evidence Among Political Parties’
Manifestos
The previous chapter demonstrates that backlash to a past war can undermine
the public’s future resolve, in accordance with the War-Weariness Hypothesis. In this
chapter, I analyze whether a similar dynamic also holds among decision-making elites.
As the dependent variable for my analysis, I use data from The Manifesto
Project (Volkens et al. 2020) to measure the relative hawkishness of political parties
in North America and Europe. This data, which measures the policy preferences
of political parties before elections, has been used by many prominent studies as a
measure of the foreign policy views of leaders and/or political parties (Whitten and
Williams 2011; Mattes 2012; Heffington 2018; Carter and Smith 2020). Empirically,
it has also been shown to accurately predict how aggressively leaders will act once in
office (Heffington 2018), and thus does actually measure elite resolve to some extent.
The independent variable in my analysis is the expected backlash from war.
It varies from 0 to 4 where 0 means a country has not participated in an interstate
war in the near past and 4 means they have participated in an interstate war in
the near past and backlash to the war is expected to be extremely high. Following
the discussion in Chapter 2, I utilize the principal policy objective, whether direct
security interests were involved, the costs of the war, and the outcome of the war in
order to code expected backlash.
My analysis builds on prior large-N studies on the war-weariness hypothesis
in several ways. First, many previous studies utilize relatively indirect measures of
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resolve like war participation or initiation, which can reflect factors besides resolve
such as a change in capabilities or the strategic situation. Instead, I use a more direct
measure: what politicians actually say their views on the military and foreign affairs
are. Second, some prior studies only examine correlations and do not include control
variables in their analysis, meaning they are at high risk for omitted variables bias
(Garnham 1986; Levy and Morgan 1986). I control for a wide range of possible confounders in my analysis, like economic growth and regime type. Third, prior studies
generally pool all observations in their main analyses, meaning that they compare variation between different countries. Although this approach enhances statistical power,
it can lead to confounding given the many differences between countries. By contrast,
I utilize fixed effects in my analysis, meaning I only leverage variation within political
parties rather than between them. Given that fewer factors differ within political parties than between them, this strategy increases the comparability of treatment and
control groups (each political party serve as its own control) and enhances internal
validity. Fourth, Garnham’s (1986) prominent study in particular has an extremely
small sample size—17 to 27 observations in his main analysis—which significantly reduces statistical power and external validity. By comparison, my main model includes
over 1,400 observations, each of which corresponds to a particular party in a specific
election year. Fifth, prior studies operationalize (what I call) expected backlash either
by only considering casualties (Levy and Morgan 1986), only considering winning or
losing (Pickering 2002), or looking at both in isolation (Garnham 1986). By contrast,
I also consider principal policy objective, which is arguably the most important factor
affecting backlash (Jentleson 1992), as well as whether direct security interests were
involved in the conflict. I then consider these factors in conjunction with costs and
outcome rather than looking at each separately.
In accordance with H1 , the War-Weariness Hypothesis, I find political parties
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adopt less hawkish foreign policy positions following wars that are more likely to lead
to backlash. This is an important finding supporting DRT because if participation in
a past war reduces elite hawkishness and resolve, then it could also reasonably reduce
a country’s reputation for resolve in the eyes of foreign countries. This is especially
the case because political parties’ manifestos are public and hence easily observable
by foreign actors.

Research Design
Dependent Variable: Measuring Hawkishness
In order to measure the policy positions of decision-making elites, I utilize
data on political parties’ election manifestos from The Manifesto Project (Volkens
et al. 2020). This dataset codes the policy preferences, principles, and statements—
including those related to foreign policy—of over 1,000 parties from over 50 democratic
countries, most of which are located in North America or Europe.38 The Manifesto
Project’s extensive temporal coverage—from about 1944 to 2019—makes it the most
comprehensive dataset available of elites’ stated foreign policy preferences and thus
ideal for this analysis. Although Carter and Smith’s (2020) dataset does have greater
temporal and geographic coverage, it only measures leaders’ latent willingness to use
force based on their background characteristics (e.g., religion, military experience,
and parental status) and political orientations. Therefore, it only proxies leaders’
willingness to use force, while the manifesto data is closer to a direct measure. In other
words, while my measure uses what political parties actually say about foreign policy

38

Only examining democratic countries does limit the external validity of my findings in this chapter,
and thus an avenue for future research would be to test whether the War-Weariness Hypothesis holds
in an analysis of statements made by political parties and/or leaders in autocratic countries.
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to construct a measure of hawkishness, Carter and Smith’s (2020) measure makes an
(informed) guess about a leader’s level of hawkishness using indirect measures like
whether a leader is an orphan, whether they are married, and whether they served in
the military. This latter approach can lead to some nonsensical codings of hawkishness
that decrease the measure’s face validity. For example, Carter and Smith’s (2020)
best-performing measure reports that Jimmy Carter had greater latent hawkishness
than Ronald Reagan.
More specifically, I utilize an aggregate measure of a party’s foreign policy
hawkishness that has been employed in previous research (Whitten and Williams
2011; Heffington 2018; Carter and Smith 2020). This measure is constructed using
three variables from The Manifesto Project. The first variable measures the relative
share of positive statements about the military or the use of force in relation to all
statements in a manifesto. For example, statements expressing the importance of
external security and the need to increase defense spending or the size of the military
would fall under this category. The second variable measures the share of negative
statements about the military, including the need to reduce military spending or
negative statements concerning the use of military power to solve conflicts. The third
and final variable measures the share of statements that emphasize using peaceful
means to solve conflicts. To the extent that political elites have a more negative view
of the military and prefer using peaceful rather than violent means to solve conflicts,
they may also be less willing to risk war and endure the costs of war. Table 13 shows
examples of statements that fall under these three headings from Republican and
Democratic party platforms. For instance, statements made by the Republican Party
in 2004 in support of an increase in defense spending and the decision to invade Iraq
are coded as positive statements about the military by The Manifesto Project. By
contrast, statements made by the Democratic Party in 2012 about the need to cut
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military spending and the “careless” decision to invade Iraq are coded as negative
statements about the military because they suggest skepticism about the use of force
and the utility of the military in general.
The aggregate measure of a party p’s hawkishness during election e is then
calculated by subtracting the negative military statements score and the statements
in support of peace score from the positive military statements score:
Hawkishnessp,e = Positive Statements about the Military – Negative Statements about the Military – Positive Statements about Peace
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Table 13: Examples of Party Manifesto Statements
Positive Statements about the Military: 2004 Republican Platform
• “These long-overdue budget increases help fulfill the President’s commitments
and ensure a fighting force that is second to none.”
• “Deploying missile defenses to defend the United States and its friends and
allies.”
• “As Republicans, we do not equivocate, as others have done, about whether
America should have gone to war in Iraq.”
• “We are confronting terrorists overseas so we do not have to confront them
here at home.”
Negative Statements about the Military: 2012 Democratic Platform
• “In our current fiscal environment, we must also make tough budgetary decisions across the board – and that includes within the defense budget.”
• “But President Obama has taken important steps to decrease America’s nuclear arsenal and is committed to further responsible reductions.”
• “Then-Senator Obama pledged during the 2008 campaign to responsibly end
the war in Iraq, saying it was imperative to ‘be as careful getting out as we
were careless getting in’ – and that is precisely what he has done.”
• “After more than a decade at war, we can focus on nation-building here at
home.”
Statements in Support of Peace: 2016 Democratic Platform
• “We will use all the tools of American power, especially diplomacy and development, to confront global threats and ensure war is the last resort.”
• “We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously
enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a
bomb without resorting to war.”
• “That is why we will promote peacebuilding, protect democracy, and champion human rights defenders.”
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Higher values of this measure indicate that a party is more hawkish and lower
values indicate that it is more dovish. As displayed in Figure 2, the measure of
hawkishness has a mean close to 0 with most values clustered between about -1 and
1. Given the distribution’s long tails, I show that my results are robust to trimming
or re-coding extreme values of this measure.

Figure 2: Distribution of the Party Hawkishness Measure

One potential criticism of this measure is that there may be inconsistencies
between what parties say they will do prior to an election and what they actually
do once in office. For example, partisans may have political incentives under certain
circumstances to advocate less hawkish positions in manifestos when the opposing
party adopts hawkish policies (and vice-versa), but then not follow through on these
stated preferences once in office. If the policies and principles outlined in party
manifestos are nothing but cheap talk, then they would not be an accurate measure
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or proxy of elite resolve. However, in contrast to this possibility, Heffington (2018) uses
the same measure of hawkishness I employ in this chapter and finds that leaders do
indeed live up to their foreign policy positions taken in party manifestos. Specifically,
he finds that leaders whose parties take more hawkish positions in party manifestos
are more likely to initiate MIDs and be involved in crises coded in the International
Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). As Heffington (2018)
argues, publicly committing to certain foreign policies may tie leaders’ hands to some
extent (Fearon 1997) because backing down from these promises later on could cause
leaders to incur inconsistency costs (Kertzer and Brutger 2016). This is especially
the case because party manifestos (or, at least, the policies and principles contained
within them) typically receive significant media coverage in democracies (Klingemann,
Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). All of this suggests that my measure of hawkishness
does indeed tell us something concrete about elite resolve. As a robustness check, I
also utilize a variable from The Manifesto Project that measures to what extent a
party supports international peace.
A second potential criticism is that it is only the views of a country’s leader,
or their political party, that matters since leaders often have a greater influence on a
country’s foreign policy than political parties that hold seats in a legislature. Although
I will restrict the analysis to parties who supply a country’s executive as a robustness
check, McManus (2017) establishes that the hawkishness of legislators impact the
effectiveness of statements of resolve made by leaders. Consequently, the relative
hawkishness of political parties in the legislature is a salient factor for international
politics.
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Explanatory Variable: Expected Backlash from War
In order to examine whether backlash to a past interstate war can undermine
elites’ future resolve, it is necessary to code two things: (1) interstate war, and (2)
expected or actual backlash to war. To code interstate wars, I utilize the Correlates
of War (COW) interstate war dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), which includes all
interstate wars from 1816 to 2007. To be considered a war, the conflict must result
in 1,000 battle-related deaths overall, and to be considered a participant in the war,
a country must commit at least 1,000 troops to the conflict or suffer at least 100
battle-related deaths.
Coding backlash is more difficult, as no dataset has comprehensive information
on the 4 factors (outlined in Chapter 2) that make backlash more or less likely: (1)
the policy objective of the war; (2) whether direct security interests were involved;
(3) the costs of the war; and (4) the outcome of the war. Therefore, I hand coded
the first two of these elements for states who both participated in interstate wars
and are coded in The Manifesto Project.39 To code the third and fourth factors, I
relied on COW’s battle-related deaths and outcome variables. Specifically, the policy
objective of the war is coded as 1 if it involves internal political change and 0 otherwise
(Jentleson 1992). This was relatively easy to code by examining leaders’ stated goals
for the war and reports (available to the country’s general public) about how military
force was being used. Direct security interests—or, rather, the lack of direct security
interests—are coded as 1 if the war involves a humanitarian intervention or an act
of unprovoked aggression by the state in question; 0.5 if the war involves aiding an
ally; and 0 if the war involves a direct attack against a country’s homeland or threat
against a country’s territory, which is relatively easy to observe. The costs variable
39

See Table A.2 in the appendix for the full list of hand-coded wars and an explanation for their
coding.
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is coded as 1 if total battle-related deaths are 1,000 or greater (a salient threshold in
studies of war); 0.5 if they are between 100 and 999; and 0 if deaths are under 100.
Finally, the outcome variable is coded as 1 if a state lost the war according to COW;
0 if they won the war; and 0.5 otherwise.40 As discussed in Chapter 2, higher values
of these variables are associated with a greater chance of backlash.
The aggregate measure of expected backlash from a war for country c is then
calculated by summing these variables and so ranges from 0 to 4:41
Expected Backlashc = Internal Political Change + Lack of Direct Security
Interests + Casualty Severity + Negative Outcome
In terms of timing, this variable is operationalized in two different ways. First,
Expected Backlashc takes its value in the 3 years following the end of a war, as backlash is most likely to have a strong effect in the short to medium-term following the
end of a conflict, and 0 in all other years, including the year when a war ends.42 The
year when a war ends is coded as 0 in order to reduce concerns about potential endogeneity. Second, Expected Backlashc takes its value in the closest election following
the end of a war—whether that be 1, 5, or 10 years from the end of the conflict—and
is coded as 0 in all other years.
My theoretical expectations—per H1 —are that greater expected backlash should
be associated with a decline in the hawkishness score of political parties. Figure 3
illustrates the distribution of the EXPECTED BACKLASH variable, and the results
are broadly consistent with a priori expectations.43 For example, backlash was expected to be significant for the Vietnam War because it involved internal political

40

For example, if the war ends in a compromise or stalemate according to COW it is coded as 0.5.

41

Note that countries that did not participate in an interstate war are coded as 0.

42

If multiple wars overlap for this 3-year time period, then I take the maximum value of backlash.

43

For wars where more than one country participated, I plot only the highest value in Figure 3 for
simplicity.
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change, did not involve significant direct security interests (neither the homeland nor
an ally was attacked), led to significant battle-related deaths, and ended in a loss
for the United States. By contrast, backlash to the Falklands War in Britain was
expected to be relatively low because it involved restraining foreign policy aggression
(by Argentina) rather than internal political change, did entail direct security interests
because Britain’s territory was threatened, did not lead to significant battle-related
deaths (about 255), and ended in a victory for Britain.

Figure 3: Distribution of the Expected Backlash Measure

Control Variables
I control for several variables that could be correlated with war and have an
important impact on the policy positions and principles political parties commit to
in their manifestos:
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• GDP Per Capita Growth: Using data from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al.
2018), I control for real GDP per capita growth because declining economic
conditions—which may be a result of war—could incentivize parties to adopt
less hawkish foreign policy positions in order to invest more resources into the
domestic economy.44
• Changes in Regime Type: Using data from Polity (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
2014) or V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019), I also control for changes in a country’s regime type, which could be affected by war and may affect the relative
hawkishness of a country and its political parties.
• Number of Interstate Rivals: Since political parties face incentives to adopt
more hawkish policies when their country faces greater interstate threats, I
control for the total number of serious interstate rivals a country has utilizing
data from Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016).
• Defense Alliance with the United States: Because states under the protection
of the most powerful country in the world may have incentives to free ride and
devote less resources to their military, I control for a defense pact with the
United States using data from the Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provisions
(ATOP) dataset (Leeds et al. 2002).
• Cold War: Finally, I also include a binary variable for the Cold War because
the structural changes caused by its end may have reduced the incentives for
political parties—especially those in the many European democracies included
in The Manifesto Project—to adopt hawkish foreign policies.

44

Although, as Whitten and Williams (2011) show, there may not be a significant tradeoff between
guns and butter because defense spending can also stimulate the economy and support jobs.
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I also show that my results remain robust to including other control variables,
like perceptions of economic growth by the media coded by the National Elections
Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012); the
composite index of national capabilities (CINC) from the COW dataset (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972); and party-level variables from The Manifesto Project relating
to right-left ideology and economic preferences. All independent variables are lagged
one year to reduce potential concerns about endogeneity.

Estimation Strategy
There are, of course, many difficult-to-control-for-factors that vary between
countries and between parties, and affect whether countries experience war and what
foreign policy positions parties adopt. Thus, to more closely identify the effect of
expected backlash on hawkishness, I utilize party fixed effects in my main models
in order to eliminate the impact of factors that vary between countries and between
political parties (e.g., Clark 2014). For example, this estimation strategy entails
analyzing the impact of the Vietnam War on the Democratic Party’s foreign policy
positions separately from the impact of the war on the Republican Party. Accordingly,
the unit of analysis in my main models is the party-election year.45 Nevertheless, I
also show that my results remain robust to using country fixed effects instead of
party fixed effects, which involves analyzing variation between parties in the same
country as well as within them. In these models, I also control for party ideology
since right-wing parties are likely to support more hawkish policies than left-wing
parties (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994).

45

Only elections that (a) involve the lower house and (b) involve the production of at least one party
manifesto are included. For the United States, The Manifesto Project only has data for elections
involving the president.
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I opt not two include two-way fixed effects (TWFE)—for example, party and
year fixed effects—in my main models because of two issues with this approach. First,
it is extremely difficult to interpret the results of TWFE models (Imai and Kim 2020;
Kropko and Kubinec 2020). TWFE models in the context of this analysis would
model variation within political parties in different election-years (this is what party
fixed effects do) and variation between political parties in the same election-year (this
is what year fixed effects do). In other words, TWFE models are a “complex amalgamation” of effects that do “not isolate either the variation across cases or the variation
across time” (Kropko and Kubinec 2020, 12). This complexity makes it quite difficult
to intuitively interpret what TWFE are precisely testing. By contrast, the interpretation is much clearer for models with only party fixed effects: As expected backlash
for party X changes over time, how does its level of hawkishness change over time,
generalized to all parties? The second downside of TWFE models is that they have
the potential to be heavily biased in the presence of treatment effect heterogeneity,
which is common (e.g., Callaway and Sant’Anna 2021; Goodman-Bacon 2021). Given
these limitations, I utilize only party fixed effects in my main models. Nevertheless,
given the ubiquity of TWFE models in social science research, I also demonstrate
that my core results are robust to the use of both party and year fixed effects.
Since many political parties only receive a very small share of the vote and
consequently have less of an impact on a country’s aggregate level of resolve compared
to more popular parties, I weight the data based on vote share in the main models
(e.g., Clare 2014). I also show that the results are robust to unweighted models or a
weighting scheme based on seat share rather than vote share.
Finally, since a party’s hawkishness position in one election is likely highly
correlated with its position in the previous election, I show that the results are also
robust to including a lagged dependent variable or using a change score dependent
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variable.

Statistical Results
Main Findings
Table 14 contains the results from 7 different models with standard errors clustered by political party. As expected by the War-Weariness Hypothesis, all models
report a negative, statistically significant relationship between expected backlash and
hawkishness. This indicates that wars that are more likely to lead to backlash are
associated with political parties taking less hawkish positions in subsequent elections.
Model 1 includes fixed effects by party, weights by a party’s vote share, and does not
include any control variables. Model 2 includes a series of control variables. Model 3
removes the weights. Model 4 includes a lagged dependent variable. Model 5 includes
both party and year fixed effects (i.e., TWFEs). Model 6 restricts the analysis to the 4
countries most frequently involved in interstate war: the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel. Model 7 includes country fixed effects instead of party fixed
effects, as well as a control variable for party ideology.46 The stability of the main
result across these different model specifications builds confidence in the findings.
In addition to being statistically significant, the above results are substantively
significant as well. For example, Model 2 indicates that going from the lowest to the
highest score on the expected backlash scale leads to a greater than 0.39 standard
deviation decline in a party’s hawkishness score. That number increases to 0.52 for
Model 5, which includes the countries most frequently involved in interstate war.
46

This result also holds when country and year fixed effects are included. Per conventional expectations, the coefficient on the variable for party ideology indicates that parties that are more right-wing
are more likely to have higher hawkishness scores. Note also that there is no significant interaction
between my measure of backlash and the party ideology variable.

105

Table 14: Does War Make Political Parties Less Hawkish?
Expected Backlash
GDP Per Capita Growth

(1)
Hawk
-0.3410∗∗
(0.1582)

(2)
Hawk
-0.4411∗∗
(0.1791)
0.0207
(0.0354)
-0.0150
(0.1025)
-0.0883
(0.2252)
-1.2617∗∗∗
(0.2518)
-0.9008∗∗
(0.3495)

(3)
Hawk
-0.3715∗∗
(0.1736)
0.0228
(0.0347)
0.0897
(0.0791)
-0.0929
(0.1801)
-0.9117∗∗∗
(0.3471)
-1.1658∗∗∗
(0.3316)

(4)
Hawk
-0.5242∗∗
(0.2054)
0.0178
(0.0408)
-0.3214
(0.2306)
-0.1358
(0.1794)
-0.9870∗∗∗
(0.3704)
-0.8734∗∗
(0.3461)

(5)
Hawk
-0.3259∗
(0.1962)
-0.0090
(0.0412)
-0.1452
(0.1193)
-0.2635
(0.1815)
-2.0387∗
(1.1647)

(6)
Hawk
-0.8873∗∗
(0.4309)
0.0409
(0.1477)
0.2938
(0.3753)
0.0169
(0.2465)
-1.0471
(2.0402)
-2.0992∗∗∗
(0.6798)

0.1465∗∗∗
(0.0450)
1513
Party
✓
✕

1.7843∗∗∗
(0.4576)
1438
Party
✓
✕

1.0656∗∗∗
(0.4061)
1453
Party
✕
✕

1.7557∗∗∗
(0.4585)
1219
Party
✓
✓

2.0378∗∗
(0.9728)
1438
Party/Year
✓
✕

2.2475
(1.9854)
365
Party
✓
✕

Change in Regime Type
Number of Rivalries
Defense Pact with US
Cold War
Party Ideology
Constant
Observations
Fixed Effects
Weighted by Vote Share
Lagged DV

(7)
Hawk
-0.4216∗∗
(0.1682)
0.0273
(0.0272)
-0.1411∗
(0.0842)
-0.0538
(0.1875)
-0.7836∗∗
(0.3598)
-0.3281
(0.3421)
0.0765∗∗∗
(0.0100)
1.1131∗∗∗
(0.4183)
1532
Country
✓
✕

Notes: Standard errors clustered by party in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.

Using the results from Model 2, Figure 4 visually demonstrates the negative relationship between expected backlash and political parties’ predicted hawkishness score in
future elections.

Robustness
Table 15 shows that the main results hold for an additional series of robustness
checks. Model 1 weights the data by the share of seats a party won rather than its
share of the vote. Model 2 uses a change score specification for the dependent variable
that measures the difference in a party’s hawkishness score in electiont compared to
electiont−1 . Model 3 trims the dependent variable of the top and bottom 1% of
observations such that the maximum value of the dependent variable is 12.5 instead
of 64.3 and the minimum value is -19.4 instead of -55.6. This result is also robust
to re-coding observations in the top and bottom 5% or 10% to the value of the
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Figure 4: Relationship Between Expected Backlash and Hawkishness

5th/10th or 95th/90th percentiles. Model 4 starts the analysis in 1950 instead of 1944
and thus excludes the impact of World War II. Model 5 includes several additional
control variables, including whether economic growth was perceived as good within
the country; a country’s CINC score; a party’s ideology; and a party’s support for a
planned economy, market economy, and welfare. Model 6 uses a binary rather than
ordinal variable to measure expected backlash, where expected backlash is coded as 1
if the ordinal variable is greater than 2. Models 7 through 9 code expected backlash
in the nearest election following a war instead of in the 3 years following a war.47
Although EXPECTED BACKLASH is slightly under conventional levels of significance
in Model 7, it is negative and significant in Model 8 when a change score dependent

47

Expected backlash is coded as 0 in all other elections.
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variable is used,48 as well as Model 9 when I restrict the analysis to the countries
most frequently involved in war.

Table 15: Robustness Tests
Expected Backlash
Expected Backlash (Binary)

(1)
Hawk
-0.4020∗∗
(0.1709)

(2)
Hawkt − Hawkt−1
-0.5211∗∗
(0.2296)

(3)
Hawk (Trimmed)
-0.2712∗∗
(0.1328)

(4)
Hawk
-0.4127∗∗
(0.2061)

(5)
Hawk
-0.4365∗∗
(0.1829)

Expected Backlash (Nearest Election)
GDP Per Capita Growth
Change in Regime Type
Number of Rivalries
Defense Pact with US
Cold War
Good Perception of Economic Growth

0.0128
(0.0360)
-0.0516
(0.1099)
-0.1429
(0.2099)
-1.2437∗∗∗
(0.2657)
-0.8035∗∗
(0.3718)

0.0478
(0.0511)
0.0572
(0.6588)
-0.1062∗
(0.0546)
-0.1067
(0.7327)
-0.7458∗∗∗
(0.2686)

0.0114
(0.0312)
-0.0658
(0.1141)
-0.1644
(0.1704)
-1.0146∗∗∗
(0.2946)
-0.8797∗∗
(0.3411)

0.0341
(0.0391)
-0.0240
(0.0537)
-0.3130
(0.2277)
-1.2493
(1.0182)
-0.7174∗∗
(0.3524)

1.8286∗∗∗
(0.4324)
1389
✓
Seat Share
1944

0.8337
(0.5794)
1219
✓
Vote Share
1944

1.5824∗∗∗
(0.4314)
1402
✓
Vote Share
1944

2.0502∗∗
(0.8017)
1532
✓
Vote Share
1950

Party Ideology
Party Support for a Planned Economy
Party Support for a Market Economy
Party Support for Welfare
CINC
Constant
Observations
Fixed Effects by Party:
Weighted by:
Analysis begins in:

0.0056
(0.0375)
-0.0652
(0.0805)
-0.1376
(0.1960)
-1.0407∗∗∗
(0.3281)
0.0620
(0.4218)
0.4143
(0.3110)
0.0602∗∗∗
(0.0190)
0.0645
(0.0451)
-0.0337
(0.0308)
0.0631∗∗
(0.0292)
-6.5532
(7.7416)
0.3888
(0.7659)
1391
✓
Vote Share
1944

(6)
Hawk
-1.1675∗∗∗
(0.3765)
0.0292
(0.0349)
-0.0676
(0.1004)
-0.0875
(0.2275)
-1.2317∗∗∗
(0.2503)
-0.8983∗∗∗
(0.3420)

(7)
Hawk

(8)
Hawkt − Hawkt−1

(9)
Hawk

-0.3068
(0.2066)
0.0169
(0.0380)
-0.0538
(0.1089)
-0.0934
(0.2248)
-1.2349∗∗∗
(0.2765)
-0.8832∗∗
(0.3443)

-0.6846∗∗∗
(0.2482)
0.0384
(0.0523)
-0.0656
(0.6539)
-0.1153∗∗
(0.0551)
-0.1026
(0.7434)
-0.7603∗∗∗
(0.2612)

-0.8830∗∗
(0.4261)
0.0406
(0.1478)
0.1855
(0.3474)
0.0152
(0.2459)
-1.8714
(1.8812)
-2.1000∗∗∗
(0.6797)

0.9061
(0.5936)
1219
✓
Vote Share
1944

2.6776
(1.9358)
365
✓
Vote Share
1944

1.6609∗∗∗
1.7308∗∗∗
(0.4687)
(0.4584)
1438
1438
✓
✓
Vote Share Vote Share
1944
1944

Notes: Standard errors clustered by party in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 16 also shows that the results remain consistent with my theoretical expectations when an alternative dependent variable—support for international peace—
is utilized. Model 1 includes control variables, utilizes party fixed effects, and weights
by vote share. Model 2 removes the weights. Model 3 adds a lagged dependent
variable. Model 4 adds year fixed effects in addition to party fixed effects. Model
5 restricts the analysis to the countries most frequently involved in interstate war.
Model 6 uses country rather than party fixed effects and controls for party ideology.
The models all indicate that wars that are more likely to lead to backlash are associated with greater support for international peace by political parties, which is in
accordance with expectations.
48

This result is also robust to the use of a lagged dependent variable instead.
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Table 16: Alternative Dependent Variable
(1)
Int’l Peace
Expected Backlash
0.2984∗∗
(0.1276)
GDP Per Capita Growth
0.0251
(0.0255)
Change in Regime Type
-0.0532
(0.1007)
Number of Rivalries
0.2065∗∗∗
(0.0708)
Defense Pact with US
0.9275∗∗∗
(0.2938)
Cold War
1.4872∗∗∗
(0.2381)
Party Ideology
Constant
Observations
Fixed Effects
Weighted by Vote Share
Lagged DV

0.2002
(0.3385)
1438
Party
✓
✕

(2)
Int’l Peace
0.2865∗
(0.1546)
0.0087
(0.0254)
-0.0711
(0.0698)
0.2197∗∗∗
(0.0772)
0.8944∗∗∗
(0.2678)
1.3723∗∗∗
(0.3153)

(3)
Int’l Peace
0.3111∗∗
(0.1400)
0.0300
(0.0294)
0.1787
(0.1511)
0.2606∗∗∗
(0.0831)
0.8302∗∗∗
(0.2766)
1.3102∗∗∗
(0.2077)

(4)
Int’l Peace
0.4189∗∗∗
(0.1385)
0.0316
(0.0291)
-0.0277
(0.0995)
0.2957∗∗∗
(0.0939)
1.6766∗
(0.8535)

(5)
Int’l Peace
0.7923∗∗∗
(0.2217)
0.0686
(0.0825)
-0.4094∗
(0.2235)
0.1036∗∗
(0.0474)
-0.3015
(1.1095)
2.0018∗∗∗
(0.6353)

0.6915∗∗
(0.3400)
1453
Party
✕
✕

0.0313
(0.3626)
1219
Party
✓
✓

0.5215
(0.6848)
1438
Party/Year
✓
✕

1.9428∗∗∗
(0.7155)
365
Party
✓
✕

Notes: Standard errors clustered by party in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.
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(6)
Int’l Peace
0.2841∗∗
(0.1345)
0.0127
(0.0226)
0.0571
(0.0742)
0.1904∗∗∗
(0.0546)
0.7262∗∗
(0.3141)
1.1466∗∗∗
(0.2130)
-0.0471∗∗∗
(0.0063)
0.5609∗
(0.3346)
1532
Country
✓
✕

Restricting the Analysis to Leaders
One potential criticism of the above results is that it is really the leaders of
countries that have the greatest impact on foreign policy rather than coalition or
opposition parties. To examine the impact of past wars on the policy positions of
leaders, Table 17 restricts the analysis to parties who supply a country’s executive.
For example, in this analysis the only observation for the US in 1988 is the Republican
Party because George H.W. Bush won the election. In 1992, the only observation is
the Democratic Party because Bill Clinton won. In other words, these models examine variation between a country’s leaders (or, at least, the parties they are members
of) instead of variation within political parties. The leaders of countries are identified using Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and Seki and Williams’
(2014) Government Dataset. The results remain robust to this change, building further confidence in the statistical and substantive significance of these findings. Model
1 includes control variables, country fixed effects, and starts the analysis in 1944.
Model 2 adds year fixed effects. Model 3 include a lagged dependent variable. Model
4 begins the analysis in 1950 to exclude the impact of World War II. Model 5 includes
only the countries most frequently involved in interstate war. Model 6 codes expected
backlash in the nearest election following a war instead of in the 3 years following a
war. Model 7 uses support for international peace as the dependent variable instead
of hawkishness.
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Table 17: Restricting the Analysis to Leaders
Expected Backlash
Expected Backlash (Nearest Election)
Party Ideology
GDP Per Capita Growth
Change in Regime Type
Number of Rivalries
Defense Pact with US
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Fixed Effects by Country:
Fixed Effects by Year:
Lagged DV
Analysis begins in:

(1)
Hawk
-0.5346∗∗
(0.2493)

(2)
Hawk
-0.6250∗∗
(0.2812)

(3)
Hawk
-0.6914∗∗
(0.2911)

(4)
Hawk
-0.6914∗∗
(0.2911)

(5)
Hawk
-1.0656∗∗∗
(0.1183)

0.0440∗∗∗
(0.0141)
0.0239
(0.0413)
-0.2129
(0.1655)
0.0701
(0.2449)
-1.2997∗∗
(0.4776)
-0.5866
(0.4968)
1.7941∗∗∗
(0.5381)
268
✓
✕
✕
1944

0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0145)
-0.0184
(0.0723)
-0.3403
(0.2117)
-0.1604
(0.2843)
-3.0724
(1.8375)

0.0474∗∗∗
(0.0143)
-0.0050
(0.0461)
0.1872
(0.2361)
0.0511
(0.2725)
-1.4663∗∗
(0.5908)
-0.2621
(0.4480)
1.9572∗∗
(0.6778)
254
✓
✕
✓
1944

0.0474∗∗∗
(0.0143)
-0.0050
(0.0461)
0.1872
(0.2361)
0.0511
(0.2725)
-1.4663∗∗
(0.5908)
-0.2621
(0.4480)
1.9572∗∗
(0.6778)
254
✓
✕
✓
1950

0.0835∗
(0.0268)
0.0556
(0.1332)
-0.2013
(0.5868)
0.1385
(0.3046)

3.1388∗
(1.5007)
266
✓
✓
✕
1944

-1.3473
(0.8976)
1.5904
(1.8518)
66
✓
✕
✓
1944

(6)
Hawk
-0.6332∗∗
(0.2579)
0.0459∗∗∗
(0.0142)
-0.0155
(0.0495)
0.1294
(0.2837)
0.0425
(0.2718)
-1.4191∗
(0.7370)
-0.2539
(0.4134)
1.9250∗∗
(0.7155)
254
✓
✕
✓
1944

(7)
Int’l Peace
0.5228∗
(0.2872)
-0.0093
(0.0069)
0.0112
(0.0254)
0.0220
(0.0907)
0.2196
(0.1403)
0.7212∗
(0.4052)
1.1001∗∗∗
(0.2661)
0.2906
(0.4970)
254
✓
✕
✓
1944

Notes: Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.

Component Variables of the Expected Backlash Index
Finally, Table 18 disaggregates the expected backlash index in order to analyze
the individual impact of each of its components. As expected, the coefficients on all
of the components are negative, indicating that wars whose goal is internal political
change, wars that do not involve significant direct security interests, wars that result
in more battle-related deaths, and wars that result in worse outcomes are associated
with less hawkish positions by political parties. This result is statistically significant
in Models 1, 2, 3, and 5. The main negative outcome measure is not statistically
significant (Model 4), but it does achieve significance in Model 5 when I collapse it
into a binary measure coded as 1 when a state loses and 0 otherwise. This suggests
that losing relative to not losing does, as expected, have a significant effect on future
foreign policy views.
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Table 18: Component Variables of the Expected Backlash Index

Goal: Internal Political Change
Lack of Direct Security Interests

(1)
Hawk
-1.6311∗∗∗
(0.6037)

Casualty Severity

(2)
Hawk
-1.0257∗∗
(0.4027)

Negative Outcome

(3)
Hawk

-1.0728∗
(0.6431)

Negative Outcome (Binary)
GDP Per Capita Growth
Change in Regime Type
Number of Rivalries
Defense Pact with US
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Fixed Effects by Party:
Weighted by Vote Share

0.0249
(0.0352)
-0.0709
(0.0978)
-0.0724
(0.2247)
-1.2398∗∗∗
(0.2480)
-0.9211∗∗∗
(0.3451)
1.7218∗∗∗
(0.4839)
1438
✓
✓

0.0287
(0.0351)
-0.0710
(0.1015)
-0.0890
(0.2271)
-1.1801∗∗∗
(0.2599)
-1.0008∗∗∗
(0.3669)
1.7549∗∗∗
(0.4622)
1438
✓
✓

0.0210
(0.0349)
0.0062
(0.1131)
-0.1102
(0.2170)
-1.3843∗∗∗
(0.2704)
-0.7971∗∗
(0.3436)
1.7910∗∗∗
(0.4220)
1438
✓
✓

(4)
Hawk

-0.4901
(0.6738)
0.0224
(0.0369)
-0.0615
(0.1087)
-0.0923
(0.2273)
-1.1269∗∗∗
(0.2859)
-0.8455∗∗
(0.3430)
1.5600∗∗∗
(0.4822)
1438
✓
✓

(5)
Hawk

-1.2704∗∗
(0.6365)
0.0116
(0.0358)
-0.0187
(0.1035)
-0.0835
(0.2273)
-1.1344∗∗∗
(0.2716)
-0.8135∗∗
(0.3467)
1.5562∗∗∗
(0.4860)
1438
✓
✓

Notes: Standard errors clustered by party in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.

Conclusion
In summary, this chapter demonstrates that participating in a past war can
lead to a reduction in a democratic state’s future resolve. While Chapter 3 showed
that this was the case among members of the public, this chapter finds that a similar dynamic also holds for political elites; specifically, political parties. Even though
previous research on the topic has yielded mixed—and often null—results (Garnham
1986; Levy and Morgan 1986; Pickering 2002; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Sta112

pleton 2014, 2015; DiCicco and Fordham 2018), the findings in Chapters 3 and 4 build
confidence in the War-Weariness Hypothesis. By adopting an experimental approach,
the analysis in Chapter 3 provided a causally identified test of H1 . The analysis in
this chapter then builds on prior large-N literature by using a more direct measure
of resolve, including control variables, employing country fixed effects, and incorporating the four principal factors associated with backlash. That the War-Weariness
Hypothesis holds in a large-N, real-world context suggests it has external validity and
is not just an artifact of the experimental lab. More generally, the results in Chapter
3 and 4 establish a critical microfoundation for my broader argument, as a reduction
in a state’s actual resolve could reasonably reduce a state’s reputation for resolve. In
the next chapter, I utilize a historical case study to provide further evidence for the
key mechanism of DRT.
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Chapter 5: Historical Case Study
Evidence – World War I
Experimental and large-N statistical studies—such as those conducted in Chapters 3 and 4—have some significant advantages compared to historical case studies.
The major advantage of experiments compared to historical case studies is internal
validity, as salient factors can be experimentally manipulated and thus the counterfactual can be directly observed. By contrast, history cannot be re-run and consequently the counter-factual cannot be directly observed in case studies. Relevant
factors can also be more easily controlled for in experimental and large-N statistical
studies, which helps avoid omitted variables bias. The principal advantage of large-N
statistical analyses relative to historical case studies is external validity. By examining a large number of cases, we can be more confident about whether a theory holds
or does not hold in general. By comparison, a small number of historical cases that
support or do not support a particular theory may give a skewed perception about
whether the theory holds in general or not.
Nevertheless, historical case studies also provide some significant advantages.
Relative to experiments, which typically take place in a lab or online, involve hypothetical scenarios, and make certain factors extremely salient, historical case studies
allow researchers to probe whether theories actually hold in the “real world” outside
of the lab. For example, the experimental study in Chapter 3 made participation
in a prior war particularly salient, but will the results from that study hold in the
real world when a prior conflict may be less salient given greater overall levels of
information? Compared to large-N quantitative analyses, historical case studies are
also valuable because they allow researchers to go more in-depth on each case and
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have a better understanding of sequencing and causal mechanisms (Brady and Collier
2004). For instance, by tracing events in-depth, researchers can often avoid problems
like reverse causation, where the dependent variable affects the independent variable
rather than the other way around. While reverse causation may not be immediately
apparent in large-N research, it often stands out more prominently in historical case
studies when the sequencing of events and beliefs is clearer.
Given the benefits of historical case studies, this chapter tests the key mechanism of DRT by analyzing the impact World War I had on the United States’ level
of resolve. By “resolve,” I specifically mean the US’ willingness to risk costs in order
to be involved in economic and security affairs outside of the Western hemisphere.
Given the relevance of Eurasia to the outbreak of World War II and historical debates in America dating back to the founding about how involved the US should be
in Eurasian affairs, the US’ resolve in this context is substantively meaningful. As
discussed in more depth in the next section, I study the impact of World War I because, on many dimensions, it is a least-likely case for the War-Weariness Hypothesis
(H1 ) to hold. If theories hold in least-likely cases, then that is strong evidence for a
theory because it suggests that similar dynamics should also hold in other cases that
are easier tests for the theory (Eckstein 1975; Levy 2008).
Overall, my analysis suggests that participating in World War I did undermine
America’s resolve, in accordance with the arguments of DRT. The traumatic experience of World War I made the US public and elites much less willing to risk another
costly war in Europe or Asia, despite increasing aggression by what would eventually
become the Axis powers in World War II. The most conspicuous illustration of reduced American resolve was the Neutrality Acts of the 1930’s, which changed the US’
historic policy of neutrality in order to reduce the risk of the US being dragged into
another costly war. Although the US was ultimately compelled to enter World War
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II in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration
of war against the United States, war-weariness following World War I diminished
American resolve and thus played a role in the US’ delayed entry into the conflict.

Case Selection
There are four primary reasons why this case was chosen. First, World War I
was, obviously, substantively important. The conflict led to around 40 million casualties (including over 15 million deaths), reshaped the global map, and set the stage for
World War II, which was the deadliest conflict in history. Second, as (arguably) the
most powerful country in the world at the time and today, America’s level of resolve
and the factors that impact it are substantively meaningful. In combination, points
one and two suggest that testing the implications of this conflict for the US’ resolve is
inherently valuable. Third, the relative transparency of the American political system
makes it easier to analyze the state’s overall level of resolve. Especially given that
leaders may have incentives to lie about their state’s true level of resolve in public,
greater access to accurate public polling and private discussions in democracies like
the US help address this issue.49
Fourth, and most importantly, this is, on many dimensions, a least-likely case
for the War-Weariness Hypothesis to hold. Despite the high costs of participating in
World War I, it is a least-likely case because the primary objective was about restraining foreign policy aggression rather than internal political change in Germany, the
conflict involved at least a medium level of direct security interests, and the outcome
of the war was victory for the United States. World War I involved RFPA because the

49

Of course, the dynamics may be different in autocracies, and so an avenue for future research would
be to conduct formal historical case studies in non-democratic contexts.
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proximate cause of US entry into the war and the main rationale for fighting was to
restrain the aggressive foreign policy actions of Germany. Most notably, Germany’s
utilization of unrestricted submarine warfare against passenger and commercial ships
and their infamous promise in the “Zimmerman Telegram” to help Mexico recover
lands lost to the US during the Mexican-American War (that the US considered its
own territory) were the main rationales outlined by Woodrow Wilson for declaring
war against Germany.50 Furthermore, though the war ultimately led to regime change
in Germany, that was as much if not more due to the German Revolution of 1918 as
direct action taken by the US and its allies. Per the discussion in Chapter 2, a war
that involved RFPA, moderate direct security interests, and ended in victory is relatively unlikely to lead to significant backlash and war-weariness compared to conflicts
that are primarily about IPC, do not involve significant direct security interests, and
end in defeat. Consequently, if participation in World War I led to war-weariness
in the US, then that would provide relatively strong evidence for H1 and DRT. It
would also suggest that HRT’s assumption that resolve is fixed and exogenous to the
decision of whether to fight or back down in the moment of decision is incorrect.

The Impact of World War I on American Resolve
Signs of backlash to World War I sprang up quite early on: at the tail end of
the conflict. In the midterm elections that took place in November 1918—just before
the end of the war—President Wilson’s Democratic Party lost control of both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. This despite the fact that the US was on
the verge of military victory. A year later, on November 19, 1919, the Senate failed
50

Given these factors, the US had at least a moderate level of direct security interests in the conflict.
Since the US homeland was not directly attacked, as in Pearl Harbor or 9/11, I do not classify US
direct security interests as high.
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to ratify the Treaty of Versailles that ended the war and called for the creation of
Wilson’s vaunted League of Nations. The reasons for the rejection were multifaceted,
but, in an early sign of America’s reduced resolve to risk war in the future due to
the traumatic and formative experience of World War I, one salient concern was that
joining the League would increase the risk of the US being dragged into another
European war. The main concern was with Article X, which stated, “The Members
of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”
In response to these concerns, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican majority
leader and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, proposed 14 “reservations”
to the treaty. The second was that “the United States assumes no obligation to
preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to
interfere in controversies between nations” (Kupchan 2020, 249). Wilson rejected this
reservation and the ratification vote ultimately failed in the Senate.
Further illustrating the immediate backlash to World War I and a desire to avoid
another painful war, Republican presidential nominee Warren Harding ran in 1920
“against the internationalism” of Wilson and “for the policies of [George] Washington”;
that is, neutrality and the avoidance of European wars (Kupchan 2020, 255). His
margin of victory is still the largest in American history, save for James Monroe
who ran unopposed 100 years earlier in 1820. This illustrates the mechanism of
“selection” discussed in Chapter 2, by which public opinion can come to impact a
state’s foreign policy. In his inaugural address, Harding proclaimed, “We do not
mean to be entangled [in Europe]” (Kupchan 2020, 255).
During Harding’s presidency and that of his successor Calvin Coolidge (who
took over in 1923 after Harding’s death), the US military budget was slashed, with
severe cuts to the Navy and a huge reduction in the number of Army personnel. The
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US also joined the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, which capped the tonnage of
naval ships for 10 years among the US, UK, France, Italy, and Japan. American
also signed the Kellogg–Briand Pact in 1928, which outlawed war among the major
powers in the world. The primary goal of these agreements was to (a) limit rather than
increase the US’ international commitments (there was no enforcement mechanism
in either treaty and joining them allowed the US to cut its military spending), and
(b) to enable the US to avoid another costly European war (Nichols 2015, 276-277).
As US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg (who the Kellogg-Briand Pact was named
after) said, he 11knew perfectly well that the United States would never sign a treaty
imposing any obligation on itself to apply sanctions or come to the help of anybody”
(Rose 2021, 104). Similarly, Harding said in 1922 when presenting the Washington
Naval Treaty to the Senate, the “proposed commitments are...fraught with vastly less
danger, than our undertakings in the past...There is no commitment to armed force,
no alliance, no written or moral obligation to join in defence...” (Kupchan 2020,
263-164).
More systematic evidence for backlash to World War I comes in the form of
public opinion surveys. Polls conducted on the American public consistently demonstrated that the war was perceived as a mistake. For example, the 1936-1937 Gallup
survey found that just 28% of Americans believed it was not a mistake for the US
to “Enter the World War” (Seltzer 2022, 235). Generally during this time, about two
thirds of the country believed participating in the war was an error (Thompson 2015,
139).
Backlash to the war became more intense in the 1930’s, especially following the
Nye Committeee hearings. Gerald Nye, a Republican senator from North Dakota,
famously chaired an investigation and set of well-publicized hearings between 1934
and 1936 that were formally known as the Special Committee on Investigation of
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the Munitions Industry. Nye’s investigation blamed US entrance into World War
I on the greed of bankers and weapons producers. Because significant loans had
been made to the Allied Powers during the war, Nye reasoned that bankers and
weapons producers needed the Allied Powers to win the conflict so that they could
pay back their loans and thus pressured the government to enter the war (Divine
1974, 75). For example, the committee revealed that the DuPont company’s earnings
skyrocketed from $5 million in 1914 to $82 million in 1916 due to the arms trade,
giving them a strong incentive to lobby in favor of conflict and Allied victory (Divine
1974, 76). This made many Americans rethink the utility of World War I, which
some now believed was conducted to benefit narrow interests rather than the country
as a whole. As Nye said in 1934, “when the Senate investigation is over, we shall
see that war and preparation for war is not a matter of national honor and national
defense, but a matter of profit for the few” (Glass 2007). Senator Homer T. Bone,
a Democrat from Washington state and member of the Nye Committee, similarly
argued, “For the sake of profits, for dollars to protect the loans of certain commercial
interests in this country, 50,000 boys now lie buried in France” (Thompson 2015, 138).
These individuals were commonly and pejoratively referred to as “merchants of death.”
Although the Nye Committee never found convincing evidence of a conspiracy and the
Senate cut off its funding in 1936 (after Nye made unsubstantiated accusations against
Woodrow Wilson regarding withholding information from Congress), the belief in
the conspiracy led to public outrage and backlash against World War I by making
people rethink the war’s benefits (Simms and Laderman 2021). Consequently, while
misinformation may be used by actors to reduce backlash to a war, it can also be
employed to fan the flames of backlash.
The committee also argued that it was the lopsided nature of trade to the
Allied Powers that angered the Germans and caused them to conduct the attacks,
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meaning everything could be traced back to the bankers and munitions producers.
There was truth to this argument, as America’s commercial relations with the Allies
was certainly a major reason why the US ultimately entered or was forced to enter
(depending on your point of view) the conflict. As Charles Warren (a former assistant
attorney general and intellectual father of the Neutrality Acts) said, “One of the
leading sources of friction between us and Germany and Austria was the supply by
citizens of this country of arms and munitions to the Allied Governments—an action
permitted by international law. Germans became infuriated (and not unnaturally)
when they saw, or believed they saw, their soldiers killed and wounded by Americanmanufactured armament” (Warren 1934). This argument further cemented the view
that World War I was a mistake not be repeated in the future, and Warren (1934)
warned that “every condition which confronted the United States from August 1914
to April 1917 is still present or possible today.”
There were, of course, other grievances with World War I as well. While the war
was sold by Wilson as a great moral endeavor to “make the world safe for democracy,”
many Americans were disheartened with the imperialist actions taken by the UK and
France following the conflict (Jonas 1966, 101). For example, the UK cracked down
on the Indian independence movement and extended their colonial rule in the Middle
East and Africa (Mead 2002, 59; 206). The UK also defaulted on wartime loans
made by the US, despite finding money for many of their imperial activities. This
further angered the US and worked to turn public opinion against the war. Continued
aggression and conflict after the war, in spite of agreements such as the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, also made the US public and elites reevaluate the contention that World War
I was the “war to end all wars” (Jonas 1966, 116-120). Per the discussion in Chapter
2, the benefits of war relative to their costs was rethought following the experience
of World War I, which led to backlash. In accordance with the experimental findings
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in Chapter 3, it also made Americans less sanguine about the potential benefits of
participating in another European war.
The backlash to World War I led to changes in public opinion and public policy
that clearly illustrated America’s war-weariness and diminished level of resolve. The
general and widely agreed upon foreign policy goal of the 1930’s was to avoid getting
involved in another foreign war (Thompson 2015, 134; Rose 2021). In other words,
World War I became a salient reference point and analogy that, perhaps in combination with negativity bias, made the US less willing to risk a costly future conflict.
As two prominent journalists of the time said, many Americans had become “prisoners of memory” and saw strong parallels between World War I and a new potential
European war (Rose 2021, 316). In the late 1930’s, Time magazine summarized the
national mood: “For twenty years, with the memories of the futility of World War I
still fresh, U.S. citizens have urged one another to a progressively mounting hatred
of war” (Rose 2021, 271, emphasis added).
More specifically, both public and elite surveys at the time revealed majority
support for the position that the US should stay out of any future European war
(Jonas 1966, 33). One poll in November 1936 found an overwhelming 95% of the
American public believed the US should not take part in another conflict like World
War I again (Drummond 1955, 43). As discussed in Chapter 2, changes in public
opinion can impact a state’s resolve via the mechanisms of selection and responsiveness. Still, perhaps the most notable illustration of America’s reduced resolve was
a series of laws passed by Congress in the mid to late 1930’s, which also had strong
public support. Per Chapter 2, another indicator of a reduction in a country’s resolve
can be laws passed by a country. At least in relatively well-functioning states like the
US, laws are binding and thus can serve as a credible and public signal of a country’s
resolve.
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The first law passed that vividly demonstrated the reduction in America’s resolve as a result of World War I was the 1935 Neutrality Act. Although President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) opposed this law at first, he ultimately relented
due to public and congressional pressure. This demonstrates that the mechanism of
“responsiveness” is one pathway through which public opinion can matter and ultimately impact a state’s resolve. The 1935 Neutrality Act prohibited arms sales to
any belligerent in an interstate conflict and proclaimed that US citizens traveling on
ships in war zones did so at their own risk. Both features of the act were designed to
prevent the US from being involved in a future conflict. Following the logic outlined
by the Nye Committee, the ban on arms sales was implemented in significant part due
to a belief that merchants of death had caused US entry into World War I. As a result
of this analogy, perhaps combined with negativity bias, public support for the act was
quite high (Langer and Gleason 1952, 14). Announcing that American citizens traveling on ships in war zones did so at their own risk was motivated by the sinking of the
passenger ship Lusitania in 1915 by a German U-boat. This incident, in which over
100 Americans were killed, was another factor that galvanized the US to join World
War I. Given that resolve can be defined specifically as a state’s willingness to risk
war or more generally as a state’s willingness to risk costs, this law makes clear that
the experience of World War I made the US public and lawmakers less willing to risk
war and costs in order to be involved in economic and security affairs outside of the
Western hemisphere (Kupchan 2020, 278). In fact, the tense situation between Italy
and Ethiopia, which ultimately led to an Italian invasion in the so-called “Abyssinia
Crisis,” was the context in which the 1935 Neutrality Act was debated and passed.
Fearing the US would be dragged into the conflict, the Neutrality Act was passed
before Italy invaded and invoked after they invaded to prevent the supply of weapons
to either side, even though Italy was deemed the aggressor by the League of Nations
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(Thompson 2015, 138). The lack of action in response to Italy’s aggression was viewed
as a failure of the still young League of Nations (which, of course, the US had not
joined despite being its intellectual founder) and, ultimately, a possible contributing
factor to World War II. The 1935 Neutrality Act was also passed in the context of
Hitler’s proclamation that Germany would not adhere to the Treaty of Versailles.
Thinking again about the causes of World War II, the passing of the Neutrality Act
in 1935 clearly was not sending strong signals of American resolve to countries like
Germany and Italy, two of the key belligerents in the coming conflict. However, the
overwhelming majority of US citizens were more concerned with staying out of a new
war rather than trying to prevent it by projecting a high level of resolve and thus
deterring potential aggressors (Thompson 2015, 139). The experience of World War
I had made the US less willing to risk a potentially costly conflict, despite America’s
high level of capabilities. As FDR said, the Neutrality Act was an “expression of the
desire...to avoid any action which might involve [the United States] in war” (Glass
2017).
In 1936, the original Neutrality Act was renewed and a key additional restriction was added in order to further reduce the risk of the US being dragged into war:
loans of any kind—not just arms sales—were prohibited to belligerents involved in
a conflict. By this time, Germany was openly rearming in violation of the Treaty
of Versailles, Italy had violated the Kellogg–Briand Pact by invading Ethiopia, and
Japan had violated the Kellogg–Briand Pact by invading Manchuria and renounced
the Washington Naval Treaty. Additional restrictions were added in the 1937 Neutrality Act that further demonstrated America’s war-weariness and reduced level of
resolve: the previous acts were made permanent; the sale of arms to neutral countries that intended to sell them to belligerents in a conflict was outlawed; citizens
were banned from sailing on belligerent ships; merchant ships were prohibited from
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transferring arms to belligerents even if the weapons were not produced in the US;
the president was given the power to ban all trade with warring parties rather than
just arms sales or loans; and these provisions were applied to intrastate (civil) wars
in addition to interstate wars. This time period is often referred to as the era of
isolationism, and that is because America’s willingness to risk a potentially costly
war was severely diminished as a result of World War I (Kupchan 2020). As FDR
said during his 1936 re-election campaign, Americans were “not isolationist except
insofar as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war” (Simms and Laderman
2021, 30). FDR also recognized that he was up “against a public psychology of long
standing—a psychology which comes very close to saying ‘Peace at any price” ’ (Casey
2001, 23). A near absolute unwillingness to go to war suggests quite low levels of US
resolve indeed.
It is important to note that the Neutrality Acts were not a return to the status
quo before World War I, but a momentous change in the status quo of US foreign
policy going back to the founding. Traditionally, neutrality was conceived as a situation in which the US would trade with all belligerents in a conflict—just as they had
before the conflict broke out—and there would be no discrimination against any of
the parties. For example, in his farewell address, George Washington said, “The great
rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial
relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible” (Washington
1796). Thomas Jefferson similarly asserted that “Commerce with all nations, alliance
with none should be our motto” (Jefferson 1799). In a speech to Congress, Wilson
also proclaimed that “every man who really loves America will act and speak in the
true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness
to all concerned” (Kupchan 2020, 226). This “traditional” principle of neutrality was
one of the key causes of the War of 1812 (Britain was not respecting the US’ “neu125

tral rights” to trade with France) and US entry into World War I. By contrast, the
Neutrality Acts were based on a “new” conception of neutrality, which involved the
cessation of all arms trade and loans with all belligerents. The goal, of course, of this
paradigm shift was to reduce the risk of being pulled into a costly conflict to an even
greater degree than the traditional neutrality policy. To reduce the “frictions”—in
Charles Warren’s (1934) nomenclature—that can lead to war. In a counter-factual
universe where World War I did not occur, it is unlikely the Neutrality Acts would
have been able to pass. In fact, there was some support in Congress in 1915 to ban
arms sales to all belligerents—as the Neutrality Act of 1935 did—but it did not have
sufficient backing to become law (Divine 1974, 7). This suggests that backlash to
World War I was a necessary condition for this new version of neutrality to take hold.
It also implies the experience of the Great War changed the US’ resolve compared to
what it was before the conflict and what it would have likely been if the conflict had
not occurred.
Although continued aggression by Germany, Japan, and Italy in the following
years—culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese—increased the US’
willingness to involve itself to some extent in the emerging conflict, a strong degree
of war-weariness remained as a result of World War I. In January 1938, a vote on
the so-called Ludlow Amendment to the Constitution that would require a national
referendum before war was declared—thereby limiting the government’s power and
reducing the chances of war actually taking place—narrowly failed in the House of
Representatives. This despite overwhelming public support of around 75% (Kennedy
1993, 402-403). Although the amendment was defeated, Secretary of State Cordell
Hull assessed that the closeness of the vote was “a striking indication of the strength
of isolationist sentiment in the United States” (Kupchan 2020, 277).
Following Germany’s annexation of Austria in 1938, the Munich Agreement
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that enabled Germany to annex the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, and the Kristallnacht incident in Germany that targeted Jewish civilians, public opinion began to
turn against Germany. In October 1937 around 62% of US citizens were neutral
towards Germany, but by the next year those numbers had reversed as 61% of Americans said they would support a boycott of German goods (Jacob 1940). Aggressive
actions by Germany increased public and elite support for a defense buildup domestically in order to deter and potentially prepare for a direct German attack against
the US. To this end, Congress approved FDR’s request to double military spending in
1939 (Thompson 2015, 163). Public opinion polls in 1939 showed that between 80%
and 90% of American citizens supported increasing the size of the US military and a
strong majority also reported they would be willing to pay higher taxes for this cause
(Langer and Gleason 1952, 130; 136-147; Thompson 2015, 163). Germany’s invasion
of Poland and France in 1940 only increased support for greater military spending.
As a consequence, defense spending increased by a factor of four between 1940 and
1941 and the size of the Army expanded from less than 200,000 in 1939 to 1,500,000
in 1941, supported by large majorities in Congress and most Americans (Thompson
2015, 190; Kupchan 2020, 284).
While support for greater military spending grew in response to extreme acts
of aggression by Nazi Germany, opposition to World War I and reluctance to provide
aid to possible belligerents remained strong. One poll in late 1939 found that nearly
70% of US citizens continued to view World War I as a mistake (Thompson 2015,
162). Still fearing the US would be pulled into another stupid war as a result of arms
transfers and other forms of aid, there remained strong resistance to repealing any of
the Neutrality Acts, even after it was clear the Munich Agreement would not satisfy
Hitler’s aggressive appetite. As such, an attempt by FDR to scale back the neutrality
laws in the summer of 1939 was rebuffed by Congress (Thompson 2015, 163), and a
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majority of the American people approved of this rejection (Langer and Gleason 1952,
130; 136-147; Divine 1974, 273-278). This demonstrated that America’s resolve—their
willingness to risk a costly conflict—remained damaged from World War I.
Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the ever-rising specter of
the German threat did ultimately lead to a rethinking of the Neutrality Acts among
the public and elites. By October 1939, a majority of Americans were willing to
support a repeal of the arms embargo (Thompson 2015, 165). Congress followed suit
in November by officially ending the arms embargo and allowing belligerents to buy
weapons from the US as long as they paid for them in cash and transported them via
their own ships at their own risk (“cash and carry”). While this clearly shows increased
American resolve to risk war in response to the growing threat, the prohibition on
loans remained and US ships were not allowed to transport the arms (Kupchan 2020,
282). This prohibition on loans continued until March 1941, when Congress passed
the Lend-Lease Act following the German invasion of France and air assault on the
UK (the “Battle of Britain”).51 This new law enabled the US government to lend or
lease critical supplies like food, oil, and weapons to Allied nations such as the UK
and the Soviet Union (Langer and Gleason 1952, 275; 283–284). This clearly signaled
the end of neutrality, as FDR claimed America would serve as the “great arsenal of
democracy.” Still, FDR and others maintained that the purpose of the act was to keep
the US out of war and there was a strong campaign against its passage from anti-war
groups such as the America First Committee (Kupchan 2020, 283; 289). In a private
meeting with Senators at the White House, FDR also asserted that “the last thing
that this country should do is ever to send an army to Europe again” (Farnham 1997,
196). This expression of the trauma World War I caused the US would be mirrored

51

The Selective Service Act also passed in September 1940, which established the first military draft
in the US’ history during a time of technical “peace” (i.e., when the US had not declared war).
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after the Second Iraq War when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “Any future
defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army
into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.”
Despite the outbreak of general war in Europe as a result of Germany’s everincreasing belligerence, the US public and elites remained unwilling to join the war.
Support for direct entry into the conflict among the American people ranged between
about 15% and 24% from 1940 to late October 1941 (Thompson 2015, 155). Given the
public’s lack of resolve to risk a costly conflict, FDR had strong political incentives to
promise that the US would not directly involve itself in the war. Per the discussion
in Chapter 2, FDR also closely monitored and was responsive to public opinion.
For example, he said it was essential to “watch Congress and public opinion like a
hawk,” followed the mail the White House received after his radio broadcasts, received
polling data from the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University,
and even suggested polling question to researchers at Princeton (Casey 2001, 16-19).
Furthermore, America’s enemies also believed public opinion restrained FDR. For
example, chief Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary in 1941 that
“the USA is preparing to make the leap to war. If Roosevelt were not so chary of
public opinion, he would have declared war on us long ago” (Goodwin 1994, 235).
Following domestic political incentives (and perhaps his own personal views as
well), FDR promised “mothers and fathers” during his re-election campaign in 1940
that “your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars” (Divine 1974, 3435). Similarly, the Democratic Party platform committed that the US would “not
participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to
fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack” (Thompson
2015, 169). In 1941, with war in Europe and elsewhere raging, 80% of Americans
still wanted to stay out of the conflict and only about half of those polled would
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support entering the war if otherwise it was certain that the UK would be defeated,
removing the last barrier between Hitler and the US (Cantril 1951, 976). As FDR
said to Lord Halifax (the UK ambassador to the US) in October 1941, “if he asked
for a declaration of war he wouldn’t get it, and opinion would swing against him”
(Casey 2001, 44). This, in turn, caused UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill to
tell FDR’s principal advisor that the US’ unwillingness to directly enter the war was
causing “waves of depression through [the UK] Cabinet and other informed circles
[in the UK]” (Gilbert 2001, 1125). Similarly, the South African Prime Minister,
Jan Smuts, told Churchill that FDR had “let slip so many opportunities for action
including the sinking of American warships that I fail to see what stronger provocation
is likely to be effective...Roosevelt continues Hamlet-like to hesitate” and so it’s likely
that “Roosevelt means to keep America out of the war in spite of his brave words”
(Gilbert 2001). The trauma and war-weariness that resulted from World War I was
so deep that it would take a direct attack on the US—Pearl Harbor—and a German
declaration of war against the US in order to rouse America to join the second world
war. Though war-weariness in response to World War I was not a sufficient condition
to overcome the Axis threat and prevent the US from eventually entering the war, it
clearly reduced American resolve to risk conflict during the interwar period and may
very well have delayed US entry into the war.
One possible criticism of my argument—that World War I led to a reduction in
American resolve—is that the US was less isolationist during the interwar period than
is traditionally assumed. For instance, Braumoeller (2010) argues during this time
the US was not uninvolved in European politics or categorically opposed to future
involvement. Examples include the aforementioned Washington Naval Treaty and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as well as the significant role played by the US in resolving
debates over Germany’s reparations obligations under the Treaty of Versailles (Brau130

moeller 2010). I find this potential criticism unpersuasive for two related reasons.
First, the extent to which the US was or was not isolationist during the interwar
period depends on how isolationism is defined. Second, isolationism is not the same
concept as resolve, and definitions of isolationism that are closer to resolve suggest
the US was indeed more isolationist during the interwar period. Braumoeller (2010,
354) defines isolationism to mean “the voluntary and general abstention by a state
from security-related activity in an area of the international system in which it is
capable of action.” This sets a high bar for a state to be classified as isolationist, as
any activity by a state in security affairs (e.g., signing international agreements) can
potentially be a sufficient condition to classify them as non-isolationist. By contrast,
following Washington’s “great rule,” scholars like Kupchan (2020, 6) define isolationism as “the avoidance of strategic commitments.” This sets a lower bar for a state
to be classified as an isolationist since activities like signing the Washington Naval
Treaty, which was designed to enable the US to avoid costly commitments in Eurasia,
may actually be evidence of isolationism. Resolve, of course is a distinct concept from
isolationism. In this case, resolve refers to the US’ willingness to risk costs in order to
be involved in economic and security affairs outside of the Western hemisphere. My
definition of resolve has much more in common with Kupchan’s definition of isolationism than Braumoeller’s since strategic commitments (e.g., alliancecs or collective
security pledges like Article X of the League of Nations52 ) can enhance the risk of
costs by heightening the chances a state will be dragged into war. “General abstention
by a state from security-related activity in an area of the international system” has a
less direct relation with the risk of enduring costs than strategic commitments do, as
strategic commitments in a region are more binding than more general engagement
with a region (Braumoeller 2010, 354). In summary, while some definitions of isola52

Though I do not claim Article X would have been binding on states.
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tionism suggest the US was less isolationist in the interwar period than conventional
wisdom suggests—possibly implying the US was more resolved in this period than I
argue—the definitions of isolationism that are closer to resolve suggest the US was
indeed relatively isolationist during this period.
A second possible criticism is that there were heterogeneous preferences among
the American public and elites, and not everyone was averse to risking a costly conflict
in order to engage with Eurasia. As Braumoeller (2010, 359) notes, some Americans
supported the Neutrality Acts because they wanted to use the threat of economic
embargo as a deterrent to aggression. While certainly true, the historical record
demonstrates that the single most important reason for the creation of the Neutrality
Acts was to reduce the risk that the US would be dragged into another war outside of
the Western hemisphere. Thus, the acts illustrated the US’ diminished resolve, even
if they did not signal a complete lack of resolve among all Americans.
Third, a critic might note that the US was much more willing to risk and
engage in interventions in its own hemisphere, suggesting a relatively higher level of
resolve. This is certainly true, though at that time America had historically been
less isolationist and more resolved in the Western hemisphere. More importantly,
this chapter assess US resolve outside of the Western hemisphere given the strategic
importance of Eurasia to World War II and the historical debate in the US about the
extent to which the country should be involved in Eurasian affairs.

Conclusion
World War I is not a conflict where backlash and war-weariness among the
US public and elites was relatively likely. The US entered the conflict primarily to
restrain foreign policy aggression rather than engage in internal political change, the
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war involved at least a medium level of direct security interests, and America emerged
from the war as a victor. Despite this hard case for the War-Weariness Hypothesis,
the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the US was less resolved following
World War I. The US’ major foreign policy goal was to avoid another costly war in
Europe, and to this end the government took many tangible and visible steps in order
to reduce the risks of being involved in a costly conflict. Most notably were the series
of Neutrality Acts passed in the 1930’s, which signaled a paradigm shift in how the US
conceived of neutrality and how much risk the US was willing to take in order to be
involved in Eurasian affairs. Though counter-factuals are difficult to evaluate using
historical case studies, the evidence suggests that had the US not entered World War
I, the Neutrality Acts and other manifestations of relatively low US resolve would
likely not have occurred. In combination with the experimental evidence presented
in Chapter 3 and the large-N statistical evidence in Chapter 4, the results from this
historical analysis suggest that a key mechanism of DRT—that fighting in a past war
can reduce a state’s future resolve—can indeed operate. This is not to say that the
US fighting in World War I was a mistake, but simply that fighting entails greater
costs than skeptics of the War-Weariness Hypothesis and HRT suggest. A state’s
future resolve is not unrelated to its decision of about whether to fight or not fight
in the moment of decision. I now turn to Part III of this dissertation, which involves
testing the main argument of DRT by analyzing the impact fighting can have on a
state’s reputation for resolve.
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Part III: Testing the Main Effect of
Dovish Reputation Theory – The
Impact of Fighting on Reputation for
Resolve
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Chapter 6: Experimental Evidence
Among the Public
Do conflicts that lead to significant backlash and war-weariness undermine a
state’s reputation for resolve relative to those that do not? If there is significant
backlash and war-weariness to a conflict, then does standing firm provide no additional
benefits to a state’s reputation for resolve than if that state had backed down initially?
Part II of this dissertation established that fighting in a past war can undermine a
state’s resolve. In Part III, which begins with this chapter, I turn to whether it can
also harm a state’s reputation for resolve. This is the core contention at the heart of
DRT.
Answering these questions by analyzing real-world conflicts is difficult for two
main reasons. First, it’s challenging to analyze counter-factuals in observational data.
Since we cannot re-run the world or randomly assign conflict, analyzing, for example,
what the United States’ reputation for resolve would be if the Vietnam War did not
produce significant backlash and war-weariness is an inherently speculative exercise.
Second, there are many factors that likely affect a state’s reputation for resolve besides
war—like leadership turnover, regime type, economic shocks, etc.—and thus it is difficult to isolate the impact of war by analyzing observational data. Finally, these two
issues are compounded by the relative rarity of interstate conflict and thus the small
number of cases to examine. In this chapter I therefore turn towards experiments to
test hypotheses H2 through H5 . Compared to observational data, experiments can
more easily examine counter-factuals and can hold relevant factors constant in order
to isolate the impact of key variables. As such, experiments can be an especially
useful tool for testing the microfoundations of different theories.
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As a first cut, I carry out experiments on the general public. Although it is
political leaders and national security elites that play the biggest role in evaluating
a foreign country’s reputation for resolve, I argue that experiments conducted on the
public are valuable for three reasons. First, scholars argue that research programs
should begin by testing their theories on the general public given the difficulty and
cost associated with acquiring elite samples (McDermott 2002). This is a central
reason why the overwhelming number of experiments published in top political science
journals—over 91% according to one estimate—are non-elite samples (Kertzer and
Renshon 2022).
Second, prior studies demonstrate that elite-public gaps may be overstated and
generally smaller than expected. In other words, the findings of experiments on
average citizens—such as the ones in this chapter—may also have external validity
to political elites. Most prominently, Kertzer (2020) conducts a meta-analysis of
162 paired experiments conducted on members of the public and elites. He finds
that elites generally respond to treatments in the same ways as members of the
public. Of the 162 treatment effects Kertzer (2020) analyzes, over 98% do not differ
in sign (i.e., whether the relationship is positive or negative) between members of
the public and elites, and almost 90% do not differ in magnitude. Moreover, some
studies demonstrate that political elites look surprisingly like average citizens in the
way they cognitively process information (Tetlock 1998; 1999; Linde and Vis 2017),
and a study by Renshon, Yarhi-Milo, and Kertzer (2019) finds that members of the
Israeli Knesset estimate the resolve of democracies relative to autocracies similarly
to members of the Israeli, United Kingdom, South Korean, and US publics. Even
more directly, Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon (2018) show that members of the
Israeli Knesset and Israeli citizens similarly update their assessments of an adversary’s
resolve in response to public threats (i.e., tied hand signals) or military mobilization
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(i.e., sunk cost signals) by that adversary. Overall, these results suggest that we
should not necessarily expect members of the public to assess resolve in a radically
different manner than elites.
Third, public views about an enemy’s reputation for resolve can also directly
impact crisis bargaining and international politics. If the public believes a foreign
adversary has a relatively high degree of resolve, then they should be less supportive of
using force against that adversary or, more generally, of challenging them in any way.
By contrast, if citizens believe a foreign adversary has a relatively low degree of resolve,
then they should be more willing to use force and challenge that adversary. Since
prior research demonstrates that public opinion can impact the views of policymakers,
the experiments discussed in this chapter are inherently valuable, even if their results
are not externally valid to policymakers.
I conduct two different experiments on nationally representative samples of the
American public in order to test DRT. The first experiment utilizes a between-subjects
design and is based on a seminal reputation experiment conducted by Renshon, Dafoe,
and Huth (2018). It involves a territorial dispute between two countries where the past
actions of one of the countries is experimentally manipulated. The second experiment
employs a hybrid within-subjects and between-subjects design and is based on a prior
experiment conducted by Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon (2018). It involves a
maritime crisis between two countries where the past actions of one of the countries
is experimentally manipulated.
These two experiments yield four key findings, which support the arguments
of DRT. First, in accordance with DRT, HRT, and H2 , but in contrast to SRT, the
experiments establish that backing down in a previous conflict undermines a state’s
reputation for resolve (all else equal). Second, per H3 , I find evidence that signs of
backlash and war-weariness in response to a previous conflict also undermines a state’s
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reputation for resolve. The substantive size of this effect is also large: between 10 and
37 percentage points. Third, contrary to HRT, but in line with DRT and H4,W eak ,
I generally find that conditional on fighting leading to backlash and war-weariness,
standing firm does not have a significant effect on a state’s reputation for resolve
compared to backing down. Although observationally equivalent to the predictions
of SRT, the statistically significant results for H2 and H3 mean we know this null is
being driven by countervailing reputation for resolve costs (the positive impact of not
backing down and the negative impact of war-weariness) rather than because past
actions do not impact reputation at all, as the strongest version of SRT contends.
On the other hand, I do not find compelling evidence for H4,Strong , which suggests
that standing firm should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve compared to backing
down conditional on backlash and war-weariness. Finally, I find support for H5 :
standing firm reduces a state’s reputation for resolve compared to avoiding getting
into a dispute at all, conditional on backlash and war-weariness. The effect size is a
whopping 37 percentage points for this case. Overall, these results suggest that the
reputation for resolve ramifications of choosing to fight in the moment of decision are
much more complicated than HRT assumes. Fighting does not unambiguously bolster
a state’s reputation for resolve if a state exhibits strong signs of war-weariness, and,
all else equal, signs of backlash and war-weariness undermine a state’s reputation for
resolve. Consequently, the argument that states should fight wars in order to enhance
their reputations for resolve is suspect.

Study 1 Experimental Design
In order to test the impact of backing down and war-weariness on a country’s
reputation for resolve, I designed and administered a 2 x 2 + 2 between-subjects
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experiment on a representative sample of 608 Americans recruited via Lucid in April
2020. As a reminder, Lucid generates representative samples based on age, gender,
ethnicity, and region. I also blocked on party identification to ensure an approximately
equal number of Democrats and Republicans in each experimental cell.53 As in
Chapter 3, I conducted this experiment on members of the American public given the
critical role the United States plays in global affairs. The design and wording of the
experiment is based off of a seminal study conducted by Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth
(2018) on whether reputations adhere to states, leaders, or both.54
First, following Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth (2018), respondents are presented
with a scenario where Country A and Country B—labeled as such for purposes of
generality—are involved in a territorial dispute over a small, contested piece of territory. Survey subjects are also informed that they will need to evaluate B’s likely
resolve in this crisis. To hold constant regime type and capabilities, all subjects are
then told that B is a democracy, A and B have roughly equal military capabilities,
and neither country has nuclear weapons.55
Respondents are then randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions
relating to Country B’s actions in its most recent international crisis (with a country
other than A) and the outcome of that crisis.56 The experimental conditions are designed to test H2 through H5 . As a reminder, H2 , the Backing Down Reputation Costs
Hypothesis, holds that backing down in a past crisis should reduce a state’s reputation
53

About 53% of respondents identified as Republicans and 47% as Democrats.
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See also Dafoe, Zwetsloot, and Cebul (2021).
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Respondents are also informed that the territory is currently controlled by Country A. If, alternatively, the territory was controlled by Country B, then survey subjects may have reasonably
concluded that B would be resolved no matter what.
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By contrast, Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth (2018) inform respondents about B’s actions in its last
two international crises with Country A. I opt to prime a single previous international crisis with
a country other than A because (1) Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth’s (2018) prime is likely to be very
strong; and (2) hawkish reputation theory suggests that Country B’s past actions against Country
C should also affect its reputation for resolve in the eyes of Country A.
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for resolve relative to fighting, all else equal. H3 , the War-Weariness Reputation Costs
Hypothesis, posits that wars that lead to significant backlash and/or war-weariness
should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve relative to those that do not produce
backlash. H4,W eak , the War-Weariness vs. Backing Down Weak Hypothesis, holds
that conditional on fighting leading to backlash and/or war-weariness, standing firm
should have no significant effect on a state’s reputation for resolve compared to backing down. H4,Strong postulates that standing firm should actually reduce a state’s
reputation for resolve compared to backing down. Finally, H5 , the War-Weariness
vs. No Dispute Hypothesis, argues that conditional on fighting leading to backlash
and/or war-weariness, standing firm should reduce a state’s reputation for resolve
compared to avoiding getting into a dispute at all. Figure 5 outlines the experiment’s
six conditions.
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Figure 5: Six Experimental Conditions
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Condition 1 is a pure control where Country B experiences no previous conflict.
In the remaining experimental conditions, Country B is involved in a previous conflict,
and thus has to decide what course to take in the moment of decision. In Condition
2, B backs down and avoids war, but also fails to achieve its aims. In Conditions
3 through 6, Country B stands firm in the moment of decision and the crisis leads
to war. For these four conditions I experimentally vary whether B wins or loses
the conflict and whether they demonstrate signs of war-weariness or not.57 In order
to prime war-weariness in Conditions 3 and 5, respondents are given the following
treatment:
During its most recent major international crisis with a country other
than Country A, Country B did not back down and the crisis led to war.
According to most impartial observers, Country B [did/did not] achieve
its aims, [though/and] the war led to the deaths of tens of thousands of
B’s soldiers and cost Country B a humongous amount of money. According to public polling, about 70% of Country B’s people believe that the
war was not worth it and that the experience should make Country B
more cautious about using military force in the future. Country B’s new
leader––who was elected after this conflict––has also said the war was a
“mistake” and that the country should focus more on domestic issues going
forward.
To make this treatment sufficiently credible, respondents are first told that the
war cost Country B a huge amount of money and led to the deaths of thousands of B’s
soldiers. Since war-weariness is only likely to result after a costly war, the inclusion
of this information makes war-weariness more believable (Richardson 1960). The
polling numbers and elite statements correspond to similar numbers and statements
about the Iraq War, rendering the treatment realistic as well as credible. In the
2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy,
about 70% of Americans indicated the Iraq War was not worth the costs (Smeltz,
57

Since you cannot win a conflict or experience war-weariness if you back down or there is no previous
conflict, the experiment cannot be fully crossed. Hence the 2 x 2 + 2 design.

142

Daalder, and Kafura 2014, 13). In their 2012 survey, the number was 67%, and
in ABC News/Washington Post polls from 2007 to 2011, over 60% of respondents
agreed the Iraq War was not worth the costs (Smeltz 2012, 6). The 2012 Chicago
Council Survey also found that 71% of Americans agreed that “the experience of
the Iraq war should make nations more cautious about using military force to deal
with rogue states” (Smeltz 2012, 6). A similar percentage—66%—agreed with this
statement in their 2006 survey (Bouton 2006, 15). With respect to the elite statement
in the experimental prime, President Obama frequently argued the Iraq War was a
mistake and that “it is time to focus on nation building here at home” (e.g., Obama
2011). Finally, subjects are told that the leader of Country B “was elected after this
conflict” because it more realistically fits the scenario, as the leader who launched
the war is relatively unlikely to characterize it as a “mistake.” Additionally, the
study by Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth (2018) finds that country-specific reputations are
generally larger than leader-specific reputations, and thus having leadership change
hands should not nullify the negative reputational signal of backing down.58
In accordance with Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth (2018), Country B’s reputation
for resolve is measured by asking respondents: “What is your best estimate, given
the information available, about whether Country B will back down in this dispute?”
Responses range from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating a greater reputation for resolve. Table 19 details how each hypothesis is tested in the context of this experiment.
For example, the Backing Down Reputation Costs Hypothesis is tested by subtracting
the fought/lost condition (4) from the backing down condition (2). In both of these
conditions, Country B “failed to achieve its aims” and war-weariness is not primed.
Consequently, the only factor that varies is whether the B stood firm or backed down
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Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth (2018) do, however, find evidence of leader-specific reputations and that
they become more important when leaders are more influential.
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in the moment of decision.59 SRT would expect this quantity will not be statistically
different than 0, whereas HRT and DRT expect that reputation for resolve in the
backed down condition will be significantly lower than in the fought/lost condition.
The War-Weariness Reputation Costs Hypothesis is tested by comparing the
fought/lost/war-weariness condition (3) to the fought/lost condition (4) and the
fought/won/war-weariness condition (5) to the fought/won condition (6). DRT would
expect that reputation for resolve will be lower in the conditions where war-weariness
is primed compared to those where it is not. Since the outcome of the previous conflict
(losing or winning) is being experimentally manipulated, it is possible war-weariness
reputation costs will vary based on this factor.
The War-Weariness vs. Backing Down Hypotheses can be tested by comparing
the war-weariness conditions (3 and 5) to the backing down condition (2). Per HRT,
reputation for resolve should be significantly lower in the backing down condition
than either of the war-weariness conditions. The weak version of DRT (H4,W eak )
would expect no difference between these quantities, whereas the strong version of
DRT (H4,Strong ) would expect reputation for resolve to be lower in the war-weariness
conditions than the backing down condition.
Lastly, the War-Weariness vs. No Dispute Hypothesis can be tested by comparing the war-weariness conditions (3 and 5) to the no previous conflict condition. Per
H5 , DRT expects reputation for resolve will be lower in the war-weariness conditions
59

One factor that is not explicitly controlled for and thus could lead to a lack of information equivalence
between these two experimental conditions is casualties (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018). In the
backing down condition, Country B would, of course, experience zero casualties, while fighting and
losing could result in moderate or significant casualties. Thus, if respondents assume that Country
B experiences significant casualties in condition 4 and these casualties lead to a degree of warweariness, then it could be war-weariness rather than the decision made in the moment of decision
driving backing down costs. However, data gathered from the experiment suggests this was not
the case. After the main dependent variable measure, subjects were asked to what extent they
thought Country B’s citizens would support a military conflict against Country A. Results were
nearly identical for respondents assigned to condition 2 or 4: 2.80 vs. 2.82 on a 5-point scale. This
suggests that there were no perceived differences in war-weariness between the two conditions.
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than in the no previous conflict condition.

Table 19: Calculating The Effect of War-Weariness and Backing Down
on Reputation for Resolve
Hypothesis

Calculation

DRT Expectation

Backing Down
Reputation Costs

2–4

<0

War-Weariness Reputation
Costs (Average)

(3 − 4) + (5 − 6)
2

<0

War-Weariness Reputation
Costs (Won)

5–6

<0

War-Weariness Reputation
Costs (Lost)

3–4

<0

War-weariness vs. Backing
Down (Average)

(3 − 2) + (5 − 2)
2

<0 or =0

War-weariness vs. No
Dispute (Average)

(3 − 1) + (5 − 1)
2

<0

Study 1 Main Results
I begin by examining H2 and H3 , which hold that backing down from a previous conflict and signs war-weariness should both respectively entail costs to a state’s
reputation for resolve. In accordance with previous studies and to more clearly illustrate substantive effects, I collapse the 7-point measure of State B’s reputation for
resolve into a binary measure of whether B is perceived as likely to stand firm or not.
Substantively identical results emerge with the full seven-point measure, as I show in
the next section.
Figure 6 provides evidence that significant backing down and war-weariness
reputation costs exist, in accordance with H2 and H3 . Per the predictions of HRT
and DRT, but in contrast to SRT, backing down in a previous conflict decreases State
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Figure 6: Study 1 War-Weariness & Backing Down Reputation Costs

Note: Results are calculated from 2,000 bootstraps and error bars display 95% bootstrapped
confidence intervals.

B’s reputation for resolve 25 percentage points (p < 0.001). This is in accordance
with Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth (2018), who also find backing down harms a state’s
reputation for resolve relative to standing firm. Most importantly, and per DRT and
H3 , there are also immense reputation costs associated with fighting in a previous
conflict and exhibiting signs of backlash and war-weariness: on average, war-weariness
decreases State B’s reputation for resolve by 36.7 percentage points (p < 0.001).
These results suggest that the reputational ramifications of choosing to fight in the
moment of decision are more complicated than HRT assumes. Fighting does not
unambiguously bolster a state’s reputation for resolve if a state exhibits strong signs
of war-weariness.
Interestingly, Figure 6 suggests that there may be an interactive effect between
war-weariness and the outcome of a conflict. Specifically, war-weariness costs may be
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greater if a state wins a conflict than if they lose. The explanation is that respondents
also downgrade their assessments of B’s resolve when they lose compared to when they
win, and thus war-weariness is a more informative signal when a state wins a conflict
than when they lose. Regression results described below confirm there is a significant
interactive effect between these two factors when utilizing the binary version of the
dependent variable. However, there is no significant interaction when the full 7-point
scale of resolve is employed.
In order to examine hypotheses H4 and H5 , Table 20 displays the perceived
likelihood that Country B will back down from its conflict with Country A. Recall that
H4,W eak theorizes that there should be no significant difference in a state’s reputation
for resolve when it backs down in a previous conflict compared to when it fights
and shows signs of war-weariness. H4,Strong , by contrast, theorizes that a state’s
reputation for resolve should be greater when it backs down relative to when it fights
and exhibits signs of war-weariness. Although no statistically significant evidence
emerges to support H4,Strong , there is evidence for H4,W eak . This is an important
finding because it suggests that fighting does not always maximize a state’s reputation
for resolve relative to backing down, bringing into question the central implication
of HRT, which is that states should stand firm in conflicts in order to enhance their
reputation for resolve. Although observationally equivalent to SRT, we know that
H4,W eak is being driven by the logic of DRT (countervailing reputation for resolve
costs as a result of the positive impact on a state’s reputation for resolve of not
backing down and the negative impact of war-weariness) because of the significant
results for H2 and H3 .
I also examine H5 , which predicts that fighting in a previous conflict and displaying signs of war-weariness will reduce a state’s reputation for resolve relative to a
situation where Country B is not involved in a previous conflict at all. This hypothesis
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is strongly supported. If Country B fights and exhibits strong signs of war-weariness
in a previous conflict, then it is perceived as 37.6 percentage points more likely to
back down in a future dispute relative to being involved in no previous conflict at
all (p < 0.001). This is an important finding because it suggests that in potential
conflicts where war-weariness is relatively likely to occur, countries may maximize
their reputations for resolve by avoiding getting into a dispute at all, if possible.

Table 20: Fighting vs. Backing Down vs. No Previous Conflict
Action in
Previous
Conflict

Likely
to Back
Down (%)

Difference from
No Previous Conflict
(Percentage Points)

Difference from
Backed Down
(Percentage Points)

No Previous Conflict

33.7%

—

—

Backed Down

70.1%

36.4***

—

Fought;
War-Weariness

71.3%

37.6***

1.2

Note: Results depict percentage support for the statements. * = p<0.10, ** =
p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is statistically
different than 0.

Study 1 Robustness & Internal Validity
I take several steps to ensure the robustness of these findings. First, I show
in Table 21 that the results hold when the full 7-point measure of resolve is utilized;
when dropping respondents that failed the attention check; and when weighting the
sample to population demographics (Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Zu 2012).60
60

Although Lucid samples are representative based on age, gender, ethnicity, and region, in this
analysis I also weight the data to be representative on education and income.
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Table 21: Study 1 Robustness
Type of
Cost

Reputation for
Resolve

Full 7-Point Scale
War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Average)

-1.46***

War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Won)

-1.82***

War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Lost)

-1.11***

Backing Down Reputation Costs

-1.00***

Passed Attention Check
War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Average)

-1.76***

War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Won)

-2.27***

War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Lost)

-1.24***

Backing Down Reputation Costs

-1.29***

Weighted to Population Demographics
War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Average)

-1.61***

War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Won)

-1.90***

War-Weariness Reputation Costs
(Lost)

-1.32***

Backing Down Reputation Costs

-1.13***

Note: Results depict percentage support for the statements calculated from 2,000
bootstraps. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate
whether support is statistically greater than 0.
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Table 22 further shows that these results hold in a regression context when
controlling for other factors like respondent party identification, militant assertiveness, gender, education, age, income, and race. I also control for the extent to which
respondents believe Country B is likely to win a conflict with Country A, conditional
on a conflict actually occurring. Although I hold constant military capabilities across
all of the experimental conditions, one potential concern is that respondents will believe that countries that experience war-weariness are less likely to win a conflict with
Country A than countries that do not, leading to a lack of information equivalence
across experimental conditions (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018). If that is the
case, then it could be perceptions about State B’s chance of victory rather than resolve per se driving war-weariness costs. Promisingly, there is no systematic evidence
of confounding. The results are robust to holding constant this factor in a regression: Table 22 illustrates that both backing down and signs of war-weariness reduce a
country’s reputation for resolve. Model 5, which uses the full 7-point measure of reputation for resolve, and model 6, which uses a binary measure, also analyze whether
war-weariness reputation costs vary significantly depending on whether the previous
conflict ended in defeat or victory. Although there is a significant interaction in model
6, suggesting that war-weariness costs are greater when a previous conflict ends in
victory, this result does not quite reach conventional levels of statistical significance
for model 5 when the full 7-point scale is utilized (p < 0.13).
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Table 22: Study 1 Regression Results
Reputation for Resolve
(1)
Effect of Backing Down
Effect of War-Weariness

(2)

(3)

(4)

−1.14
(0.24)

Effect of War-Weariness (Won)

−1.54∗∗∗
(0.19)

Effect of War-Weariness (Lost)

−1.83∗∗∗
(0.28)

War-Weariness x Won

Militant Assertiveness
Female
Education
Age
Income
White
Black
Perceived Chance Victory
Constant
Observations

(6)

−1.27∗∗∗
(0.26)

−0.30∗∗∗
(0.06)

−0.17∗∗
(0.08)
0.24∗∗∗
(0.06)
0.01
(0.04)
−0.01
(0.03)
0.08∗
(0.04)
−0.02
(0.01)
0.03∗
(0.02)
0.001
(0.02)
−0.03
(0.06)
−0.14∗
(0.08)
−0.01
(0.02)
0.42∗∗∗
(0.13)
397

−1.38∗∗∗
(0.25)

0.01
(0.29)
−0.02
(0.16)
0.35
(0.25)
0.12
(0.07)
0.01
(0.12)
−0.17∗
(0.09)
0.22
(0.44)
−0.52
(0.50)
−0.46∗∗∗
(0.14)
4.97∗∗∗
(0.72)

−0.10
(0.20)
−0.02
(0.12)
0.42∗∗
(0.20)
−0.02
(0.06)
0.21∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.03
(0.07)
−0.24
(0.27)
−0.88∗∗
(0.38)
−0.12
(0.09)
4.47∗∗∗
(0.58)

0.23
(0.29)
−0.05
(0.18)
0.62∗∗
(0.29)
−0.14
(0.09)
0.30∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.07
(0.12)
−0.22
(0.38)
0.40
(0.63)
0.04
(0.15)
4.14∗∗∗
(0.90)

−0.49∗
(0.28)
0.12
(0.15)
−0.03
(0.26)
0.06
(0.07)
−0.04
(0.11)
−0.11
(0.09)
−0.06
(0.39)
−0.94∗
(0.50)
−0.40∗∗∗
(0.13)
5.31∗∗∗
(0.75)

−0.57
(0.37)
1.01∗∗∗
(0.26)
−0.04
(0.20)
−0.02
(0.12)
0.37∗
(0.19)
−0.02
(0.05)
0.19∗∗
(0.08)
−0.03
(0.07)
−0.15
(0.27)
−0.60
(0.38)
−0.18∗
(0.09)
4.12∗∗∗
(0.58)

212

397

194

203

397

Won
Republican

(5)

∗∗∗

∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Study 2 Experimental Design
To probe the external validity of Study 1 to a different crisis scenario and a
different experimental design, I also conducted a hybrid within-subject and between151

subject experiment on a representative sample of about 800 Americans recruited via
Lucid in December 2021.61 The design and wording of Study 2 is closely based on an
experiment conducted by Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon (2018), which analyzed
whether hand-tying signals (e.g., public threats) and sunk cost signals (e.g., military
mobilizations) impact a state’s reputation for resolve among members of the Israeli
Knesset and Israeli citizens.
Following Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon (2018), all respondents are first
informed that the United States and Country B are involved in a tense standoff at
sea. The dispute began when a US shipping vessel and a ship registered to Country B
collided, injuring people on both ships. The US and Country B both allege that their
ship was carrying sensitive military technology. Consequently, both countries are suspicious about the circumstances of the collision and are questioning the motives of
the other country. To hold constant regime type and capabilities, all respondents are
then told that Country B is a democracy and that the United States’ military forces
are estimated to be about 2.5 times stronger than Country B’s. Finally, all respondents are informed that during its most recent major international crisis, Country B
did not back down, the crisis led to war, and (according to most impartial observers)
Country B did not achieve its aims in the war. They are then asked to estimate
the probability (percentage chance) that Country B will stand firm in the dispute.
Standing firm involves not backing down from the “tense standoff at sea.” Any whole
number between 0 and 100 may be chosen. Responses to this question serve as the
baseline estimate of Country B’s reputation for resolve. In other words, this can be
thought of as the control condition.
Respondents are then told that they will be presented with an alternative ver61

More specifically, I utilize a “pre-post” design (Clifford, Sheagley, and Piston 2021). In accordance
with prior literature, I include a pre-treatment attention screener to weed out inattentive respondents
(Berinsky et al. 2014; 2019; Vaughn, Peyton, and Huber 2022).
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sion of the scenario they just read. The alternative scenario is the exact same as the
baseline scenario, except that instead of respondents being told Country B fought
and did not achieve its aims in their most recent major international crisis, they are
randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In treatment 1, Country B backed down
in the previous dispute. In treatment 2, war-weariness is primed in the exact same
way as in Study 1. Specifically, Country B fought, did not achieve its war aims,
and demonstrated signs of war-weariness. Respondents are again asked to estimate
Country B’s probability of standing firm from 0 to 100. The structure of Study 2 is
depicted visually in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Study 2 Experimental Design

There are four primary quantities of interest in this experiment; two withinsubject treatment effects, one between-subjects treatment effect, and one hybrid effect:
1. Backing Down Reputation Costs (H2 ): This is a within-subject treatment effect
that is the difference in reputation for resolve between the baseline condition and
the backing down condition.62 If respondents’ estimates of Country B’s resolve
62

Note this is exactly how this quantity of interest was calculated in Study 1. However, the major
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are lower in the backing down condition compared to the baseline condition,
then that would provide evidence—in accordance with H2 —that backing down
is harmful (all else equal) to a state’s reputation for resolve. Since each subject
effectively serves as their own “control,” this is a within-subjects estimate.
2. War-Weariness Reputation Costs (H3 ): This is also a within-subject treatment
effect that is the difference in reputation for resolve between the baseline condition and the war-weariness condition.63 If respondents’ perceptions of Country
B’s resolve are lower in the war-weariness condition compared to the baseline
condition, then that would provide evidence—in accordance with H3 —that warweariness is harmful (all else equal) to a state’s reputation for resolve.
3. War-Weariness vs. Backing Down (H4 ): This is a between-subjects treatment
effect that is the difference in reputation for resolve between the war-weariness
condition and the backing down condition. This tests whether war-weariness
is more, less, or just as harmful than backing down to a country’s reputation
for resolve. Per H4,W eak , there should be no significant difference between the
two, and according to H4,Strong , reputation for resolve should be lower in the
war-weariness condition than the backing down condition. Since this treatment
effect is calculated by comparing responses across different subjects, it is a
between-subjects estimate.
4. War-Weariness Reputation Costs vs. Backing Down Reputation Costs (H4 ):
This is a hybrid treatment effect that is the difference between backing down
reputation costs and war-weariness reputation costs. This is very similar to the
difference is that this treatment effect is calculated within subjects in Study 2, whereas it was
calculated between subjects in Study 1.
63

This is exactly how war-weariness costs were calculated in Study 1, at least for states that lost in
their previous conflict.
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above treatment effect, except it also incorporates the baseline condition into
the analysis.64 This tests whether war-weariness reputation costs are greater,
less than, or equal to backing down costs.
Overall, the benefits of this experimental design are threefold. First, it enables
me to probe the external validity of Study 1 to a different crisis scenario and experimental design. Whereas Study 1 involved a territorial dispute between two generic
countries (A and B), Study 2 involved a maritime dispute between the United States
(survey subjects’ home country) and Country B. Theoretically, we might expect baseline resolve to be higher in Study 1 than Study 2 because (a) territorial disputes are
more likely to evoke strong passions among the involved parties and be perceived
as more vital to their national interests than a maritime dispute involving colliding
ships, and (b) resolve in combatting the US, which is highly capable, may be lower
than against a more generic “Country A.”
The second benefit of this survey setup is that enables me to test the external
validity of Study 1 to a different experimental design. Whereas Study 1 utilized
a between-subjects design, Study 2 employs a hybrid between and within-subjects
design. Although a large majority of experimental studies use a between-subjects
design, within-subject designs may be “underutilized” in political science because
their advantages are understated and their disadvantages overstated (Mutz 2011).
The major comparative advantage of within-subject designs is increased precision
and statistical power compared to between-subject designs (Clifford, Sheagley, and
Piston 2021). Why is that the case? When estimating treatment effects in a betweensubjects experiment, you are comparing different survey respondents that vary based
64

Since the baseline treatment is identical for all respondents and subjects are randomly assigned to
the backing down and war-weariness treatment conditions, there should be little difference between
(3) and (4) given a sufficient sample size. However, for completeness, I estimate both treatment
effects.
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on a multitude of factors, such as age, education, gender, political identification, and
foreign policy attitudes. Although random assignment significantly mitigates these
differences in the aggregate, they can still drag down statistical power. By contrast,
in a within-subject design, each subject serves as their own control and so there
are no differences in factors like education and political identification. According to
a seminal study on within-subject experiments, the gains in statistical power can
be “dramatic,” yielding standard errors that are between 20% and 58% lower than
comparable between-subject designs (Clifford, Sheagley, and Piston 2021). Enhanced
power is particularly beneficial for experiments conducted on elites, which typically
involve relatively small sample sizes (Kertzer and Renshon 2022). This will become
especially relevant in Chapter 7, when I discuss an experiment conducted on British
policymakers.
There are, of course, some theoretical disadvantages of within-subject experiments. Most notably, they could potentially lead to demand effects and consistency
pressures. Demand effects occur if respondents surmise researchers’ hypotheses and
adjust their behavior to validate those expectations. Within-subject designs could
potentially increase the chance of demand effects because the repeated measure may
alert respondents to what researchers are testing. However, a comprehensive study
conducted by Mummolo and Petersen (2019) found minimal evidence for the existence
of demand effects. They experimentally manipulated the amount of information provided to survey subjects about the researchers’ goals and hypotheses, and they found
it had little impact on treatment effects. Another possibility is that within-subject
designs could lead to consistency pressures, where respondents feel the need to respond to dependent variable questions later in an experiment in a similar way as they
responded to them earlier in the experiment. Nevertheless, Clifford, Sheagley, and
Piston (2021) demonstrate that this concern—in addition to worries about demand
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effects—are overblown. They directly compare between-subject and within-subject
designs and find they yield substantively similar results, but that within-subject designs substantially increase statistical power and precision. Consequently, on net, the
evidence suggests that within-subject designs provide valid and credible estimates of
treatment effects.
Lastly, an additional benefit of this experimental design is that it is identical to
the one utilized in Chapter 7 on an elite sample of British policymakers. This helps
facilitate a more direct comparison between elite and public opinion.

Study 2 Main Results
Table 23 displays the main results from Study 2. I begin by discussing the findings related to war-weariness and backing down costs, which are the within-subject
treatment effects displayed in column 3.

Table 23: Study 2 Overview of Results
Probability
of Standing Firm

Baseline Probability
of Standing Firm

Within-Subject
Treatment Effect

War-Weariness
Treatment Group

45.8%

56.0%

-10.4***

Backed Down
Treatment Group

43.2%

56.6%

-13.4***

Between-Subject
Treatment Effect

2.6*

–

–

Note: Results are calculated from 2,000 bootstraps. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and
*** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is statistically different than
0.
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Per H2 and H3 , I find significant evidence for the existence of both war-weariness
and backing reputation down costs. Survey respondents in the war-weariness treatment assess that Country B has a 45.8% chance of standing firm, which is 10.4
percentage points less than the baseline. In other words, countries’ reputation for
resolve suffers if they choose to fight in the moment of decision and later display
signs of war-weariness. This finding supports DRT and complicates the argument
made by HRT that states maximize their reputation for resolve by choosing to fight
in the moment of decision. It also contradicts SRT by showing that past actions
can affect future crisis secenarios. Similar reputation for resolve costs also exist for
backing down. Survey subjects in the backing down treatment assess that Country
B has a 43.2% chance of standing firm, which is 13.4 percentage points less than
the baseline. Consequently, per the arguments of HRT and DRT—but in contrast to
SRT—the evidence suggests that backing down is not harmless to a state’s reputation
for resolve.
As displayed visually in Figure 8, war-weariness and backing down costs are
both substantively large and statistically significant.
To further probe the substantive significance of war-weariness and backing down
costs in Study 2, I collapse the 100-point measure of resolve into a binary measure that
equal 1 if respondents believed Country B was likely to stand firm in its conflict with
the United States (the probability of standing firm is greater than or equal to 50%) and
0 if respondents believed B was unlikely to stand firm (the probability of standing firm
is less than 50%). After all, marginal changes in the estimated probability of whether
a foreign country is likely to stand firm may matter less than whether observers
believe a country will either (a) be more than likely stand firm or (b) be more than
likely not stand firm. In other words, some observers may think about resolve as a
binary (a state will likely stand firm or not) rather than as a probability (there is
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Figure 8: Study 2 War-Weariness & Backing Down Reputation Costs

Note: Error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

an X% chance a state will stand firm). The results of this analysis for war-weariness
costs are displayed in Figure 9. This figure plots the densities for the war-weariness
treatment and the baseline condition. The left-hand side of the figure shows that
more respondents believe Country B is unlikely to stand firm when it shows signs of
war-weariness than in the baseline condition. The right-hand side of the figure shows
the opposite: fewer respondents believe Country B is likely to stand firm when it
shows signs of war-weariness than in the baseline condition. On average, about 62%
of respondents believe Country B is likely to stand firm in the baseline condition, while
just 46% believe B is likely to stand firm in the war-weariness condition. This means
war-weariness costs involve an over 16 percentage point reduction in the perceived
likelihood of a country standing firm.
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Figure 9: Binary Measure of Resolve: War-Weariness Reputation Costs

Figure 10 conducts a similar analysis for backing down costs. On average, about
66% of respondents believe Country B is likely to stand firm in the baseline condition, while just 44% believe B is likely to stand firm in the backed down condition.
This means backing down costs involve an over 22 percentage point reduction in the
perceived likelihood of a country standing firm.
I now turn to directly comparing reputation for resolve in the backing down and
war-weariness treatments, which is the between-subjects treatment effect displayed
in Row 3 in Table 23. Somewhat in contrast to theoretical expectations, I find that
reputation for resolve is greater when State B displays signs of war-weariness than
when they back down. However, this effect is only statistically significant at the 10%
level and is substantively small: just 2.6 percentage points. To visually illustrate
the substantively small difference in estimated resolve for respondents in the war160

Figure 10: Binary Measure of Resolve: Backing Down Reputation Costs

weariness compared to the backed down treatment, I plot the relevant densities in
Figure 11. This figure shows that the densities mostly overlap for the two treatments,
demonstrating there is little difference in estimated resolve for respondents in these
two treatment conditions. Moreover, as I show below, the significant difference between the war-weariness and backed down treatments does not hold when controlling
for other factors like political identification, providing some evidence for H4,W eak .
Next, I again collapse the 100-point measure of resolve into a binary measure
that equals 1 if respondents believed Country B was likely to stand firm in its conflict with the United States and 0 if respondents believed B was unlikely to stand
firm. Figure 12 plots the densities for the war-weariness treatment and the backed
down treatment. The densities almost entirely overlap for the two treatments, visually illustrating the lack of large differences between the two treatments. On average,
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Figure 11: War-Weariness vs. Backing Down

about 45.9% of respondents believe Country B is likely to stand firm in the warweariness condition and 44.3% of subjects believe B is likely to stand firm in the
backed down condition. The difference between the two treatments—about 1.6 percentage points—is not statistically significant and thus provides evidence for H4,W eak .
The lack of substantive differences in reputation for resolve for states that back down
compared to those that fight and show signs of war-weariness undermines the logic
of fighting in order to bolster your reputation for resolve.
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Figure 12: Binary Measure of Resolve: War-Weariness vs. Backing
Down

Study 2 Robustness & Heterogeneous Effects
I now proceed to test the robustness of these results and to probe whether there
are any heterogeneous treatment effects. I first do so for war-weariness and backing
down reputation costs, which are the within-subject treatment effects in Study 2.
Model 1 in Table 24 analyzes whether war-weariness and backing reputation down
costs hold when controlling for covariates like militant assertiveness and political identification. The negative and statistically significant coefficients on War-Weariness and
Backed Down indicate that these two treatments both reduce Country B’s reputation
for resolve relative to the baseline condition, even when controlling for other factors.
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This provides additional support for H2 and H3 . Given the 100-point scale utilized
to measure reputation for resolve, one problematic possibility is that outliers could
be driving the findings for war-weariness and backing down costs. To test this, I drop
the top and bottom 10% of dependent variable responses in Model 2. This corresponds to dropping respondents that assessed resolve in the war-weariness or backed
down condition was 50+ percentage points less than in the baseline condition, or 16+
percentage points greater than in the baseline condition. My core findings hold for
this test.
Models 3-8 in Table 24 then test for heterogeneous effects. In other words, they
test for whether war-weariness or backing down reputation costs are higher or lower
depending on different respondent characteristics. The quantities of interest for these
analyses are not the regression coefficients themselves, but the differences depicted in
the bottom rows of the table. Model 3 analyzes heterogeneous effects based on party
identification and demonstrates that there are some significant differences. Looking at
the bottom of the table, reputation for resolve in the backed down treatment relative
to the baseline condition is significantly greater for Democratic respondents than
Republican respondents. In other words, Republicans impose greater backing down
reputation costs on states than Democrats do. This finding makes logical sense, as
prior research shows that Republican members of the public generally punish leaders
more for backing down than Democratic members of the public (Kertzer and Brutger
2016; Brutger and Kertzer 2018). Model 3 also shows that war-weariness reputation
costs are greater among Independents than among either Democrats or Republicans.
Given the political importance of independents in swaying political outcomes, this is
a substantively important finding that bolsters the arguments of DRT.
Model 4 examines heterogeneous effects based on militant assertiveness. To
facilitate this analysis, I use the median split to classify respondents as either high or
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Table 24: Within-Subject Effects: Robustness & Heterogeneous Effects
Reputation for Resolve Relative to the Baseline
(1)
War-Weariness
Backed Down
Political Identification
Militant Assertiveness
Education
Income
Declined to Share Income
Female
Age
War-Weariness; Democrat

(2)
∗∗

−7.38
(4.24)
−9.84∗∗
(4.27)
−0.62*
(0.45)
1.59∗∗
(0.81)
−0.14
(0.57)
−0.06
(0.17)
−0.48
(5.72)
0.76
(2.01)
−3.60∗∗∗
(0.89)

(3)

−5.05
(2.78)
−6.26∗∗
(2.80)
−0.18
(0.30)
0.82*
(0.54)
−0.40
(0.37)
−0.07
(0.11)
−0.64
(3.84)
−2.60∗∗
(1.32)
−1.83∗∗∗
(0.58)

War-Weariness; Republican
War-Weariness; Independent
Backed Down; Democrat
Backed Down; Republican
Backed Down; Independent
War-Weariness; High Militant Assertiveness

1.70∗∗
(0.82)
−0.22
(0.57)
−0.04
(0.17)
−1.63
(5.75)
1.11
(2.01)
−3.58∗∗∗
(0.88)
−8.41∗∗
(4.28)
−8.72∗∗
(4.80)
−14.25∗∗∗
(4.60)
−10.38∗∗
(4.24)
−16.67∗∗∗
(4.95)
−12.18∗∗∗
(4.64)

−0.59*
(0.45)

−0.18
(0.57)
−0.07
(0.17)
−0.16
(5.73)
1.12
(2.02)
−3.70∗∗∗
(0.89)

−0.49
(4.12)
−3.50
(3.82)
−0.86
(4.16)
−7.62∗∗
(3.82)

War-Weariness; Low Militant Assertiveness
Backed Down; High Militant Assertiveness
Backed Down; Low Militant Assertiveness
WW: 0.51
BD: 6.34**
WW: 5.90**
BD: 1.83
WW: 5.39*
BD: -4.51

Difference Dem/Rep
Difference Dem/Ind
Difference Rep/Ind
Difference High/Low
Observations

(4)

∗∗

781

616

Notes: Results calculated from 2,000 bootstraps. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01
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781

WW: 2.99
BD: 6.91***
781

Table 25: Within-Subject Effects: Robustness & Heterogeneous Effects,
Continued
Reputation for Resolve Relative to the Baseline
(5)
War-Weariness; High Education
War-Weariness; Low Education
Backed Down; High Education
Backed Down; Low Education
War-Weariness; High Income

(6)

(7)

−6.80*
(4.97)
−6.81*
(4.38)
−8.36∗
(5.03)
−10.17∗∗
(4.35)

War-Weariness; Low Income
Backed Down; High Income
Backed Down; Low Income
War-Weariness; Female
War-Weariness; Male
Backed Down; Female
Backed Down; Male
War-Weariness; High Age

−7.37∗∗
(3.96)
−6.46*
(4.37)
−8.25∗∗
(4.04)
−10.65∗∗∗
(4.38)

War-Weariness; Low Age
Backed Down; High Age
Backed Down; Low Age
Political Identification
Militant Assertiveness
Education
Income
Declined to Share Income
Female
Age
Difference High/Low

−0.58*
(0.44)
1.52∗∗
(0.80)

−0.66*
(0.45)
1.56∗∗
(0.81)
−0.34
(0.55)

−0.11
(0.16)
0.01
(5.56)
0.54
(1.97)
−3.63∗∗∗
(0.88)

−2.06
(5.11)
0.95
(1.99)
−3.61∗∗∗
(0.89)

WW: 1.59
BD: -1.40

WW: -0.01
BD: 1.73

786

781

Difference Female/Male
Observations

(8)

−6.52∗∗
(3.85)
−8.11∗∗
(3.74)
−10.49∗∗∗
(4.01)
−9.19∗∗∗
(3.67)

−0.64*
(0.45)
1.62∗∗
(0.81)
−0.16
(0.57)
−0.06
(0.17)
−0.43
(5.72)
−3.59∗∗∗
(0.89)

WW: -0.88
BD: 2.44
781

Notes: Results calculated from 2,000 bootstraps. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01
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-17.45***
(4.64)
-7.02**
(4.29)
-16.77***
(4.49)
−12.29∗∗∗
(4.41)
-0.69*
(0.45)
1.54**
(0.81)
−0.21
(0.57)
−0.08
(0.17)
1.28
(5.73)
0.91
(2.01)

WW: -10.36***
BD: -4.42*
781

low in militant assertiveness (I also adopt a similar strategy for subsequent models).
Interestingly, backing down reputation costs are actually lower for those that score
highly in a measure of militant assertiveness than those that score lower. Model 5
shows there are no significant heterogeneous effects based on education. Model 6
shows the same is true for income. No significant heterogeneous effects emerge for
respondent gender in Model 7. Model 8, however, illustrates that both war-weariness
reputation costs and backing reputation down costs are higher for older respondents
compared to younger ones.
Next, I analyze the robustness of my results and heterogeneous effects when
directly comparing the war-weariness and backing down treatments, which is the
between-subjects effect in Study 2. Model 1 in Table 26 tests whether reputation
for resolve in the war-weariness condition is still greater than in the backing down
condition when controlling for covariates. The coefficient on War-Weariness is not
statistically significant, indicating that reputation for resolve is not greater when
Country B shows signs of war-weariness than when they back down, per H4,W eak .
This null result further demonstrates that choosing to fight in the moment of decision
does not necessarily bolster a state’s reputation for resolve if the fighting leads to
signs of war-weariness. Model 2 shows this null result also holds when addressing the
possibility of outliers by trimming the top and bottom 10% of responses.
Model 3 adopts a different approach in order to compare the war-weariness
and backed down treatments. Instead of conducting a purely between-subjects comparison between perceived reputation for resolve in the two treatments, Model 3
also controls for perceived reputation for resolve in the baseline condition. This
estimate is therefore a kind of hybrid between and within-subjects estimate; it incorporates both the within-subjects estimate of perceived reputation for resolve in
the war-weariness/backed down treatment relative to the baseline, and the between167

subjects estimate of perceived reputation for resolve in the war-weariness treatment
relative to the backed down treatment. I opt to control for baseline measures of the
dependent variable rather than create change scores (e.g., perceived resolve in the
war-weariness condition minus perceived resolve in the baseline condition) because
the former approach can yield more precise estimates and its downsides are mitigated
when treatments are randomly assigned (Blair et al. 2019; Clifford, Sheagley, and
Piston 2021). In contrast to H4 , this analysis suggests estimates of Country B’s reputation for resolve are slightly larger in the war-weariness treatment than in the backed
down treatment, though the result is only significant at the 10% level (p ≈ 0.093).

Table 26: Between-Subject Effects: Robustness & Heterogeneous Effects
Reputation for Resolve
War-Weariness
War-Weariness x Political Identification

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1.99
(1.92)

-0.70
(3.46)

2.22*
(1.68)

2.83
(3.66)
−0.23
(0.84)

3.36
(5.36)

5.16
(4.66)

2.85
(3.06)

4.92∗∗
(2.77)

1.94
(3.20)

War-Weariness x Militant Assertiveness

−0.42
(1.54)

War-Weariness x Education

−0.70
(0.94)

War-Weariness x Income

−0.09
(0.26)

War-Weariness x Female

−5.59*
(3.83)

War-Weariness x Age
Political Identification
Militant Assertiveness
Education
Income
Declined to Share Income
Female
Age
Resolve Baseline
Constant
Observations

−0.93*
(0.61)
2.46∗∗∗
(0.80)
0.49
(0.57)
0.16
(0.17)
−12.56∗∗∗
(5.68)
1.31
(2.00)
−4.02∗∗∗
(0.88)

−1.04∗∗
(0.45)
2.66∗∗
(1.10)
0.49
(0.57)
0.16
(0.17)
−12.57∗∗∗
(5.68)
1.35
(1.99)
−4.02∗∗∗
(0.88)

−1.07∗∗
(0.45)
2.42∗∗∗
(0.81)
0.84
(0.73)
0.16
(0.17)
−12.62∗∗
(5.68)
1.29
(1.99)
−3.98∗∗∗
(0.88)

−1.06∗∗
(0.45)
2.45∗∗∗
(0.80)
0.49
(0.57)
0.20
(0.21)
−12.51∗∗∗
(5.68)
1.34
(1.99)
−4.01∗∗∗
(0.88)

−1.08∗∗∗
(0.45)
2.50∗∗∗
(0.80)
0.47
(0.56)
0.17
(0.17)
−12.50∗∗∗
(5.67)
4.11*
(2.75)
−3.98∗∗∗
(0.88)

0.03
(1.73)
−1.04∗∗
(0.45)
2.46∗∗∗
(0.80)
0.50
(0.57)
0.16
(0.17)
−12.59∗∗∗
(5.68)
1.34
(1.99)
−4.03∗∗∗
(1.24)

42.72∗∗∗
(4.55)

−0.84∗∗
(0.39)
2.03∗∗∗
(0.71)
0.19
(0.50)
0.05
(0.15)
−6.64
(4.99)
1.06
(1.74)
−3.81∗∗∗
(0.77)
0.49∗∗∗
(0.03)
16.14∗∗∗
(4.06)

40.87∗∗∗
(4.44)

40.58∗∗∗
(4.86)

39.87∗∗∗
(4.61)

40.90∗∗∗
(4.34)

39.85∗∗∗
(4.34)

41.26∗∗∗
(4.49)

616

781

781

781

781

781

781

781

−1.04∗∗
(0.45)
2.46∗∗∗
(0.80)
0.50
(0.56)
0.16
(0.17)
−12.58∗∗∗
(5.67)
1.34
(1.99)
−4.01∗∗∗
(0.88)

−0.91**
(0.36)
2.41∗∗∗
(0.67)
0.32
(0.46)
-0.01
(0.13)
−5.28∗∗
(4.61)
−1.19
(1.60)
−2.83∗∗∗
(0.71)

41.23∗∗∗
(4.24)
781

Notes: Results calculated from 2,000 bootstraps. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01
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Models 4-9 analyze heterogeneous effects through a standard interaction approach. No significant heterogeneous effects emerge based on political identification
(Model 4), militant assertiveness (Model 5), education (Model 6), income (Model
7), and age (Model 9). Model 8, on the other hand, shows that the difference in
perceptions about Country B’s resolve for the war-weariness relative to the backed
down condition is significantly less for women than for men. While men appear to
believe backing down is slightly more harmful to a country’s reputation for resolve
than war-weariness, women do not.

Conclusion
In summary, this chapter utilizes a series of two experiments on the American
public in order to establish several of the key arguments of DRT. First, in accordance
with DRT and HRT, but in contrast to SRT, states face reputation for resolve costs
when they back down compared to when they do not back down, all else equal.
In other words, past actions taken in the moment of decision do matter for future
credibility, and leaders are not crazy for worrying about the negative effects of backing
down. Second, I also find evidence states face reputation for resolve costs when
they fight and show signs of backlash and war-weariness compared to when they
fight and do not demonstrate any of these signs. This is a critical result for DRT
because it demonstrates that there can also be reputation for resolve costs associated
with fighting, in contrast to HRT and SRT. Third, I generally find that conditional
on fighting leading to backlash and war-weariness, standing firm does not have a
significant effect on a state’s reputation for resolve compared to backing down. This
helps establish a key contention of DRT: that fighting does not necessarily maximize
a state’s reputation for resolve relative to backing down. Finally, Study 1 shows that
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standing firm reduces a state’s reputation for resolve compared to avoiding getting
into a dispute at all, conditional on backlash and war-weariness. This means that in
cases where backlash/war-weariness is relatively likely to occur, states can maximize
their reputation for resolve by not getting into a dispute at all because this allows
them to avoid both war-weariness and backing down reputation for resolve costs.
Nevertheless, critics might still question whether these effects are externally valid
to political decision-makers, who are the actors that most directly assess a state’s
reputation for resolve. I turn to this question next.
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Chapter 7: Experimental Evidence
Among Political Leaders
In Chapter 6, I utilized experimental studies conducted on members of the general public in order to provide evidence for DRT. Here, I conduct an elite experiment
to probe the external validity of my findings on the public. Specifically, I conduct an
experiment on United Kingdom (UK) members of parliament (MP) that is based off
of the study conducted by Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon (2018) and is identical
to Study 2 in the previous chapter. However, whereas their experiment analyzed the
impact of public threats (i.e., tied hand signals) and military mobilization (i.e., sunk
cost signals) on a state’s reputation for resolve, I test the impact backing down and
signs of war-weariness have on a state’s reputation for resolve. I begin this chapter by explaining why UK MPs are relevant elites for the purpose of testing DRT.
I then outline this study’s research design and sample before discussing its results.
Three principal findings emerge from the analysis. First, per DRT, HRT, and H2 ,
policymakers impose reputation for resolve costs against states that back down compared to those that do not back down, all else equal. This mirrors the results from
Chapter 6 and provides additional evidence against the core contention of SRT. Second, in accordance with H3 , UK MPs also impose reputation for resolve costs against
states that demonstrate signs of backlash and war-weariness compared to those that
do not. This also echoes the findings from Chapter 6 and suggests that the reputational benefits of choosing to fight in the moment of decision are more complicated
than HRT suggests. Finally, I find evidence for the strongest argument of DRT—
H4,Strong —as a state’s reputation for resolve is lower when states fight and show signs
of war-weariness than when they back down. In other words, backing down in the
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moment of decision is actually beneficial for a state’s reputation for resolve compared
to fighting. By contrast, the studies in Chapter 6 on members of the US public only
found evidence for H4,W eak . Although I cannot disentangle precisely why this result
differs between the public studies in Chapter 6 and the elite study in this chapter,65
this is an important finding given that political elites like UK MPs play a more direct role in foreign policy decision-making than members of the public. Of course,
given the more modest findings in Chapter 6 and the fact that the reputation costs
of war-weariness can likely be made artificially larger or smaller depending on how it
is primed in an experimental context, this result should not be taken to mean that
fighting (conditional on backlash) is always harmful to a state’s reputation for resolve
relative to backing down. Nevertheless, the results from this study provide further
evidence that fighting for reputation may not yield the expected benefits.

The Advantages of an Elite Experiment
Although elite experiments are still relatively rare in political science, they have
been utilized more frequently in recent years for at least three reasons (Kertzer and
Renshon 2022). The reasons for their increasing use also point to the advantages of
deploying an elite experiment in order to test the arguments of DRT.
The first explanation for the increasing use of elite experiments is that it coincides with a broader trend in political science research: a growing focus on leaders
and elite opinion (Horowitz and Fuhrmann 2018). The study of leaders in political
science and international relations initially declined in response to the rise of theories
like structural realism (Waltz 1979) and neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984),

65

I cannot pinpoint the difference because these studies differ on (at least) two factors: “eliteness”
(members of the public vs. MPs) and country of origin (US vs. UK).
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which posited that states could be effectively modeled as unitary actors. In other
words, these theories assume that individual leaders matter much less than structural
factors faced by all states, like the absence of an international government (i.e., anarchy). Nevertheless, a new wave of leader-centric research demonstrates that studying
individual-level factors—like elite opinion—can increase the explanatory power of political science theories (e.g., Wolford 2007; Croco 2011; Saunders 2011; Horowitz et
al. 2018; Yarhi-Milo 2018; Schwartz and Blair 2020). In the context of research on
reputation for resolve, an assumption that states are unitary actors and only structural factors like anarchy matter leads to arguments that are not well supported by
the empirical evidence. For example, as discussed previously, Tang (2005) adopts the
assumptions of structural realism, which leads him to conclude that reputations for
resolve cannot form at all in international politics because anarchy incentivizes states
to prepare for the worst possible scenario. To be safe and avoid unwelcome surprises,
he argues states should assume that their adversaries are highly resolved and that
their allies are irresolute. However, the evidence discussed in Chapter 2—and presented in Chapter 6—suggests this argument is not well supported. Studying elite
opinion directly in this chapter therefore helps address the limitations of theories that
assume unitary states and the preeminence of structural factors.
A second reason for the rise of elite experiments—especially in international relations and comparative politics—is that the public is poorly informed about foreign
policy issues in general and thus elite cues may be critical in shaping the public’s attitudes (e.g., Berinsky 2009; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Saunders 2015; Guisinger
and Saunders 2017). If the causal arrow regularly flows from elite opinion to public
opinion, but not the reverse, then studying elite opinion on foreign policy issues may
be more fruitful than analyzing public opinion prior to any elite cues. Of course, as
discussed in detail previously, there is significant evidence to suggest (a) public opin173

ion can also impact elite opinion, and (b) elite cues are not the exclusive driver of
public views on foreign policy issues (e.g., Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Chu and Recchia
2021). Consequently, while the importance of elite cues in the realm of international
relations makes studying elite opinion valuable, I also argue independently studying
the views of the mass public is a useful approach as well.
Third, and most importantly, scholars often turn to elite experiments in order
to probe the external validity of their findings on the public. The major concern
is that elites may differ from the public in important ways, limiting the external
validity of experiments conducted on the public. Although a preponderance of the
evidence (as discussed in Chapter 6) suggests that elite-public gaps are narrower than
is traditionally assumed (Kertzer 2020), that may not hold in every case. Theoretically, Kertzer (2020) outlines the many different reasons elite-public gaps may exist.
They could exist due to differences in traits. For example, elites tend to be more
educated and skew male compared to the general public. Differences could also occur due to differences in policy preferences/beliefs, or differences in decision-making
processes. Though it is difficult to disentangle which of these three factors drive particular elite-public gaps, for the purposes of this project it is relevant to note that
some studies do find evidence for these gaps. For example, Dellmuth et al. (2021) find
large gaps in international organization legitimacy between government officials and
citizens. In Uganda, a paired study on members of the national parliament and average citizens found the former are much more supportive of government development
programs relative to foreign aid for development, whereas the opposite holds for the
latter (Findley et al. 2017). Comparing college students and military officials, Mintz,
Redd, and Vedlitz (2006) find that the former are much more content to do nothing in
a counter-terrorism scenario compared to the latter. In the literature on gender and
international security, studies show that female members of the public are less likely
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to support the use of force than male members of the public (Eichenberg 2019; Barnhart et al. 2020), whereas female leaders have incentives to be more hawkish than
their male counterparts (Koch and Fulton 2011; Bashevkin 2018; Schramm and Stark
2020; Schwartz and Blair 2020). In a sample of parliamentarians in Belgium, Canada,
and Israel, Sheffer et al. (2018) show elites have a stronger status quo bias and exhibit
a stronger tendency to escalate commitments in the face of sunk costs compared to
non-politicians. Synthesizing previous literature, Hafner-Burton, Hughes, and Victor
(2013) conclude that elites are often more prone to overconfidence, are more aware
of other relevant political players in a strategic situation, and think farther into the
future in iterated games. Finally, Kertzer’s (2020) meta-analysis finds elite public
gaps tend to be larger in experiments about international security issues. Any one of
these differences could cause elites to evaluate the resolve of a foreign actor differently
than members of the public. As such, conducting an elite study to probe the external
validity of the results described in Chapter 6 has value.

Why United Kingdom Members of Parliament Are
Relevant Elites
Why are UK MPs relevant elites for the purposes of assessing DRT? To answer
this question, I turn to the checklist proposed by Kertzer and Renshon (2022). They
argue that scholars utilizing elite experiments should answer the following questions
in order to determine whether there is a sufficient match between the elites relevant
to a theory and the elites that are actually being surveyed:
1. Who are the relevant political elites for the theory being tested?
2. What are the dimensions on which respondents in the elite experiment can be
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conceptualized as elites?
3. What is the level of fit between the hypothetical elites that are the focus of the
theory and the actual elites that are studied empirically?
In order to establish that UK parliamentarians are an acceptable sample on
which to test DRT, I now proceed to answer the questions posed by Kertzer and
Renshon (2022) to scholars considering utilizing elite samples. Beginning with the
first question, any government official that (a) plays a role in foreign policymaking and
(b) has incentives to assess an adversary’s resolve as part of their policy analysis could
be considered a relevant political elite for the purposes of testing DRT. Who qualifies
as a relevant political elite given these criteria? Most obviously, one candidate is a
country’s chief executive (e.g., their president, prime minister, chancellor, or supreme
leader). Typically, this person has the greatest direct influence in the realm of foreign
policy and plays a key role in deciding whether or not to use military force. The resolve
of adversaries is definitely a factor that executives have an incentive to take into
account, as, for example, using military force against a more resolved adversary should
be less appealing than against a less resolved adversary. Another relevant class of elites
for the purposes of DRT includes an executive’s foreign policy advisors, military
leaders, and foreign policy bureaucrats. For example, foreign ministers, national
security advisors, generals, and diplomats. Prior research establishes that these types
of advisors play a key role in foreign policymaking (Saunders 2018), and they also
have reasons for taking into account an adversary’s resolve for the same reasons as
executives. A third group of elites that is relevant for the purposes of testing DRT is
legislators. Members of the national legislature or parliament often have a significant
influence over foreign policy (Lindsay 1994; Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Milner and
Tingley 2016). For example, legislators oftentimes have the power to overrule the use
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of force, direct—or cutoff—military spending, approve or disapprove of international
treaties, and investigate foreign policy actions and policies by the country’s executive.
Legislators are particularly relevant for foreign policymaking in democracies, as they
are more likely to have some degree of independent authority and power. When
deciding, say, when to vote in support or against the use of force, legislators also
have an incentive to consider the resolve of the potential enemy in order to evaluate
whether the military conflict is prudent or not.
Moving on to the second question proposed by Kertzer and Renshon (2022),
UK MPs can be considered elites across several dimensions. Prior literature suggests
that elites can be conceptualized in at least three different ways, all of which UK
MPs fall under (Kertzer and Renshon 2022). First, according to the “occupational
model,” elites are actors whose institutional roles give them influence over policy.
UK MPs clearly have influence over policy generally and foreign policy specifically.
Broadly speaking, UK MPs directly influence policy by making laws, investigating
the government’s actions, and holding public debates. They also have the authority
to dissolve the government via a vote of no confidence if they are unhappy with
the prime minister’s foreign policy leadership. For example, way back in 1855, UK
Prime Minister George Hamilton-Gordon (Lord Aberdeen) lost a de facto vote of no
confidence 305 to 148. This was due to the country’s poor performance in the Crimean
War, which led to high levels of British casualties and was unpopular with the public.
UK MPs also have direct influence over foreign policy. Although the decision to
use military force is technically a “royal prerogative power,” meaning the decision is
made by the prime minister on behalf of the Crown, since 2011 a convention has
emerged where parliament has an opportunity to debate and vote on the use of force
before it occurs (Mills 2018). For example, in recent years the UK parliament has
had to vote on whether to enforce a no fly zone in Libya against the Gaddafi regime,
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intervene in Syria in response to their use of chemical weapons, utilize airstrikes in
Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State, and renew the UK’s submarine-based nuclear
deterrent (Bew and Elefteriu 2017). Although most of these votes passed, if they had
not, then the UK government would most likely have been restrained from taking
action. Consequently, the 2013 vote about whether to intervene in Syria in response
to their use of chemical weapons is particularly notable, as the government lost and
thus the intervention did not occur. As then Prime Minister David Cameron said,
“It is this House that will decide what steps we next take” (Mills 2018, 29). The UK
parliament also had an opportunity to vote on whether to deploy troops before the
Second Iraq War, and even though the motion passed by a wide margin, a loss would
have constrained the UK government from taking action. Going back even farther in
history, following their disastrous (well, at least for the British) defeat in the Battle of
Yorktown, the House of Commons passed a resolution against “further prosecution of
offensive warfare on the continent of North America” (Christie 1958). Prime Minister
Frederick North (Lord North) was forced to resign shortly after.
The UK parliament, of course, is able to influence foreign policy in other ways
as well. For instance, passing laws that relate to the defense budget or the country’s
ability to prosecute a war, voting on international treaties, investigating the government’s foreign policy, and holding public debates about important foreign policy
decisions. For instance, the Emergency Powers Defence Acts passed by parliament
just before the outbreak World War II gave the UK government significantly expanded
powers to protect the country, such as seizing property. In sum, UK MPs clearly fall
under the “occupational model” of elites given their influence over policy.
UK MPs also fall under the “compositional model,” which conceptualizes elite
as a distinctive class with particular socioeconomic characteristics. As discussed by
Kertzer (2020), elites tend to skew male, highly educated, older, and more wealthy
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compared to the general population, and these differences in socioeconomic factors
can drive elite-public gaps (Dellmuth et al. 2021). UK MPs also diverge from the
general UK population in similiar ways (Cracknell and Tunnicliffe 2022). For example,
while the UK population is split about evenly between men and women, only 34% of
MPs identify as female.
UK MPs could also be categorized as elites under the “cognitive mode,” which
holds that elites have domain-specific expertise and experience (Hafner-Burton, Hughes,
and Victor 2013). Many MPs are veterans and/or members of committees like the
Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Defence Select Committee, and International Trade
Select Committee (and, of course, the prime minister him or herself is an MP). This
domain-specific expertise in the realm of foreign policy sets them apart from members of the general population. Of course, it is also possible that other relevant elites,
like military leaders and foreign policy bureaucrats, differ from MPs in ways that
are relevant to the evaluation of reputation for resolve. For instance, perhaps they
put more emphasis on capabilities than past actions. Although future research could
extend this analysis to other types of elites that have foreign policy expertise, there
are reasons to expect the results in this chapter and the previous one would be robust
to a study on military officers. Since Kertzer’s (2020) meta-analysis finds that elitepublic gaps are smaller for military personnel than for politicians, it is likely that the
relatively consistent results I find among politicians and members of the public would
be externally valid to military personnel as well.66
Finally, I turn to the last question proposed by Kertzer and Renshon (2022):
how compatible are the hypothetical elites relevant to testing DRT and UK MPs?
Overall, I would argue the level of fit is quite high. UK MPs—some of which are the
country’s cabinet ministers—play a significant role in foreign policymaking. Com66

I calculate this result using Kertzer’s (2020) replication code for Table 1.
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pared to think tank members, low-level bureaucrats, or the general public, UK MPs
play a much more direct role in decision-making (Chu and Recchia 2021). The only
other actor that plays a more direct role is a country’s actual executive. Unfortunately, surveying the world’s presidents and prime ministers is not feasible. Surveying
MPs in the United Kingdom is also a good fit for testing DRT because the UK is a major world power. They have (approximately) the fifth-largest economy in the world,
are a nuclear power, and are a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council (Chu and Recchia 2021).
Note also that my studies in Chapters 6 and 7 differ on an additional dimension
besides “eliteness:” country of origin. By surveying members of the US public and UK
elites, it is harder to isolate whether any differences are due to eliteness or country
of origin.67 On the other hand, this setup has an advantage: it stresses external
validity to an even greater extent. Therefore, if the results are similar for the two
sets of studies, then we can potentially be more confident about the results. Kertzer,
Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo (2021) adopt a similar approach in assessing the factors
that impact perceptions of resolve. They conduct experiments on members of the US
public and Israeli elites.

Research Design
The design of the elite experiment I conducted on UK MPs is substantively
identical to the design of Study 2 in Chapter 6. As in that study on the public,
this study on UK MPs is a hybrid within-subject and between-subject experiment.
Again, within-subject designs are especially valuable for elite experiments because
67

Furthermore, as Kertzer (2020) discusses, “eliteness” per se is also not causally identified even if
paired studies are conducted in the same country because differences could also be due to compositional variation between elites and members of the public.
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they need fewer participants to be well-powered statistically and elite experiments
tend to have smaller sample sizes (Dietrich, Hardt, and Swedlund 2021). This study
is no exception. Following Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon (2018), all respondents
are first informed that the United Kingdom and Country B are involved in a tense
standoff at sea. The dispute began when a UK shipping vessel and a ship registered
to Country B collided, injuring people on both ships. The UK and Country B both
allege that their ship was carrying sensitive military technology. Consequently, both
countries are suspicious about the circumstances of the collision and are questioning
the motives of the other country. To hold constant regime type and capabilities,
all respondents are then told that Country B is a democracy and that the United
Kingdom’s military forces are estimated to be about 2.5 times stronger than Country
B’s.
In terms of the realism of this scenario, a skeptic might ask whether the UK
could realistically have a conflict with a democratic country. It could. For example,
tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina—a democracy—have risen in
recent years over the Falkland Islands. In 2012, there was a recorded militarized
interstate dispute (Maoz et al. 2019) between the two countries after the UK allegedly
sent a nuclear-armed submarine to the South Atlantic (Romero and Newbery 2012).
Moreover, the UK has also had two militarized disputes in recent years (2012 and
2014) with democratic Spain over the British territory of Gibraltar, which shares a
border with Spain (Maoz et al. 2019). Both MIDs were triggered by alleged naval
incursion by Spain into the territorial waters of Gibraltar (United Kingdom Foreign
& Commonwealth Office 2012; BBC 2014). In fact, the 2014 MID was sparked by
the collision of a Spanish naval vessel and a Gibraltar police vessel. Given these
contemporary examples, a dispute at sea with a democratic country caused by the
collision of two ships is not unrealistic. Nevertheless, I do not use Argentina or Spain
181

in the experimental scenario because it may be difficult to effectively manipulate those
countries’ past actions (backed down or fought and experienced war-weariness).68
After all, UK MPs likely have fairly good knowledge of these countries and may not
believe certain experimental treatments about their past actions. By using a generic
country—Country B—as the UK’s adversary in this experiment, I should be able
to more effectively manipulate past actions. This approach is also consistent with
Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon’s (2018) design.
After this background information, all respondents are informed that during its
most recent major international crisis, Country B did not back down, the crisis led
to war, and (according to most impartial observers) Country B did not achieve its
aims in the war. They are then asked to estimate the probability (percentage chance)
that Country B will stand firm in the dispute. Standing firm involves not backing
down from the “tense standoff at sea.” Any whole number between 0 and 100 may
be chosen. Recall that responses to this question serve as the baseline estimate of
Country B’s reputation for resolve. In other words, this can be thought of as the
control condition.
Respondents are then presented with the experimental treatments. They are
first told that they will be given an alternative version of the scenario they just read.
The alternative scenario is the exact same as the baseline scenario, except that instead
of respondents being told Country B fought and did not achieve its aims in their most
recent major international crisis, they are randomly assigned to one of two treatments.
In treatment 1, Country B backed down in the previous dispute. In treatment 2,
war-weariness is primed in the exact same way as in the studies conducted on the

68

The difference in military power between the UK and Country B in the experimental scenario is
motivated by the real-world power differential between the UK and Argentina. According to 2016
composite index of national capability (CINC) scores, the most recent year for which data is available,
the UK is about 2.5 times more powerful than Argentina (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).
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public in Chapter 6. Specifically, Country B fought, did not achieve its war aims,
and demonstrated signs of war-weariness. Respondents are again asked to estimate
Country B’s probability of standing firm from 0 to 100. Finally, I ask respondents
the following open-ended question: “Please explain why your estimates of Country
B’s probability of standing firm did or did not differ between the first and second
scenario.” The structure of this study is depicted visually in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Elite Study Experimental Design

Recall that, just like Study 2 in Chapter 6, there are four primary quantities of
interest in this experiment; two within-subject treatment effects, one between-subjects
treatment effect, and one hybrid effect:
1. Backing Down Reputation Costs (H2 ): This is a within-subject treatment effect
that is the difference in reputation for resolve between the baseline condition and
the backing down condition. If respondents’ estimates of Country B’s resolve
are lower in the backing down condition compared to the baseline condition,
then that would provide evidence—in accordance with H2 —that backing down
is harmful (all else equal) to a state’s reputation for resolve. Since each subject
effectively serves as their own “control,” this is a within-subjects estimate.
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2. War-Weariness Reputation Costs (H3 ): This is also a within-subject treatment
effect that is the difference in reputation for resolve between the baseline condition and the war-weariness condition. If respondents’ perceptions of Country
B’s resolve are lower in the war-weariness condition compared to the baseline
condition, then that would provide evidence—in accordance with H3 —that warweariness is harmful (all else equal) to a state’s reputation for resolve.
3. War-Weariness vs. Backing Down (H4 ): This is a between-subjects treatment
effect that is the difference in reputation for resolve between the war-weariness
condition and the backing down condition. This tests whether war-weariness
is more, less, or just as harmful than backing down to a country’s reputation
for resolve. Per H4,W eak , there should be no significant difference between the
two, and according to H4,Strong , reputation for resolve should be lower in the
war-weariness condition than the backing down condition. Since this treatment
effect is calculated by comparing responses across different subjects, it is a
between-subjects estimate.
4. War-Weariness Reputation Costs vs. Backing Down Reputation Costs (H4 ):
This is a hybrid treatment effect that is the difference between backing down
reputation costs and war-weariness reputation costs. This is very similar to the
above treatment effect, except it also incorporates the baseline condition into
the analysis. This tests whether war-weariness reputation costs are greater, less
than, or equal to backing down costs.
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Sample
This elite experiment is conducted on a sample of 100 UK MPs recruited in
partnership with YouGov. YouGov has a data verification process to ensure that
MPs—rather than their staff members—take the survey. Additionally, according to
the academic director of YouGov:
“The general experience of the research team also tends to confirm that
this is the case. This includes: speaking to MPs’ offices to ask diary
assistants to put time in their MP’s diary to complete the survey in time
[and] getting calls from assistants and even from the MP themselves asking
to take it if perhaps they’ve missed the deadline and the survey is closed”
(Chu and Recchia 2021).
The 100 MPs in my sample also track well in terms of party identification and
gender with the actual distribution of these variables among the full population of
MPs. For example, among the full population of MPs, about 55% are members of
the Conservative Party, about 30% associate with the Labour Party, and 7% with the
Scottish National Party. In my sample, those numbers are 48%, 36%, and 11%. Thus,
the Labour and Scottish National Parties are slightly over-represented, but not by a
huge amount. In terms of gender, 32% of the MPs in my sample identify as female
compared to 34% in the full population of MPs. To correct for these small differences
and ensure a representative sample, YouGov also provides weights calculated with
reference to party identification, gender, region, and electoral cohort (i.e., the year
the MP was first elected to parliament). I present results both with and without
these weights for robustness. Finally, I should note that this sample was also utilized
in prominent research by Chu and Recchia (2021), which analyzed whether public
opinion affects the preferences of UK MPs.
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Main Results
Table 27: Elite Study Overview of Results
Probability
of Standing Firm

Baseline Probability
of Standing Firm

Within-Subject
Treatment Effect

War-Weariness
Treatment Group

30.8%

48.7%

-17.8***

Backed Down
Treatment Group

38.8%

54.5%

-15.8***

Between-Subject
Treatment Effect

-8.0**

–

–

Note: Results are calculated from 2,000 bootstraps. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and
*** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is statistically different than
0.
Table 27 displays the main results from the elite experiment. I begin by discussing the findings related to war-weariness and backing down reputation costs,
which are the within-subject treatment effects displayed in column 3. Per theoretical expectations, I find significant evidence for the existence of both war-weariness
and backing down costs. MPs in the war-weariness treatment assess that Country
B has a 30.8% chance of standing firm, which is 17.8 percentage points less than
the baseline. In other words, as in the public studies conducted in Chapter 6, countries’ reputation for resolve suffers if they choose to fight in the moment of decision
and later display signs of war-weariness. This finding supports DRT and complicates
the argument—made by HRT—that states maximize their reputation for resolve by
choosing to fight in the moment of decision. It also contradicts SRT, which contends
past actions should have no impact on future crisis scenarios. Similar reputation for
resolve costs also exist for backing down. MPs in the backing down treatment assess
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that Country B has a 38.8% chance of standing firm, which is 15.8 percentage points
less than the baseline. Consequently, per the arguments of HRT and DRT—but in
contrast to SRT—the evidence suggests that backing down is not harmless to a state’s
reputation for resolve.
As displayed visually in Figure 14, war-weariness and backing down costs are
both substantively large and statistically significant.

Figure 14: War-Weariness & Backing Down Reputation Costs

Note: Error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

To further probe the substantive significance of war-weariness and backing down
costs, I collapse the 100-point measure of resolve into a binary measure that equal 1 if
respondents believed Country B was likely to stand firm in its conflict with the United
Kingdom (the probability of standing firm is greater than or equal to 50%) and 0 if
respondents believed B was unlikely to stand firm (the probability of standing firm
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is less than 50%). Again, marginal changes in the estimated probability of whether
a foreign country is likely to stand firm may matter less than whether observers
believe a country will either (a) be more than likely stand firm or (b) be more than
likely not stand firm. In other words, some observers may think about resolve as a
binary (a state will likely stand firm or not) rather than as a probability (there is
an X% chance a state will stand firm). The results of this analysis for war-weariness
costs are displayed in Figure 15. This figure plots the densities for the war-weariness
treatment and the baseline condition. The left-hand side of the figure shows that
more respondents believe Country B is unlikely to stand firm when it shows signs
of war-weariness than in the baseline condition. The right-hand side of the figure
shows the opposite: fewer respondents believe Country B is likely to stand firm when
it shows signs of war-weariness than in the baseline condition. On average, about
59% of MPs believe Country B is likely to stand firm in the baseline condition, while
just 29% believe B is likely to stand firm in the war-weariness condition. This means
war-weariness costs involve an almost 30 percentage point reduction in the perceived
likelihood of a country standing firm. This is larger than the 16 percentage point
difference found in the comparable study conducted on the US public.
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Figure 15: Binary Measure of Resolve: War-Weariness Reputation
Costs
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Figure 16 conducts a similar analysis for backing down costs. On average, about
71% of respondents believe Country B is likely to stand firm in the baseline condition, while just 47% believe B is likely to stand firm in the backed down condition.
This means backing down costs involve an over 24 percentage point reduction in the
perceived likelihood of a country standing firm.

Figure 16: Binary Measure of Resolve: Backing Down Reputation Costs

I now turn to directly comparing resolve in the backing down and war-weariness
treatments, which is the between-subjects treatment effect displayed in Row 3 in Table
27. In accordance with the strongest version of DRT (H4,Strong ), I find that reputation
for resolve is lower—by about 8 percentage points—when State B displays signs of
war-weariness than when they back down. To visually illustrate the difference in
estimated resolve for respondents in the war-weariness compared to the backed down
treatment, I plot the relevant densities in Figure 17. This figure shows that estimates
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of Country B’s probability of standing firm cluster at the lower end of the spectrum
for MPs assigned to the war-weariness treatment and comparatively higher for MPs
assigned to the backed down treatment.

Figure 17: War-Weariness vs. Backing Down

Next, I again collapse the 100-point measure of resolve into a binary measure
that equals 1 if respondents believed Country B was likely to stand firm in its conflict
with the United States and 0 if respondents believed B was unlikely to stand firm.
Figure 18 plots the densities for the war-weariness treatment and the backed down
treatment. Again, per H4,Strong , the densities show that Country B’s reputation for
resolve is lower when it displays signs of war-weariness compared to when it backed
down in a previous crisis. On average, about 29% of respondents believe Country
B is likely to stand firm in the war-weariness condition and 46% of subjects believe
B is likely to stand firm in the backed down condition. The difference between
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the two treatments—17.6 percentage points—is substantively large and statistically
significant. These findings suggest that if fighting leads to signs of war-weariness,
then a country would have been better off backing down in the moment of decision
rather than fighting from the perspective of maximizing reputation for resolve.

Figure 18: Binary Measure of Resolve: War-Weariness vs. Backing
Down

Robustness & Heterogeneous Effects
I now proceed to test the robustness of these results and to probe whether there
are any heterogeneous treatment effects. I first do so for war-weariness and backing
down reputation costs, which are the within-subject treatment effects. Model 1 in
Table 28 analyzes whether war-weariness and backing down reputation costs hold
when controlling for covariates like party identification and gender. The negative
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and statistically significant coefficients on War-Weariness and Backed Down indicate
that these two treatments both reduce Country B’s reputation for resolve relative to
the baseline condition, even when controlling for other factors. Model 2 adds survey
weights to ensure the sample is representative based on party identification, gender,
region, and electoral cohort. The findings are robust to the inclusion of weights.
Given the 100-point scale utilized to measure reputation for resolve, one problematic possibility is that outliers could be driving the findings for war-weariness and
backing down costs. This is a particularly significant concern for this elite experiment
because the small sample size means one or a small handful of MPs that rate Country
B’s resolve as extremely high (close to a 100% chance of standing firm) or extremely
low (close to a 0% chance of standing firm) could skew the average. To probe the
robustness of my results to outliers, I drop the top and bottom 10% of dependent
variable responses in Model 4. The core findings hold for this test.
Models 5 and 6 then test for heterogeneous effects. That is, they test for
whether war-weariness or backing down reputation costs are higher or lower depending
on different respondent characteristics. The quantities of interest for these analyses
are not the regression coefficients themselves, but the differences depicted in the
bottom rows of the table. Model 5 analyzes heterogeneous effects based on party
identification. There is no significant evidence that war-weariness or backing down
costs differ based on party identification. Model 6 examines heterogeneous effects
based on whether the MP identifies a male or female. No significant differences
emerge for this analysis either.
Next, I analyze robustness and heterogeneous effects when directly comparing
the war-weariness and backing down treatments, which is the between-subjects effect
in this experiment. Model 1 in Table 29 test whether Country B’s reputation for resolve in the war-weariness condition is still lower than in the backing down condition
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Table 28: Within-Subject Effects: Robustness & Heterogeneous Effects
Reputation for Resolve Relative to the Baseline
(1)
War-Weariness
Backed Down
Conservative Party
Labour Party
Female
War-Weariness; Labour Party

(2)
∗∗∗

−21.01
(6.50)
−18.58∗∗∗
(6.09)
4.15
(6.65)
4.32
(7.26)
−1.72
(5.32)

(3)
∗∗∗

−18.26
(3.19)
−16.09∗∗∗
(3.41)

(4)
∗∗∗

−22.28
(7.34)
−19.43∗∗∗
(6.91)
4.86
(7.37)
6.14
(8.32)
−2.76
(5.52)

(5)

−18.60
(3.76)
−17.32∗∗∗
(3.66)
0.89
(3.96)
1.26
(4.13)
0.95
(3.34)

War-Weariness; Conservative Party
War-Weariness; Other Party
Backed Down; Labour Party
Backed Down; Conservative Party
Backed Down; Other Party
War-Weariness; Female

4.00
(7.33)
6.95
(8.26)
−1.55
(5.50)
−22.52∗∗∗
(6.54)
−15.32∗∗∗
(4.30)
−14.57*
(11.12)
−5.73**
(7.35)
−17.58∗∗∗
(4.86)
−23.89∗∗
(8.16)

War-Weariness; Male
Backed Down; Female
Backed Down; Male
WW: 0.10
BD: -0.03
WW: 0.29
BD: 0.12
WW: 0.19
BD: 0.16

Difference Lab/Cons
Difference Lab/Other
Difference Cons/Other
Difference Female/Male
Weights
Observations

✕
100

✓
100

✓
100

(6)

∗∗∗

✕
77

✓
100

−30.56∗∗∗
(9.27)
−19.40∗∗∗
(7.50)
−16.98∗∗∗
(8.60)
−21.97∗∗∗
(7.04)

WW: -0.004
BD: 0.06
✓
100

Notes: Results calculated from 2,000 bootstraps. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01

when controlling for covariates. The coefficient on War-Weariness is negative and
statistically significant, indicating that reputation for resolve is indeed lower among
UK MPs when Country B shows signs of war-weariness compared to when they back
down. Model 2 shows this result also holds when including weights to increase rep-

194

resentatives, and Model 3 demonstrates it is also robust to including both weights
and covariates. Model 4 addresses the possibility of outliers by trimming the top and
bottom 10% of responses.

Table 29: Between-Subject Effects: Robustness & Heterogeneous Effects
Reputation for Resolve
(1)
War-Weariness
War-Weariness x Labour Party

(2)
∗∗

−8.74
(4.72)

(3)
∗

−9.03
(4.97)

(4)
∗∗

−9.93
(5.04)

∗∗

−6.91
(3.85)

(5)

(6)

(7)

−5.50*
(4.17)

−6.00
(6.09)
−12.60
(10.95)

−8.92*
(6.22)

War-Weariness x Female
Conservative Party
Labour Party
Female
Other Party

10.35**
(6.73)
9.11*
(7.36)
3.59
(5.39)

9.86*
(7.74)
11.48*
(8.74)
4.11
(5.80)

2.07
(5.58)
−1.96
(5.94)
−1.24
(4.34)

7.17*
(5.91)
6.65
(6.45)
0.87
(4.74)

38.91∗∗∗
(4.92)

30.86∗∗∗
(7.49)

✓
100

✓
100

Resolve Baseline
Constant
Weights
Observations

29.79∗∗∗
(6.17)

41.35∗∗∗
(3.63)

31.33∗∗∗
(7.27)

37.51∗∗∗
(5.04)

0.51∗∗∗
(0.09)
4.96
(7.03)

✕
100

✓
100

✓
100

✕
77

✕
100
∗

Note:

−3.00
(10.71)
9.70*
(7.80)
11.63*
(8.80)
5.55
(7.77)

p<0.1;

8.57
(8.57)
4.92
(5.83)
−9.10*
(7.76)

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Model 5 adopts a different approach in order to compare the war-weariness and
backed down treatments. Instead of conducting a purely between-subjects comparison for perceived reputation for resolve in the two treatments, Model 5 also controls for perceived reputation for resolve in the baseline condition. This estimate
is therefore a kind of hybrid between and within-subjects estimate; it incorporates
both the within-subjects estimate of perceived reputation for resolve in the warweariness/backed down treatment relative to the baseline, and the between-subjects
estimate of perceived reputation for resolve in the war-weariness treatment relative to
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the backed down treatment. The core result holds for this test as well. Overall, these
results provide evidence for the strongest contention of DRT: that choosing to fight
in the moment of decision can undermine a country’s reputation for resolve relative
to backing down.
Models 6 and 7 analyze heterogeneous effects through a standard interaction
approach. No significant heterogeneous effects emerge based on party identification
(Model 5) or gender (Model 6).69

Open-Ended Responses
As is standard in the literature, the main dependent variable in this experiment
was a forced-choice closed-ended question that asked MPs to rate Country B’s resolve
on a 100-point scale. However, this measurement strategy has downsides. Most notably, closed-ended questions do not allow respondents to explain their answer, which
makes it difficult to understand the logic driving results (Krosnick 1999; Roberts et al.
2014). For example, even if the results from closed-ended questions are in accordance
with the arguments of DRT, we can not know for sure whether they are driven by
the logic of DRT (e.g., a previous conflict leads to a reduction in public support for
war and that leads to a reduction in their reputation for resolve) or some other rationale. Furthermore, closed-ended questions cannot necessarily disentangle the decisive
factor(s) impacting respondents’ opinions (Lazarsfeld 1944). For instance, if signs of
war-weariness reduces Country B’s reputation for resolve, is that primarily due to
the backlash among the general public or among decision-making elites? To address
this issue, I included an open-ended question that asked MPs to explain why their
69

Model 5 compares respondents in the Labour Party to respondents in the Conservative Party. A
similar null result holds if MPs in the Labour Party are compared to members of all other parties,
as well as if members of the Conservative Party are compared to MPs in all other parties.
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estimates of Country B’s probability of standing firm did or did not differ between
the first and second scenarios.
Given the small sample size of this experiment, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the open-ended responses rather than estimating a more formal topic model
(Roberts et al. 2014). Beginning with MPs randomly assigned to the war-weariness
treatment, it is clear that the results were driven by the logic outlined by DRT. The
most popular explanation for why MPs assessed Country B’s resolve to be lower in
the war-weariness treatment relative to the baseline treatment was reduced public
support for war following B’s previous conflict:
• Labour MPs
- “Expect that as a democracy they will be concerned by public opinion and
that will influence their decision.”
- “Public opinion.”
• Conservative MPs
- “Because of pressure on the government by public opinion and the media.”
- “Public opinion in Country B.”
- “Public opinion.” 70
• Other MPs
- “The optics for country B were poor in scenario A but in scenario B Country
B, a democracy, possesses a spurned demos after previous military exploits
– therefore their % is even lower.”
- “Public opinion will influence a policy maker...”
70

Two MPs answered the open-ended question this way.
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Many respondents also pointed to the views of Country B’s leadership or the
interaction between public opinion and leader views. This is in accordance with
DRT’s arguments surrounding backlash among decision-making elites:
• “The losses suffered in the previous conflict and the unpopularity of conflict
make it very unlikely that a democratically elected leader will choose war.”
• “Government was elected on an anti-conflict mandate so won’t have the stomach
to escalate.”
• “Because of the basis upon which the leader was elected and the mood of the
country following the previous conflict.”
- “Public opinion very important and new leader would make different decisions.”
• “In the second scenario it’s clear there is significant public feeling against the
war and that new leadership also feels the war was mistake so it sounds like
they are more likely to back down than in scenario one.”
Overall, the open-ended responses suggest that the findings in this experiment
related to war-weariness reputation costs are driven by the logic outlined by DRT,
as around 85% of the respondents assigned to the war-weariness condition used DRT
logic to justify their response. These open-ended responses also provide additional
qualitative evidence that public opinion matters to policymakers, as prior literature
has demonstrated. The few respondents that did not outline DRT logic instead
advocated a position closer to SRT, which is that past actions are not particularly
informative about future resolve:
• “Impossible to predict the behaviour of the Country B so kept both at 50%.”
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• “The facts leading up to the dispute remain.” 71
Moving on to respondents assigned to the backed down condition, a review of
the open-ended responses suggest backing down costs are driven by the logic outlined
by HRT. Specifically, in contrast to the general contention of SRT, past actions do
seem to influence expectations of future behavior. In fact, UK MPs in this experiment
said this quite directly:
• “Previous actions.”
• “Previous behavior.”
• “History of backing down.”
• “The history of Country B’s actions.”
• “Based on their history of how they dealt with the conflict previously.”
• “Possible propensity to back down in a dispute based on recent history.”
• “History.”
• “They have form for folding!”
One MP had a particularly strong implicit criticism of SRT’s contention that
past actions are relatively uninformative: “I would have thought the answer was
obvious!” Nevertheless, some MPs assigned to the backed down treatment did indicate
views consistent with SRT, though this was clearly a minority opinion:
• “I think the response will largely be the same.”
71

This respondent did not assess Country B’s resolve as different in the war-weariness treatment and
the baseline treatment.
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• “Both scenarios suggest the same probability.......”
• “I rated them the same. I went 50% to try to indicate my neutral view on the
questions!”
Finally, one MP outlined logic consistent with the “never again” (Mercer 1996,
40) or “reassertion” (Stapleton 2014, 23-25) hypothesis: “Backing down didn’t work
last time, so as a democracy country B has to stand strong or risk wrath of domestic
population.”
In sum, an analysis of the open-ended question from the elite experiments suggests the main results are driven by logic consistent with DRT and HRT respectively.

Conclusion
In summary, this chapter provides additional evidence for DRT. Employing an
elite survey experiment, which is relatively rare in political science, I was able to
causally identify the impact of backing down and war-weariness. Per the arguments
of DRT, three primary results emerged. First, backing down is harmful to a state’s
reputation for resolve, all else equal. Second, signs of backlash and war-weariness
also reduce a state’s reputation for resolve, all else equal. Third, UK MPs assess
that a state’s reputation for resolve is lower when it chooses to fight in the moment
of decision and displays signs of backlash and war-weariness than when it backs
down in the moment of decision. These results—especially when combined with the
findings of Chapter 6—complicate the logic of fighting for the purpose of enhancing
or maintaining your state’s reputation for resolve.
Still, survey experiments have their limitations. In this case, one of the principal
criticism one could levy is that this experiment makes backing down and signs of
200

war-weariness particularly salient. In the real world, which is a more informationrich environment, it is thus possible these factors would be less informative and have
smaller effects (Brutger et al. forthcoming). While future experimental research
could test this contention directly by including more contextual information, since I
am making both backing down and war-weariness particularly salient, that should not
necessarily bias the results when comparing backing down and war-weariness, even if
the effect sizes may be inflated. More importantly, I also provide evidence for DRT
using large-N statistical analyses of real-world data and a historical case study, which
helps mitigate this weakness of survey experiment. To this end, in the next chapter, I
probe whether similar dynamics hold outside of the lab in interactions between actual
states.
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Chapter 8: Large-N Statistical
Evidence Among Countries
Recall that in Chapter 4 I showed that a state’s actual resolve—measured in reference to political parties’ hawkishness according to data collected by The Manifesto
Project—is reduced in response to conflicts that are more likely to lead to backlash.
This provided evidence for one of the key mechanisms of DRT, as a reduction in a
state’s actual resolve could reasonably reduce a state’s reputation for resolve. In this
chapter, I complete the second step of this analysis by testing whether it is indeed
true that a reduction in a state’s actual resolve, which can be caused by participation
in a previous conflict, harms their reputation for resolve.
Specifically, I assess whether countries with leaders whose political party is
less hawkish—as measured by The Manifesto Project—are more likely to have their
threats reciprocated by foreign countries in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)
compared to countries with leaders whose political party is more hawkish. The rate
at which an initiating state’s disputes are reciprocated by a target state should be
associated with the initiating state’s reputation for resolve. If (all else equal) a state
has a lower reputation for resolve, then its threats will be seen as less credible and thus
target states should be less fearful of reciprocating them (e.g., Schultz 2001; Weeks
2008; Horowitz et al. 2018; Post and Sen 2020). Alternatively, target states should
be more hesitant to reciprocate in disputes with states that have a higher reputation
for resolve, as doing so is more likely to risk a costly conflict.
In a series of statistical models, I find evidence for the expectations of DRT.
A one standard deviation increase in my hawkishness measure is associated with a
25% to 30% decrease in the probability that a country’s threats will be violently
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reciprocated in MIDs. For my alternative measure of a state’s resolve—support for
international peace—the substantive size of the effect is even larger: 40% to 48%.
Since the evidence presented in Chapter 4 and Part II of this dissertation established
that fighting in the past can reduce a state’s future resolve, and the results in this
chapter show that a reduction in a state’s resolve can also undermine its reputation
for resolve, this provides evidence for DRT’s contention that choosing to fight can ultimately reduce its reputation for resolve. Even more directly, I also provide evidence
that fighting in wars that are more likely to lead to backlash decrease a country’s reputation for resolve to a greater extent. In combination, these results provide evidence
that the dynamics of DRT can hold outside of the experimental lab.

Research Design
For data on MID initiation and reciprocation, I use version 5.0 of the MID
dataset from the COW Project, which covers the 1816-2014 period (Palmer et al.
2020). I restrict my analysis to bilateral MIDs, as multilateral coalitions of states will
likely cloud the impact of a single state’s level of hawkishness (e.g., Braithwaite and
Lemke 2011; Post and Sen 2020). In total, this yields 267 cases between 1947 and
2014 of MIDs initiated by states coded in The Manifesto Project.72 I construct two
dependent variables from the MID dataset. The first, VIOLENT RECIPROCATION,
is coded as 1 if the target state uses force in response to the initial threat and 0
otherwise. The second, ANY RECIPROCATION, is coded as a 1 if the target states
responds in any way to the initial threat (e.g., by threatening to use force or actually

72

Unfortunately, given that The Manifesto Project only includes data for a relatively small subset
of countries, other datasets do not contain a sufficient number of observations to conduct a robust
statistical analysis. For example, the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) dataset only contains
45 relevant observations (Sechser 2011).
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using force) and 0 otherwise.
The main explanatory variable in this analysis is the same measure of hawkishness from The Manifesto Project utilized previously. Specifically, given the importance of government executives in interstate conflict relative to coalition partners or
opposition parties, this variable reflects the hawkishness score of the political party
that supplies the country’s leader. As before, I also use the extent to which a leader’s
party supports international peace as a robustness check. As a secondary explanatory
variable, I utilize the Expected Backlash measure from Chapter 4 to probe whether
after wars that are a priori expected to cause greater backlash states have lower
reputations for resolve.73
In accordance with previous studies, I control for a range of factors that could
affect MID reciprocation and be correlated with reputation for resolve in order to
mitigate the possibility of omitted variables bias:74
• Initiator Capability Share: This variable measures the relative balance of power
in the dispute, calculated by dividing the initiating state’s CINC score by the
target state’s CINC score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Given that I
exclude material capabilities from my definition of resolve, this is an important
factor to control for. States with greater material capabilities could be perceived
as more resolved and it is less attractive to reciprocate threats made by them.
• Initiator Nuclear Possession: Using data from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009),
I also control for whether the initiator possesses nuclear weapons, as fear of
nuclear war could reduce the target state’s willingness to escalate the dispute
73

I anticipate that this variable will have a weaker connection to a state’s reputation for resolve than
my proxy for resolve (hawkishness) since the latter is closer in the causal chain to reputation for
resolve than the former.

74

The results are also robust to the inclusion of the RILE variable from The Manifesto Project, which
measures the ideology of a political party.
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and states with nuclear capabilities may be viewed as more resolved.
• Regime Type: Given the democratic peace finding and arguments that democratic institutions may enable states to more effectively signal resolve (e.g.,
Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001), I include variables measuring the initiating and
target state’s regime type using data from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019) or
Polity (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). I utilize V-Dem in the main models because Polity contains missing data for 9 countries. However, the results
remain robust to the use of binary democracy variables generated from Polity.
• Alliance: This variable equals 1 if the initiating and the target state have any
type of alliance coded in the ATOP dataset (Leeds et al. 2002). Since MIDs
initiated against an ally might be perceived as less legitimate by the targeted
state, they may be more likely to provoke reciprocation (Gelpi 2003). States
may also be viewed as less willing to risk and endure costs in conflicts against
their allies. The results also hold when this variable is limited to defense pacts
between countries.
• Contiguity: Since contiguous countries are more likely to engage in conflict with
each other (Bremer 1995; Vasquez 1995), possibly incentivizing reciprocation in
order to avoid developing a reputation for irresolve, I control for whether the
initiating and target states are separated by only a land or river border (Stinnett
et al. 2002).
• Initiator Female: Following previous studies that find leader gender could affect
the credibility of threats and the relative hawkishness of leaders (e.g., Post
and Sen 2020; Schwartz and Blair 2020), I control for the gender of the leader
of the initiating state. Data on gender comes from the Leader Experience and

205

Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset up until 2004 (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis
2015), and the Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) dataset
for the remaining years (Bell 2020).
• Initiator Age: I also control for leader age using data from LEAD and REIGN
because prior research suggests that the threats of older leaders may be considered more credible and thus older leaders may be viewed as more resolved
(Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005).
• Type of Dispute: Finally, I include binary variables for the issue at stake in the
MID—territory, policy, regime, or other—as the type of dispute may affect the
likelihood of reciprocation and impact estimates of a state’s resolve (e.g., Huth
1988).
Besides including the above series of control variables, there are three other
principal components of my estimation strategy. First, I cluster standard errors by
initiating country since disputes initiated by the same country may be somewhat
related.75 Second, I control for time dependence using the cubic polynomial approach
(Carter and Signorino 2010). Third, in some models I include initiator fixed effects
and thus only leverage variation within countries that initiated MIDs in my sample.
Given that fewer factors vary within initiating countries that between them, this
strategy helps create more homogeneous control groups.

75

The results are also robust to clustering by dyad (i.e., country pairs) given that disputes between
the same countries may be related.
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Results
Table 30 contains the results from 8 different logistic models of MID reciprocation.76 Models 1 through 4 analyze violent reciprocation, and models 5 through 8
examine reciprocation in general. To ease interpretation, I report odds ratios instead
of traditional coefficient estimates. Odds ratios are interpreted relative to 1, where
values greater than 1 imply that a variable is increasing the odds of MID reciprocation, and values less than 1 suggest that a variable is decreasing the odds of MID
reciprocation. For example, a variable with an odds ratio of 2 implies that a one-unit
increase in that variable doubles the odds of reciprocation. Similarly, a variable with
an odds ratio of 0.5 implies that a one-unit increase in that variable halves the odds
of reciprocation. To further ease the interpretation of substantive effects, I convert
my two main independent variables—HAWKISHNESS and SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE—into standard deviation units. This means that a one-unit increase

in these variables corresponds to a one standard deviation increase in its value.
Moving to the analysis, Model 1 in Table 30 analyzes the impact of hawkishness
on violent MID reciprocation. As expected, violent reciprocation by target states is
significantly less likely when initiating states are more hawkish. Specifically, a one
standard deviation increase in HAWKISHNESS is associated with an over 25 percent
decrease in the odds of violent reciprocation. Model 2 tests the robustness of this
result by including initiator fixed effects and thus only leveraging variation within
countries that initiated MIDs in my sample (Horowitz et al. 2018).77 Even with
a small sample size of 232, the results are robust to the inclusion of initiator fixed
76

The results also hold when probit or OLS models are utilized instead, or standard errors are clustered
by dyad.

77

Unfortunately, it is not feasible to utilize dyad fixed effects in these models, as doing so causes over
half of the observations to drop from the analysis. Given that the sample size is already relatively
small, this makes a robust statistical analysis infeasible.
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Table 30: Are the Threats of More Hawkish Governments Less Likely
to Be Reciprocated?
Violent Reciprocation

Hawkishness
Support for International Peace
Initiator Capability Share
Initiator Nuclear Possession
Initiator Level of Democracy
Target Level of Democracy
Alliance
Contiguity
Initiator Female
Initiator Age
Territorial Dispute
Policy Dispute
Regime Dispute
Peace Years
Peace Years Squared
Peace Cubed
Observations
Initiator Fixed Effects

(1)
0.7454∗∗∗
(0.0841)

(2)
0.7068∗
(0.1422)

1.0029∗∗∗
(0.0009)
1.0401
(0.7294)
0.2467
(0.3186)
0.7656
(0.6748)
0.5263
(0.3682)
1.2982
(1.3264)
1.1424
(1.0973)
1.0165
(0.0197)
0.5684
(0.3920)
0.9751
(0.3081)
1.6872
(1.8118)
0.9969
(0.0555)
0.9981
(0.0027)
1.0000
(0.0000)
267
✕

1.0031
(0.0021)
0.7295
(0.4894)
0.1823
(0.2418)
0.6671
(0.5921)
0.4515
(0.2315)
7.0828∗∗
(5.6173)
2.1824
(2.0320)
0.9989
(0.0228)
1.1040
(0.8523)
1.1360
(0.4654)
2.0106
(2.7259)
0.9894
(0.0806)
0.9982
(0.0039)
1.0000
(0.0000)
232
✓

Any Reciprocation

(3)

(4)

1.4149∗∗∗
(0.1895)
1.0033∗∗∗
(0.0010)
0.7436
(0.5643)
0.2249
(0.3036)
0.7497
(0.6350)
0.5758
(0.3995)
1.3354
(1.3523)
1.1373
(1.1176)
1.0121
(0.0181)
0.6121
(0.4385)
1.0450
(0.3324)
1.8138
(2.3306)
0.9933
(0.0559)
0.9980
(0.0028)
1.0000
(0.0000)
267
✕

1.4825∗
(0.3130)
1.0034
(0.0021)
0.7262
(0.4865)
0.1498
(0.1995)
0.6356
(0.5676)
0.4657
(0.2413)
9.5538∗∗∗
(8.1446)
2.1343
(1.9922)
0.9947
(0.0223)
1.1375
(0.8829)
1.1842
(0.4856)
1.7606
(2.3405)
0.9901
(0.0812)
0.9978
(0.0040)
1.0000
(0.0000)
232
✓

(5)
0.8318
(0.1666)

(6)
0.7815
(0.1319)

1.0030∗∗∗
(0.0008)
0.8549
(0.4539)
1.2311
(1.6610)
0.9406
(0.6756)
0.5161
(0.2976)
1.0741
(0.7217)
0.5797
(0.5453)
1.0231
(0.0195)
2.9583∗∗
(1.5818)
0.6132∗
(0.1787)
0.5292
(0.5907)
1.0069
(0.0458)
0.9986
(0.0025)
1.0000
(0.0000)
267
✕

1.0029
(0.0019)
0.5748
(0.3688)
1.9088
(2.4451)
0.8171
(0.6146)
0.4795∗
(0.2034)
2.8941
(1.8801)
0.9011
(0.8235)
1.0159
(0.0200)
3.4724∗∗
(2.1636)
0.5490∗
(0.1935)
0.5803
(0.7285)
1.0114
(0.0717)
0.9984
(0.0034)
1.0000
(0.0000)
244
✓

(7)

(8)

1.3455∗∗∗
(0.0869)
1.0033∗∗∗
(0.0009)
0.6638
(0.3410)
1.1853
(1.5807)
0.9090
(0.6229)
0.5547
(0.3087)
1.0960
(0.7374)
0.5757
(0.5442)
1.0195
(0.0188)
3.1847∗∗
(1.6706)
0.6341
(0.1890)
0.5727
(0.7121)
1.0014
(0.0488)
0.9987
(0.0026)
1.0000
(0.0000)
267
✕

1.4536∗
(0.2833)
1.0031∗
(0.0019)
0.5649
(0.3623)
1.6817
(2.1743)
0.7489
(0.5664)
0.4976
(0.2121)
3.8955∗
(2.7189)
0.9306
(0.8561)
1.0132
(0.0195)
3.6461∗∗
(2.2798)
0.5513∗
(0.1962)
0.5290
(0.6568)
1.0098
(0.0719)
0.9982
(0.0035)
1.0000
(0.0000)
244
✓

Notes: Coefficient estimates represent odds ratios. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.

effects. This implies that reduced resolve—which, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, can
be caused by participating in a past conflict—can also undermine a state’s reputation
for resolve.
Models 3 and 4 also analyze violent reciprocation, but instead use SUPPORT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE as the main explanatory variable. Per expectations,

violent reciprocation by target states is more likely for initiating countries that are
more supportive of international peace. Substantively, in Model 3 a one standard
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deviation increase in SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE is associated with an
over 40 percent increase in the odds of violent reciprocation. And that number rises
to almost 50 percent in Model 4 when initiator fixed effects are used.
In order to further illustrate the substantive impact of HAWKISHNESS and SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, Figure 19 uses the estimates in Models 1 and 3 to
show how changes in these variables affect the probability of violent MID reciprocation when
holding all other controls at their means. A one standard deviation increase in hawkishness
reduces the probability of violent MID reciprocation by over 4 percentage points, and a one
standard deviation decrease in support for international peace reduces the probability of violent MID reciprocation by about 5 percentage points. Given that the baseline probability
of violent reciprocation in these models is about 20 percent, a decline of 4 or 5 percentage
points constitutes a significant reduction.

Figure 19: Substantive Impact on MID Reciprocation

Note: Error bars display 95% confidence intervals.
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Going back to Table 30, Models 5 and 6 show that the results are weaker when
analyzing reciprocation in general for the hawkishness variable. Although the effect of
HAWKISHNESS on any type of reciprocation is in the expected direction, it does not reach
conventional levels of statistical significance. By contrast, in Models 7 and 8 SUPPORT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE remains significant in the expected direction. What explains the discrepancy in results between violent reciprocation and any reciprocation for
the hawkishness variable? To explore this question, I generate a new specification of the
dependent variable that equals 0 if there is no reciprocation, 1 if there is non-violent reciprocation,78 and 2 if there is violent reciprocation.79 In accordance with previous literature
(Potter and Baum 2014), Table 31 presents the results of two multinomial logit models,
which show that HAWKISHNESS and SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE have
a significant effect on violent reciprocation, but do not have a significant effect on non-violent
reciprocation.80 This, then, explains why the statistical results for any type of reciprocation were less strong than the results for violent reciprocation: the former category includes
non-violent reciprocation.
Theoretically, what explains this divergence? Potter and Baum (2014, 172) provide
a possible answer:
“Of course, all reciprocation is not equal. In particular, low-level, nonviolent
reciprocation may be less subject to variations in initiator credibility in part
because it has a lesser chance of leading to uncontrolled escalation. Indeed,
such tepid reciprocation may, in fact, represent a hedging strategy from a target
state that believes the initiator is indeed credible but is perhaps playing for
time and information or seeking to minimize the costs from its own domestic
audience that might follow immediate acquiescence. In contrast, higher-level
reciprocation, including the actual use of violence, is a clearer indication that
the target is challenging the initiator’s credibility. It may, therefore, be the case

78

This includes a state threatening to use military force or displaying military force.

79

This entails the actual use of military force.

80

Note that this table presents traditional coefficient estimates rather than odds ratios, meaning that a
coefficient less than 0 lowers the chances of reciprocation, while a coefficient greater than 0 increases
the chances of reciprocation.
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Table 31: Violent vs. Non-Violent MID Reciprocation
Multinomial Logit
Violent
Non-Violent
Violent
Non-Violent
Reciprocation Reciprocation Reciprocation Reciprocation
(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)
Hawkishness
-0.2897∗∗
0.0559
(0.1404)
(0.3665)
Support for International Peace
0.3735∗∗∗
0.1882
(0.1163)
(0.1943)
Observations
267
267
267
267
Controls
✓
✓
✓
✓
Initiator Fixed Effects
✕
✕
✕
✕
Notes: Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Omitted category is no reciprocation. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.

that violent reciprocation might drive any credibility-based effects for overall
reciprocation.”
Overall, then, the results suggest that a country’s level of hawkishness and support
for international peace does affect perceptions of its credibility and resolve in MIDs, but
only for higher-levels of reciprocation.
As one last test, I analyze in Table 32 whether wars that are expected to lead to greater
backlash reduce reputation for resolve. Model 1 shows that they do. A one-unit increase in
the EXPECTED BACKLASH measure increases the probability of violent reciprocation by
almost 20%. However, this result does not hold in Model 2 when initiator fixed effects are
included. Given the small sample size (just 225) this is not surprising, as there is not a huge
amount of variation for the statistical model to leverage. It is also not surprising that the
results are somewhat stronger for the HAWKISHNESS variable, which proxies resolve, than
the EXPECTED BACKLASH measure. The reason being the former is closer in DRT’s
causal chain to reputation for resolve than the latter. In any case, this analysis also provides
some direct evidence that fighting in the past can undermine a state’s reputation for resolve.

211

Table 32: Do Wars With Higher Expected Backlash Reduce Reputation
for Resolve?
Violent Reciprocation
(1)
(2)
1.1944∗
1.0744
(0.1198)
(0.2537)
1.0032∗∗∗
1.0033
(0.0008)
(0.0021)
0.9878
0.6714
(0.7781)
(0.4649)
0.2683
0.1352
(0.3124)
(0.1875)
1.3764
1.1038
(1.2772)
(0.9964)
0.9929
0.9916
(0.0077)
(0.0102)
0.4472
0.4708
(0.3422)
(0.2404)
1.4496
5.6470∗∗
(1.5121)
(4.3213)
1.0911
1.6174
(1.1140)
(1.4827)
1.0073
0.9892
(0.0212)
(0.0219)
0.3194∗∗
0.5710
(0.1707)
(0.4969)
0.9656
1.1216
(0.2797)
(0.4588)
1.5841
1.6466
(1.6578)
(2.1947)
1.0207
1.0039
(0.0616)
(0.0829)
0.9972
0.9977
(0.0030)
(0.0040)
1.0000
1.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
263
225
✕
✓

Expected Backlash
Initiator Capability Share
Initiator Nuclear Possession
Initiator Level of Democracy
Target Level of Democracy
Initiator Political Ideology
Alliance
Contiguity
Initiator Female
Initiator Age
Territorial Dispute
Policy Dispute
Regime Dispute
Peace Years
Peace Years Squared
Peace Cubed
Observations
Initiator Fixed Effects
Notes: Coefficient estimates represent odds ratios.
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
*p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Conclusion
Experiments provide some significant advantages over observational analyses, especially their ability to make causal inference more feasible by holding relevant factors constant
and randomly assigning treatments to respondents. While Chapters 6 and 7 provided significant support for DRT in an experimental setting, skeptics might wonder whether these
effects hold in the real world outside of the experimental lab. The analysis in this chapter
helps address this concern through an examination of over 250 militarized interstate disputes
between real countries. Chapter 4 established a key mechanism of DRT, which is that wars
that are more likely to lead to backlash can reduce a state’s actual resolve, as proxied by the
hawkishness of party manifestos. This chapter then connected the mechanism of DRT to its
hypothesized main effect by showing that a reduction in a state’s actual resolve can reduce
its reputation for resolve, as proxied by violent reciprocation in MIDs. I also provide direct
evidence that wars that are more likely to lead to backlash directly undermine a country’s
reputation for resolve. In sum, Chapter 4 illustrated that war-weariness is a real phenomena,
and this chapter shows that war-weariness can have harmful effects for a state’s reputation
for resolve. Next, I proceed to test DRT in the context of a historical case study, which
enables me to zoom in on the views of one leader and trace the logic of DRT.

213

Chapter 9: Historical Case Study
Evidence – The First Iraq War
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are pros and cons to historical case studies. Relative
to experimental studies, it is more difficult to examine counter-factuals in historical case
studies, potentially reducing internal validity. On the other hand, historical case studies
can test whether a finding holds outside of the lab when certain information is not being
made especially vivid. Compared to large-N statistical analyses, individual historical case
studies may have diminished external validity as it is unclear whether the dynamics in those
specific cases hold more generally or not. Nonetheless, historical case studies also provide
an important benefit compared to large-N studies: the ability to go more in-depth on a case
and better understand the sequencing of events.
Given the benefits of historical case studies, this chapter tests all three reputation
theories in the context of the First Iraq War, which was sparked by Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990. Specifically, I test what impact the United States’ participation in the
Vietnam War had on its reputation for resolve in Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s eyes vis-avis the First Iraq War. Testing theories of reputation in the context of historical case studies
is challenging because leaders’ public statements about their adversaries’ resolve may not
reflect their private beliefs given bargaining incentives to lie and understate their enemies’
resolve in public. Additionally, prior work points to a selection effect that makes inference
challenging: during a crisis leaders may be more likely to concentrate on new information and
thus not explicitly discuss the impact that their adversary’s past actions had on assessments
of their reputation for resolve (Fearon 1994b; Huth 1997; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015,
478). This makes historical case studies a relatively hard test for the arguments of DRT and
HRT.
As discussed in more depth in the next section, I choose to study the First Iraq War
because captured Iraqi government documents allow for an understanding of Iraqi leaders’
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private beliefs. This helps address the first problem noted above. There are also good
theoretical reasons to think that each of the three principal reputation theories might hold
for this case. Though scholars could debate whether this test represents a most-likely or
least-likely case for each of the three reputation theories—or somewhere in between—a
scenario where there are strong reasons to expect each theory would hold offers a useful test
of these theories since all can be “steel manned” rather than “straw manned.” Although I do
not claim that evidence for DRT in this case offers conclusive evidence for its validity (or
vice-versa), at the very least this case can demonstrate the plausibility of DRT in a different
type of analysis than in the preceding chapters.
My examination of the Vietnam War’s impact on the US’ reputation for resolve in
Saddam Hussein’s eyes yields four primary conclusions. First, in contrast to SRT, but
in support of HRT and DRT, the United States’ past actions in Vietnam did appear to
significantly impact its reputation for resolve. This finding provides additional evidence
that past actions do indeed “matter” for international politics. Second, per HRT, DRT,
and H2 , I find some evidence that backing down, all else equal, is harmful to a state’s
reputation for resolve. Third, in accordance with DRT and H3 , but in contrast to SRT
and HRT, I find that perceived war-weariness from the US’ war in Vietnam undermined
its reputation for resolve. Finally, and most importantly, I find evidence for the strongest
argument of DRT (H4,Strong ): participating in the Vietnam War and choosing to stand firm
in the initial moment of decision ultimately undermined the United States’ reputation for
resolve on net. In other words, choosing to fight in Vietnam did not maintain or enhance the
US’ reputation for resolve as expected by HRT; instead, it reduced it. Overall, this analysis
further demonstrates the plausibility of DRT.

Case Selection
There are four primary reasons why this case was chosen. First, the Vietnam War was
substantively very important. The US fought in Vietnam for almost 20 years, sacrificed over
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58,000 American lives, and spent almost three quarters of a trillion (2011) dollars (Daggett
2010; National Archives 2019). Testing which of the three reputational theories best explains the impact of the Vietnam War on the US’ reputation for resolve is thus inherently
valuable. Second, Saddam’s many public statements on American resolve combined with
information on secret internal conversations provides a unique opportunity to assess the US’
reputation for resolve in the eyes of an autocratic foreign leader.81 Given that leaders may
have incentives to understate their true perceptions of an opponent’s resolve in public in
order to gain a more favorable bargaining position, the availability of private, internal Iraqi
government discussions may offer a more accurate view of the US’ reputation for resolve.82
Third, Saddam’s views were paramount to Iraqi decision-making during the First Iraq War
and thus are substantively important to study. For example, the Iraqi armed forces chief
of staff Lieutenant General Husayn Rashid Muhammad explained that “Saddam involved
himself in all aspects of planning for the defense of Kuwait–especially enemy scenarios. His
guidance was described as ‘continuous’ and the meetings were recorded so that military
staffs could ‘follow [Saddam’s directives] to the tiniest detail” ’ (Woods 2008, 129). Fourth,
as will be described below, there are good theoretical reasons to think that each of the three
reputational theories might hold for this case study, which helps avoid a situation where one
or more of the competing theories to DRT is “straw-manned.”

Background on the Conflict
The origins of the First Iraq War can be traced back at least as far as the Iran-Iraq
War, which raged from 1980 to 1988. Besides the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis that were
killed in the conflict, the Iran-Iraq War was also devastating to Iraq’s economy, which set

81

Though it should be noted that there was not much daylight between Saddam’s public pronouncements and private beliefs (Woods 2008, 309).

82

Of course, leaders may also have incentives to lie in private conversations. However, these incentives
are likely to be lessened in discussions with allies compared to public statements that can be observed
by enemies.
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the stage for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
Iraq’s economic problems following the Iran-Iraq War were multifaceted and led to
significant tensions with their neighbor Kuwait. One serious problem related to wartime
debts. Iraq entered the Iran-Iraq War with about $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves
and ended the conflict about $80 to $100 billion in debt (Yetiv 1997, 6-7). Most of these
debts were owed to Iraq’s Arab neighbors, including Kuwait (Freedman and Karsh 1993,
39; Woods, Palkki, and Stout 2011, 166). However, given the weakness of Iraq’s economy,
Saddam Hussein had no intention of paying back these debts. Instead, Saddam demanded
Kuwait forgive their wartime debt. In later interviews with the FBI after being captured by
US forces, Saddam even claimed that he believed Iraq had received aid from Arab countries
rather than loans, and only after the war had these countries “changed their minds” (Battle
2009a, 5). Despite Saddam’s obstinance, Kuwait refused to yield and demanded Iraq’s
debts be repaid. Tensions rose further in 1989, when Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed a nonaggression and military assistance agreement that forgave Iraq’s wartime debt. This put
additional pressure on Kuwait to also forgive Iraq’s debt, though they refused to yield and
continued to demanded repayment (Woods 2008, 47). Consequently, one benefit of the
invasion from Saddam’s perspective was that it enabled Iraq to avoid paying their debt to
Kuwait.
A second reason Iraq invaded Kuwait relates to oil prices. The estimate of how
much it would cost Iraq to rebuild following the Iran-Iraq War was a whopping $230 billion
(Freedman and Karsh 1993, 39; Karsh and Rautsi 2002, 201). Unfortunately for Iraq, the
price of oil—the driver of Iraq’s economy—was quite low following the war, which made it
difficult for them to rebuild. In interviews with the FBI, Saddam blamed Kuwait and what
he perceived as their overproduction of oil (the evidence does suggest they were exceeding
OPEC quotas) as a significant cause of low oil prices (Watson et al. 1991, 17; Battle 2009b,
1). Saddam even equated Kuwait’s overproduction to a kind of economic warfare: “War is
fought with soldiers and much harm is done by explosions, killing, and coup attempts, but
it is also done by economic means. Therefore, we would ask our brothers who do not mean
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to wage war on Iraq: this is in fact a kind of war against Iraq” (Karsh and Rautsi 2002,
206). Not only did Saddam insist that Kuwait curtail oil production, but he also demanded
billions of dollars in compensation from Kuwait for lowering oil prices, which they had no
intention of paying (Woods 2008, 52). Therefore, another reason for the invasion of Kuwait
was to stop their overproduction of oil and raise its price (Watson et al. 1991, 17).
Finally, another significant cause of the conflict involved land. Iraq had claimed
Kuwait as its own territory when it declared independence in 1961, rationalizing that it had
been part of the Ottoman Empire. To his FBI interrogators, Saddam said that “Kuwait is
Iraqi” and Kuwait was “stolen” from Iraq by a British resolution (Battle 2009c, 1). Thus,
Saddam and many Iraqi decision-makers believed Kuwait rightfully belonged to Iraq, which
made it easier to justify invasion and annexation in their minds. In the short-term, annexing
Kuwait would also enable Iraq to boost its own oil production by taking over Kuwaiti oil
assets. One of the biggest economic blows of the Iran-Iraq War to Iraq was the destruction
of much of their oil production infrastructure. For example, their offshore oil facilities in
the south (Mina-l-Bakr and Khaur al-Amayya) were destroyed (Marr 2011, 301-302). Oil
exports from Iraq were also embargoed by many countries during the war, which made a
huge dent in their bottom line. Combined, these factors severely hurt Iraqi oil production
and revenues. Before the war they produced around 3.5 million barrels a day and made
$26 billion a year via exports, whereas by 1982 Iraq was able to produce only around 1
million barrels a day and made $10 billion a year in export revenue (Marr 2011, 301-302).
Seizing Kuwait and their oil production assets could thus help make up for the destruction of
Iraq’s oil infrastructure and their fledgling production (Marr 2011, 321-322). Additionally,
Iraq had border disputes with Kuwait over the critical Rumalia oil fields and the strategic
Bubiyan Islands, which further increased animosity between the two parties (Woods 2008,
47). For instance, Iraq claimed that Kuwait had been “side-drilling” under Iraqi soil and
illegally taking oil from the Rumalia field. As compensation, Iraq insisted on a $2.5 billion
payment (Woods 2008, 52).
Overall, invading Kuwait enabled Iraq to avoid paying back its wartime debt, end
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Kuwait’s overproduction, increase oil prices, take back land viewed as belonging to Iraq
historically, and seize Kuwait’s financial and oil resources (Yetiv 1997, 6-7). It also would
theoretically allow Saddam to distract the Iraqi people from internal, economic problems and
refocus their attention on external threats in order to boost his personal political standing
(Woods 2008, 41).
The invasion began at 2 in the morning on August 2, and Kuwait was no match for
the Iraqi military. 100,000 Iraqi troops and 300 tanks easily defeated Kuwait’s relatively
small army of 16,000 in about 12 hours (Karsh and Rautsi 2002, 217-218). Iraq implemented
a new government, annexed the country, and began stealing its financial resources by taking
$2 billion from Kuwait’s central bank (Marr 2011, 332).
Of course, the biggest obstacle to the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq was not the
Kuwaiti military, but the United States and its allies. The key to victory, from Saddam’s
perspective, was deterring the US from entering the conflict and, if necessary, ultimately
defeating the United States on the battlefield. What was Saddam’s plan for doing so and
how did the US’ experience in the Vietnam War shape his strategy? In the following sections
I lay out the expectations of SRT, HRT, and DRT regarding how the Vietnam War should
have affected Saddam’s calculus, and then evaluate the three theories based on the empirical
record.

Expectations of SRT
SRT would, of course, expect that the Vietnam War would have no significant impact
on Saddam’s calculus in the First Iraq War. Moreover, there are numerous reasons to expect
that this should be a relatively easy test (Eckstein 1975; Levy 2008) for reputation skeptics:
there was a large time lag between the end of the Vietnam War and the beginning of US
military operations in Kuwait (over 15 years); US presidential leadership had changed over
several times since the end of the Vietnam War; the Vietnam War and First Iraq War took
place in different regions of the world; and the aims of the two wars were quite different in
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that the Vietnam War was about internal political change, while the First Iraq War was
primarily about restraining Iraq’s foreign policy aggression by expelling the Iraqi military
from Kuwait. Nevertheless, this case study will demonstrate that the Vietnam War did have
a significant effect on the US’ reputation for resolve in the eyes of Saddam, which provides
strong evidence against the arguments of SRT.

Expectations of HRT
It was the logic of HRT that provided the principal justification for initiating and
remaining involved in the Vietnam War. In 1965, when the administration of President
Lyndon Johnson was debating whether to send the first group of American troops to Vietnam, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said: “If the Communist world finds out we will not
pursue our commitments to the end, I don’t know where they will stay their hand” (Khong
1992, 128). In the same meeting, President Johnson asked his national security advisor
McGeroge Bundy: “Wouldn’t all these countries say that Uncle Sam was a paper tiger,
wouldn’t we lose credibility breaking the word of three presidents, if we did as you have
proposed?” (Khong 1992, 127). As the very first words of this dissertation noted, in 1966,
Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, a friend and colleague of Schelling, wrote
in an internal government memo that:
“The reasons why we went into Vietnam to the present depth are varied; but
they are now largely academic. Why we have not withdrawn from Vietnam is
one reason: to preserve our reputation as a guarantor, and thus to preserve our
effectiveness in the rest of the world. We have not hung on to save a friend, or to
deny the Communists the added acres and heads. . . or even to prove that ‘wars
of national liberation’ won’t work...At each decision point we have gambled;
at each point, to avoid the damage to our effectiveness of defaulting on our
commitment, we have upped the ante...It is important that we behave so as to
protect our reputation” (Page 1998, 22).
In 1970, when asked about the possibility of withdrawing from Vietnam, President
Johnson said: the US “would be seen as an appeaser and we would find it impossible to
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accomplish anything for anybody anywhere around the entire globe” (Goodwin 1994, 251253). Finally, on the topic of abandoning Vietnam, President Richard Nixon said: “...the
cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations’ confidence
in our reliability” (Nixon 1969, 45). So, would proponents of HRT expect a payoff from the
US’ massive investment in Vietnam?
It is tricky to think about how Vietnam should affect the US’ reputation for resolve
according to the logic of HRT. On the one hand, the US ultimately withdrew from Vietnam,
which, all else equal, should have reduced American reputation for resolve in the eyes of
HRT (and DRT). On the other hand, as Robert Jervis points out, the US “was willing to
fight for years in a country of little intrinsic value,” which should have significantly enhanced
American reputation for resolve according to HRT (Jervis 1982, 10). In fact, it stands to
reason that the US fighting for almost 20 years at tremendous monetary and human costs in
a strategically insignificant country should have been an incredibly strong signal to the rest
of the world about America’s resolve, and a stronger signal than the ultimate decision to
back down. Overall, then, the logic of HRT suggests that fighting in Vietnam should likely
have enhanced the US’ reputation for resolve in the eyes of Saddam, or, at the very least,
maintained it.83

Expectations of DRT
There are also good reasons to think that the arguments of DRT would hold in this
case. All of the scope conditions that increase the chances of public and elite backlash to
a war are present in the case of Vietnam: the Vietnam War was tremendously costly, the
US lost, the goal of the intervention was internal political change, and the interests involved
were primarily reputational rather than intrinsic. It is no surprise, then, that America’s
participation in the Vietnam War caused significant public and elite backlash. Per H3 , DRT
83

Though it also suggests that, all else equal, the US’ reputation for resolve may have suffered to some
extent for ultimately choosing to withdraw from the conflict.
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would expect that perceived or actual war-weariness resulting from the Vietnam War would
undermine America’s reputation for resolve in the eyes of Saddam Hussein, all else equal.
The strongest version of DRT (H4,Strong ) would also expect that the Vietnam War would
negatively impact the US’ reputation for resolve in the eyes of Saddam on net. In other
words, instead of the Vietnam War as a whole maintaining or enhancing the US’ reputation
for resolve per HRT, it should have undermined it.

Evaluating the Three Reputation Arguments
There is no empirical support for SRT’s expectation that the Vietnam War would
have no significant impact on Saddam’s calculus in the First Iraq War, and very little
support for HRT’s expectations. In complete contrast to the arguments of SRT, Iraqi leaders
and media constantly and consistently pointed to America’s past actions in Vietnam as an
important factor in understanding the US’ current resolve (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 276).
In partial, but damning, contrast to HRT’s arguments, Iraqi leaders and media constantly
and consistently pointed to Vietnam as a sign of America’s lack of resolve (Freedman and
Karsh 1993, 276). Therefore, overall, fighting in the Vietnam War did not enhance the US’
reputation for resolve in the context of the First Iraq War, despite all of the time, blood,
and treasure sunk in Vietnam.
Now, a proponent of HRT might retort that if the chief reason Saddam downgraded
US reputation for resolve was due to the US ultimately backing down, then that is not a
strong critique of their theory. If only the US had stayed strong and refused to withdraw,
then its reputation for resolve would have been boosted. There is, in fact, some evidence—in
accordance with H2 —that the reason Saddam downgraded his estimate of American resolve
was because of the US withdraw from Vietnam. Saddam referenced on more than one
occasion how America’s withdrawal from Vietnam revealed a lack of fortitude and stamina
(Haselkorn 1999, 51). For example, in a public speech on September 5, 1990, Saddam
proclaimed: “Their outcome [in Vietnam] is known to you. How would they do then if
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they were to confront Iraq under completely different circumstances, except for what the
people, including the Vietnamese and Iraqi people, have in common: the determination to
face the invaders?” (FBIS 1990a, emphasis added). From this statement, we can ascertain
that Saddam believed Iraq had greater resolve than the US because of America’s ultimate
withdrawal and defeat in Vietnam. Here, it is not the backlash or war-weariness that
developed from the Vietnam War that signals America’s lack of resolve, but America’s
defeat and withdrawal in Vietnam that does so. Furthermore, per HRT and DRT, Saddam
clearly bought into the logic of backing down reputation costs (H2 ), as he believed that
America’s withdrawal from other conflicts indicated their lack of resolve. For example, in
a speech to the Arab Cooperation Council on February 24, 1990, Saddam said: “We saw
the United States as a superpower departed Lebanon immediately when some Marines were
killed, the very men who are considered to be the most prominent symbol of its arrogance”
(Benigo 1992, 48).
Nevertheless, there are two crucial problems with the argument that Saddam’s downgrading of US reputation for resolve due to America’s ultimate withdrawal from Vietnam
invalidates criticisms of HRT. First, even if we accept that the US could have prevented
a reduction in its reputation for resolve by refusing to back down from Vietnam, the fact
is that some wars may simply not be sustainable. It is hard to imagine that, practically
speaking, it would have been sustainable to remain involved in the Vietnam War indefinitely.
Consequently, given that withdraw from Vietnam was highly likely at some point, the wisdom, from a reputational perspective, of getting involved initially is seriously in doubt. The
US was not given meaningful credit by Saddam for standing strong in the initial moment of
decision and refusing to back down for almost 20 years. Instead, the US was penalized for
ultimately backing down, likely because the US made the Vietnam War incredibly salient by
refusing to initially back down and fighting vigorously for so many years. Second, and more
importantly, the main reason Saddam downgraded American reputation for resolve was not
because they ultimately withdrew from Vietnam, but because he believed that the backlash
from the war led to war-weariness. Overall, these two points provide more support for the
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arguments of DRT than HRT.
There are several factors that can assist us in differentiating whether Saddam downgraded the US’ reputation for resolve due to perceived war-weariness or due to ultimately
backing down many years into the conflict. First, if it was perceived war-weariness from
Vietnam that decreased the US’ reputation for resolve, then we might find evidence that
Saddam believed Vietnam shifted the views of the American public and leaders against
war. While backing down from a conflict might reveal the US’ pre-existing lack of interests and willingness to suffer costs, which was previously private information held by the
US, a change in America’s status quo interests and willingness to suffer costs corresponds
to the war-weariness mechanism. Second, finding evidence that Saddam believed America
was fatigued from Vietnam would fit with a war-weariness explanation. Since fatigue would
ostensibly have only increased if the US had not ultimately backed down from Vietnam, the
cause of fatigue would be war-weariness rather than backing down. Finally, if it was perceived war-weariness from Vietnam that decreased the US’ reputation for resolve, then we
might find evidence that Saddam believed reminding the American public and leaders about
the trauma of Vietnam would reduce the chance of US intervention. Since war-weariness
can reduce resolve by creating a reference point in people’s minds that causes them to inflate
their estimates of a subsequent war’s costs, an adversary might try and exploit this by making the reference point more salient. As it turns out, there is evidence for all three of these
factors prior to the First Iraq War, which suggests that war-weariness, real or imagined,
from Vietnam lessened Saddam’s assessment of American resolve.
Saddam’s main hope for preventing US intervention against Iraq in response to their
invasion of Kuwait, or, more likely, defeating the US after they intervened, was to exploit
what he considered to be America’s crippling casualty aversion (Haselkorn 1999, 52). To
this end, in a Revolutionary Command Council meeting in November 1990, Iraqi Foreign
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said, “If they [the Americans] were to find
out that the battle is going to be long, they would not attack. That is the important
thing; that is the important thing” (Woods 2008, 163). Saddam agreed and said, “We will
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show them in reality it is going to be [a] long [war]” (Woods 2008, 163). Similarly, in a
private meeting in December 1990, Saddam said, “[Can anyone tell me] why America has
not ventured to a war for a long time now? Because they see our preparation and realize
they will suffer a great [number of] human casualties. After that, the decision maker would
say that he does not want to remain...Also, if [Secretary of State James] Baker decides with
him [Bush], he will lose his chance for reelection in the next period, because he wanted to
become the President after President Bush finishes his term” (Conflict Records Research
Center 1990, 16). More specifically, on July 25, 1990, in a meeting with US Ambassador
April Glaspie, Saddam said: “Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one
battle” (Sifry 2003, 64). From then on, Saddam only lowered his estimate of how many
casualties it would take to force America to withdrawal from a conflict with Iraq. In a
television interview on December 24, 1990, Saddam asserted: “We are sure that if President
Bush pushes things toward war and wages war against us — his war of aggression which
he is planning — once 5,000 of his troops die, he will not be able to continue the war”
(FBIS 1990b). Then, on February 24, 1991, in a private meeting among Iraqi leaders, one of
Saddam’s generals said that Iraq would win “if we can have the Americans lose 5,000 soldiers
in this battle,” and Saddam corrected him and said: “500” (Conflict Records Research Center
1991, 4). In the same meeting, Saddam also said they would be victorious if “a ratio of four
Iraqi casualties to every one American” were achieved (Woods 2008, 26). Saddam’s view
that America suffered from severe casualty aversion is why he ordered his generals to inflict
“maximum casualties” on US troops (Seir and Pasztor 1991) and why Iraqi Foreign Minister
and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz told US Secretary of State James Baker on January
9, 1991 that: “You think it [the war] will be short but we are determined and confident it
will be long” (FBIS 1992). The question then becomes whether Saddam believed the US
was so susceptible to casualties because of perceived war-weariness that developed from the
Vietnam War or because withdrawing from Vietnam signaled that the US had an underlying
casualty aversion. Given that the US was willing to endure over 400,000 casualties in World
War II, over 36,000 casualties in the Korean War, and over 58,000 casualties in the Vietnam
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War, it would not make much sense for Saddam to think that America’s withdrawal from
Vietnam alone indicated that the US could not bear 10,000, 5,000 or even 500 casualties in a
potential conflict with Iraq (DeBruyne 2018). It is more reasonable to conclude that Saddam
believed America’s experience in Vietnam shifted its willingness to endure casualties and thus
reduced its resolve. This seems to have been confirmed by General Wafiq Al-Samarrai, Iraq’s
head of military intelligence during the war, who said: “[Saddam] thought that America’s
involvement in Vietnam had badly damaged its willingness to use military power” (Frontline
1997). Similarly, Yevgeni Primakov (who negotiated directly with Saddam Hussein on the
Soviet Union’s behalf immediately before the war and later became the minister of foreign
affairs and prime minister of Russia) noted that Saddam followed anti-war demonstrations in
the United States and believed they suggested America would not invade (Primakov 1999).
Because Saddam based his entire strategy around his theory of US casualty aversion and this
was a consequence of perceived war-weariness that resulted from the Vietnam War rather
than backing down from Vietnam, this case provides more evidence for DRT than HRT.
There is other evidence as well that suggests perceived US war-weariness from Vietnam reduced its reputation for resolve in Saddam’s mind. For example, in his speech to the
Arab Cooperation Council on February 24, 1990, Saddam suggested that America’s resolve
had been diminished due to fatigue (ostensibly from Vietnam): The US “...has displayed
signs of fatigue, frustration, and hesitation when committing aggression on other peoples’
rights and acting from motives of arrogance and hegemony” (Benigo 1992, 48). Saddam
also hinted that the he believed the American people were tired of war when he said to
Iraqi journalists on January 14, 1991, that: “Peoples, such as the ones in the West, have
no interest in a war...Evidence of this is that war has not erupted yet but anti-war demonstrations are staged. What would happen if war erupts?” (FBIS 1991). There were, in
fact, several large anti-war protests in the US that attracted over 100,000 people (Mirra
2011, 268-269). Besides references to American fatigue, there is also evidence that Saddam
believed reminding the American public and leaders about the trauma of Vietnam would reduce the chance of US intervention. In an address to the American public on September 26,
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1990, Saddam promised that going to war with Iraq would be like “repeating the Vietnam
experience, only this time...more violent and more casualties” (C-SPAN 1990). He likely
believed that making the reference point of Vietnam more salient would marginally reduce
the chance of American intervention. In the same vein, Saddam allowed CNN reporters
in Baghdad because he believed if they reported on the costs of the war, then American
public opinion would turn against the war and there would be greater pressure on the US
government to end the conflict (Taylor 1998, 89). And after the war had begun, captured
coalition pilots were paraded on Iraqi TV to evoke memories of Vietnam where videos were
released of captors confessing their “crimes” (Taylor 1998, 104). These pieces of evidence all
suggest that the central reason Saddam downgraded American reputation for resolve was
because he perceived war-weariness had developed in response to America’s experience in
Vietnam.
Now, a critic might retort that the US was not actually war-weary from Vietnam
since they deployed several hundred thousand troops during Operation Desert Storm and
expected to absorb tens of thousands of casualties during the course of the war (Broder
1991). Although this may be true, when it comes to reputation for resolve perception is
more important than reality. If Saddam believed that the US was war-weary, then that is a
sufficient condition to reduce America’s reputation for resolve. It is also important to note
that there are other factors that impacted Saddam’s calculus. For example, some scholars
point to Ambassador Glaspie’s statements to Saddam in private that, at worst, encouraged
him to invade Kuwait, and, at best, did not sufficiently discourage him from doing so.
The argument I advance in this chapter is not that America’s experience in Vietnam was
the only factor that impacted Saddam’s calculus, but simply that it was one significant
factor. Finally, it is necessary to note a limitation with this analysis, which is common to
historical case studies in general: the counter-factual cannot be directly observed. That
means we cannot know for sure how America’s reputation for resolve would have changed if
the US never fought in Vietnam. The inferences made in this chapter are, then, somewhat
speculative. Still, it is hard to imagine that not fighting in Vietnam at all decades earlier
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would have undermined the US’ reputation for resolve in Saddam’s view to the extent that
fighting harmed it. Overall, then, this case suggests that fighting in order to maintain or
enhance your reputation for resolve—as the US did in Vietnam—may backfire.

Conclusion
To summarize, the analysis of the Vietnam War’s impact on the US’ reputation for
resolve in Saddam Hussein’s eyes yielded four primary conclusions. First, in contrast to
SRT, but in support of HRT and DRT, the United States’ past actions in Vietnam did
appear to significantly impact its reputation for resolve. Second, per HRT, DRT, and H2 ,
I find some evidence that backing down, all else equal, is harmful to a state’s reputation
for resolve. Third, in accordance with DRT and H3 , but in contrast to SRT and HRT, I
find that perceived war-weariness from the US’ war in Vietnam undermined its reputation
for resolve. Finally, and most importantly, I find evidence for the strongest argument of
DRT (H4,Strong ): participating in the Vietnam War and choosing to stand firm in the initial
moment of decision ultimately undermined the United States’ reputation for resolve on net.
Contrary to the arguments of HRT, the US’ almost 20 years of costly commitment in
Vietnam did not bolster its reputation for resolve. Instead, per DRT, America’s decision to
fight in Vietnam was counter-productive from a reputation for resolve perspective. Now, of
course, this case does not imply that fighting is always detrimental to a state’s reputation
for resolve. But, it does demonstrate the plausibility of DRT’s arguments for a substantively
important case (Levy 2008, 6-7). It also enhances the external validity of this dissertation’s
previous findings utilizing an experimental and large-N statistical approach.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
Summarizing the Argument and Evidence
For what reasons should countries be willing to risk blood and treasure by going
to war? This was the question I posed in the first sentence of this dissertation, and the
subsequent analysis has been an attempt to shed additional light on it. One conventional
answer to this query is that states should be willing to engage in conflict in order to maintain
or enhance their reputation for resolve in the eyes of other countries. Failing to do so
will embolden a state’s enemies and thus be counter-productive in the medium and longterm. This argument goes back at least as far as the fifth century BC, when Thucydides
(1954, 90) wrote (via Pericles), “If you give in, you will immediately be confronted with
some greater demand, since they will think that you only gave way on this point through
fear.” However, I argue that this conventional wisdom is, at best, incomplete and, at worst,
incorrect. Choosing to fight does not always maximize a state’s reputation for resolve and,
in some cases, can undermine it.
In order to make this argument, I propose a new theory of reputation—Dovish Reputation Theory—that proceeds in two steps. First, I contend that fighting can result in a
reduction of a state’s actual resolve if backlash to the war materializes and leads to a degree of
war-weariness among a country’s citizens and leaders. Second, I posit that foreign countries
can observe the signals of reduced resolve associated with backlash and war-weariness, which
can then undermine that state’s reputation for resolve. In this way, fighting to demonstrate
resolve can backfire.
To substantiate this argument, I bring a variety of different types of evidence to bear
by adopting a multi-method approach. First, I test the key mechanism of DRT by analyzing
whether fighting can undermine a state’s level of resolve. In Chapter 3, I utilize a survey
experiment to show that participation in a past war can undermine the American public’s
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willingness to support the use of force in a subsequent conflict. In Chapter 4, I conduct
a large-N statistical analysis that demonstrates political parties adopt less hawkish foreign
policy positions following wars that are theoretically more likely to lead to backlash. Finally,
in Chapter 5 I use a historical case study to show that US resolve was diminished in the
interwar period following World War I, despite the fact that war-weariness was relatively
unlikely to develop from a theoretical perspective in response to the great war.
In the second part of my empirical analysis, I test the main effect of DRT by probing
whether fighting can undermine a state’s reputation for resolve. In Chapter 6, I administer
two survey experiments on the US public that show there are reputation for resolve costs
associated with fighting. In Chapter 7, I leverage a unique sample of United Kingdom
Members of Parliament and establish that, in some cases, backing down rather than fighting
can actually enhance a state’s reputation for resolve. In Chapter 8, I follow-up on the largeN results from Chapter 4 to demonstrate that a reduction in a state’s actual resolve—which
can occur as a result of choosing to fight in the past—can also diminish its reputation for
resolve. Lastly, in Chapter 9 I employ a historical case study to illustrate that the US’
participation in the Vietnam War undermined its reputation for resolve in the eyes of Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein on the eve of the First Iraq War. By utilizing a variety of different
methods in order to establish the key arguments of DRT, we can be more confident in its
internal and external validity. Consequently, when taken as a whole, the evidence presented
in this dissertation in support of DRT is greater than the sum of its parts.

Implications for Academic Scholarship
The most important contribution this project makes to academic scholarship is to
provide a new way to think about how fighting or not fighting in the past impacts a state’s
future reputation for resolve. The current major theories of reputation for resolve in the
literature posit that fighting either enhances a state’s reputation for resolve relative to backing down (Hawkish Reputation Theory) or has no impact at all on a state’s reputation for
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resolve (Skeptical Reputation Theory). By contrast, Dovish Reputation Theory posits that
fighting can harm a state’s reputation for resolve under certain conditions. This novel way
to think about the relationship between fighting or backing down and a state’s future reputation for resolve is an insight that scholars of reputation, bargaining, signaling, extended
deterrence, overextension, hegemonic decline, grand strategy, international relations theory,
public/elite opinion, and domestic politics should consider moving forward.
For academic scholarship on reputation, this project suggests that the assumption that
fighting in the past cannot undermine a state’s future reputation for resolve is incorrect. It
also implies that scholars should not assume that a state’s actual resolve is exogenous to
the decision about whether to fight or not fight, and that only analyzing the choice made
in the moment of decision “all else equal,” while ignoring the direct consequences of that
decision—such as fighting—can be misleading. Nonetheless, though DRT disagrees with
SRT and HRT on several critical points, it does not invalidate or fully contradict either of
them. With respect to SRT, DRT does not dispute its argument that there are situations in
which past actions may have a smaller impact on a state’s future reputation for resolve. For
example, after longer periods of time and when the stakes and issue-areas in the two disputes
vary to a greater extent. In accordance with HRT, DRT stipulates that backing down in the
moment of decision, all else equal, does harm a state’s reputation for resolve compared to
standing firm. Additionally, while the reputation costs of backing down are universal (though
their size may vary), the reputation for resolve costs associated with fighting are conditional
on backlash and/or war-weariness occurring. This means that though DRT, HRT, and SRT
can be considered distinct theories and paradigms with their own set of predictions, they are
not necessarily diametrically opposed to each other and can potentially be complementary
if deployed in a nuanced manner.
For scholarship on bargaining (e.g., Fearon 1995), this dissertation suggests that
choosing to fight in the present could undermine a state’s bargaining leverage in the future
by lowering its resolve and reputation for resolve. In other words, the kinds of negotiated
settlements states may be able to achieve in the future may be less advantageous if fighting in
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the past hurts their resolve and reputation for resolve. These insights could be incorporated
into future theoretical and formal models, as well as empirical analyses, on bargaining.
With respect to scholarship on signaling, this project demonstrates that signs of warweariness—in addition to backing down—send a message of irresolve to foreign countries.
Just as sunk cost and tied hand signals can enhance a state’s credibility, signs of warweariness or backing down can curtail it (e.g., Fearon 1997; Tomz 2007; Kertzer and Brutger
2016; Schwartz and Blair 2020).
Compared to direct deterrence, extended deterrence is about the protection of allies
through the threat of punishment against those who would harm them. In order to attract
allies and deter threats against them, states may care about their reputation for reliability
vis-à-vis their allies. Per this logic, prior studies find that violating alliance commitments
can undermine a state’s ability to attract and deter threats against them (e.g., Gibler 2008;
Miller 2011; Crescenzi et al. 2021). Nevertheless, a counter-intuitive implication of DRT
is that upholding an alliance commitment today by engaging in conflict could, potentially,
undermine a state’s willingness to uphold the same or a similar commitment tomorrow and
thus undermine extended deterrence. As Jervis (1991, 36, emphasis added) said, “The effort
to help an ally—whether successful or not—will not make the desired impression if others
believe that it has so drained the defender’s power or resolve that it will not repeat the
exercise.”
For work on overextension, hegemonic and imperial decline, etc., DRT provides an
additional explanation for why these phenomenon occur (e.g., Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987;
Snyder 1993). If choosing to engage in military conflict bleeds not only a major power’s
resources, but also its resolve and reputation for resolve, then that can lead to decline.
When it comes to academic work on grand strategy, DRT implies that the advantages
of approaches that are more restrained and call for less military intervention are greater
than conventional wisdom suggests (e.g., Posen and Ross 1996/1997; Ikenberry 2001; Posen
2014; Avey, Markowitz, and Reardon 2018; Silove 2018). Furthermore, proponents of more
activist grand strategies may actually undermine their ability to get their way in the future
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by supporting military intervention in the present that can lead to war-weariness. A similar
takeaway applies to the international relations theory debate between offensive and defensive
realists. The latter advocate for less aggressive foreign policies for a variety of reasons,
but especially because the security dilemma means aggressive behavior can lead to counterbalancing (Lobell 2010). Like defensive realism, but for different reasons, DRT also indicates
that aggressive foreign policies may not bring the security benefits that offensive realism
promises.
Finally, this project also has implications for research on public opinion, elite opinion,
domestic politics, and the constraints these factors impose on a country’s ability to use
military force (e.g., Sobel 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002; Gartner, Segura, and Barratt 2004;
Kriner and Shen 2007; Weeks 2008; 2012; Turbowitz 2011; Baum and Potter 2015; Payne
2019; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Chu and Recchia 2021; Kertzer and Renshon
2022). Most importantly, this dissertation provides evidence that backlash to a past conflict
can undermine the public’s willingness to engage in future conflicts and political parties’
willingness to engage in future conflicts, thereby heightening the domestic constraints against
using military force. Scholars studying domestic politics and public/elite opinion should
therefore consider the impact that conflicts have on a state’s future resolve. Although prior
research found only mixed evidence for the war-weariness hypothesis, the evidence presented
in this dissertation provides more robust support for it (Garnham 1986; Levy and Morgan
1986; Pickering 2002; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Stapleton 2014, 2015; DiCicco and
Fordham 2018).

Implications for Policymaking
Although not all academic work is policy-relevant or read by policymakers, research
suggests that political science scholarship—including on matters related to credibility and
reputation—does influence foreign policy (e.g., Avey et al. 2022). As a result, academic
research on which theory of reputation is most accurate (or under which conditions each
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theory is most likely to hold) is not simply an ivory tower exercise, but also can have realworld implications. So, what are they for this dissertation?
At the highest level of generality, the most important implication of this project for
policymakers is that they should be more skeptical about the utility of using military force.
This is especially the case when the primary or a principal rationale for a conflict is based
on extrinsic concerns about reputation rather than because the outcome of the conflict is
intrinsically meaningful to a country. Because fighting can undermine a country’s reputation
for resolve, the reputational benefits of choosing to fight are not as great as the conventional
wisdom suggests. Policymakers should also be particularly skeptical of conflicts that involve
internal political change, do not involve significant direct security interests, are likely to be
costly, and are relatively more likely to end in defeat. Given that these factors make backlash
and war-weariness more likely, they increase the probability that fighting will undermine a
country’s future resolve and reputation for resolve. In sum, by being more skeptical about
the utility of intervention and the HRT-based “obsession with credibility” (Posen 2014, 33)
that exists among the foreign policy establishment, policymakers can reduce the risk of
embroiling their country in “unnecessary,” “dumb,” and “stupid” wars. President Lyndon
Johnson’s (1971, 147-148) statement in a 1965 cabinet meeting illustrates this point well: “If
we run out on Southeast Asia, there will be trouble ahead in every part of the globe—not
just in Asia, but in the Middle East and in Europe, in Africa and Latin America. I am
convinced that our retreat from this challenge will open the path to World War III.” Of
course, the US’ eventual retreat from and defeat in Vietnam did not lead to World War III,
but it did save thousands of American and Vietnamese lives that wold have been lost if the
war continued.
Be that as it may, if policymakers do decide engage in military interventions, then
there are several steps they can take in order to reduce the chances that fighting will lead
to DRT-like dynamics and undermine their future resolve and reputation for resolve. First,
policymakers can make the principal policy objective of military interventions restraining
foreign policy aggression rather than internal political change. For example, they can fol-
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low the example of George H.W. Bush rather than George W. Bush. Whereas the former
limited the First Iraq War to expelling the Iraqi military from Kuwait rather than deposing
Saddam Hussein’s regime, the latter went further in the Second Iraq War and overthrew the
Iraqi government. Given the poor historical track record of foreign-imposed regime change
(Downes 2021), focusing on restraining foreign policy aggression is also prudent because it
can increase the chances of victory. Second, policymakers can take steps to reduce the monetary and human costs of a conflict. For example, instead of large-scale ground operations,
policymakers can utilize standoff strikes with missiles, airstrikes via inhabited and uninhabited aircraft, smaller-scale special operations deployments, and proxies in order to achieve
their objectives. Of course, the benefits of reducing the costs of war via these methods have
to be balanced with the risk that they will increase the chances of defeat. Third, policymakers can potentially increase the chances of military victory by adopting best practices
when it comes to military organization84 (e.g., Shils and Janowitz 1948; Talmadge 2015),
military innovation (e.g., Rosen 1984; Horowitz 2010), force employment (e.g., Biddle 2010),
etc. Overall, by minimizing the probability of backlash and war-weariness, policymakers can
curtail the chances fighting will lead to a depletion of resolve and reputation for resolve.
DRT also has implications for more concrete cases, such as how the US and its allies should respond to a rising China and revanchist Russia. For instance, take the (as of
this writing) ongoing Russia-Ukraine War. Per the HRT-based “credibility addiction” (Walt
2015), foreign policy elites in the policy and journalism realms have worried that an insufficiently hawkish response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could harm the US’ reputation. In
this spirit, one New York Times headline read, “Biden’s Stand on Ukraine Is a Wider Test
of U.S. Credibility Abroad”, and retired four star admiral James Stavridis said, “China will
be watching U.S. support to Ukraine, and it will inform their calculus regarding Taiwan”
(Crowley 2021). This logic is one reason that over two dozen prominent national security
scholars and former government officials endorsed the idea of “no-fly zone” over Ukraine,
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which would likely have put the two biggest nuclear powers in the world in direct combat
against each other (Betts 2022). Of course, DRT does not dispute the contention that actions taken today in response to the Russia-Ukraine War may impact the US’ reputation for
resolve in the future. However, in contrast to the conventional HRT logic, directly fighting
against Russia in what could be an extremely costly war might backfire and undermine
American resolve and reputation for resolve. This would not aid in deterring future Chinese
aggression and would be counter-productive. From the perspective of DRT, the US’ current
strategy of arming the Ukrainian military but not using military force directly has significant
advantages since it reduces the probability of backlash and war-weariness. From Russia’s
perspective, DRT also suggests that the costs of Vladimir Putin deciding to back down are
lower than the conventional wisdom implies. Though backing down does entail reputation
costs, continuing to fight could lead to (greater) backlash to the war among Russian elites
and the Russian public, which could ultimately lead to war-weariness and a reduction in
Russian resolve and reputation for resolve. These lessons can also by applied to future proxy
conflicts involving the US, Russia, and China.

Unanswered Questions and Avenues for Future Research
Even though I argue this dissertation makes a significant contribution to academic
and policy debates, it, naturally, leaves many questions unanswered that could form the
basis of future research.
First, although this project outlines some of the key factors that make DRT more or
less likely to hold, it is not fully clear which of these factors are more or less important. For
example, the debate over whether principal policy objective, outcome, or cost is the most
important factor in determining support for a war remains ongoing (e.g., Jentleson 1992;
Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006). Future research could disaggregate these
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factors in order to test which have the closest relationship with backlash and war-weariness.
Second, to what extent does reputation adhere to leaders versus states? Research
has addressed this question with respect to backing down reputation costs (e.g., Renshon,
Dafoe, and Huth 2018; Lupton 2020), but future work could also analyze it in the context
of war-weariness reputation costs.
Third, even though my empirical tests demonstrate that both backing down and
signs of war-weariness can undermine a country’s reputation for resolve, more work could
be done to test the factors that make each of these signals stronger or weaker. Do warweariness reputation costs vary depending on whether the relevant country is a democracy
or autocracy? Most of the evidence presented in this dissertation focuses on democracies,
but per the discussion in Chapter 2, DRT could also hold in autocracies as well. Are
there certain signs of war-weariness (e.g., public opinion polls, leader statements, new laws,
etc.) that lead to more significant decreases in reputation for resolve than others? What
relevance do leader-level characteristics have (Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2021)? To
what degree do psychological biases (Mercer 1996) or structural factors (Tang 2005) impact
the extent to which DRT holds among allied or adversarial audiences? Are signs of warweariness among a state’s enemies less likely to undermine their reputation for resolve than
signs of war-weariness among a state’s allies because of attribution bias and the self-help
nature of the anarchical international system? Does timing (e.g., whether a relationship
between two countries is in its early or later stages) moderate the impact of war-weariness
on a country’s reputation for resolve (Copeland 1997; Crescenzi 2018; Lupton 2020)? Do
higher-order beliefs matter for war-weariness reputation costs (Dafoe, Zwetsloot, and Cebul
2021)? In other words, if Country B demonstrates signs of war-weariness causing Country
A to downgrade its assessment of B’s resolve, does that also increase Country A’s resolve?
And does Country B recognize that its war-weariness is likely to enhance A’s resolve, thus
causing a further decline in B’s resolve? To what extent does the signal sent by warweariness and backing down costs decay over time (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015)? How
do backing down reputation costs vary depending on the gender of the leader who backs
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down, their explanation for backing down, and whether they substitute less hawkish policies
like sanctions or airstrikes for more hawkish ones like ground operations (Levendusky and
Horowitz 2012; McManus 2017; Lin-Greenberg 2019; Schwartz and Blair 2020)? Is backing
down later in a conflict after a state has already demonstrated resolve to some extent by
choosing to fight in prior moments of decision preferable to backing down earlier in a conflict
(Copeland 1997; Lupton 2020)? Future research can address these questions.
Fourth, what is the relative importance of past actions compared to the current balance of power or other salient factors (Press 2015) on a state’s deterrence efficacy? While
this and other studies demonstrate that past actions do indeed matter (e.g., Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2021)—in contrast to SRT—whether one is more important than the
other and under what conditions this is the case remains unclear.
Fifth, could the general logic of DRT hold for other issue areas as well? For example,
consider the decision of whether to violate (back down from) a trade agreement or honor it
(stand firm) and the effect this decision has on a state’s reputation for supporting free trade.
While violating a trade deal should, all else equal, harm a state’s reputation, if honoring
it leads to significant domestic backlash against free trade perhaps that could, ultimately,
undermine a state’s reputation for supporting free trade to a greater extent in the long-run.
Sixth, future work could attempt to create a time-series cross-sectional measure of
backlash to war that could be used as a dependent variable to analyze the factors that make
backlash more or less likely and as an independent variable to test the impact backlash has
on a state’s resolve, reputation for resolve, and other salient factors. Doing so is difficult
because the signals of backlash are subjective and inconsistently available and measured
across different countries or between different wars. For example, polling conducted in the
aftermath of war is not phrased uniformly across different countries and between different
wars, is conducted at different times, and is prone to different sources of measurement error
in different contexts (e.g., social desirability bias, representativeness, etc.). Nevertheless,
scholars could employ tools like text analysis (e.g., in the context of examining leader statements) and Bayesian latent variable analysis to construct proxies of resolve (McManus 2017;
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Carter and Smith 2020).
Seventh, while this study adopted a multi-method approach and tested DRT using
experiments, large-N statistical analysis, and historical case studies, there are other methods
that could be employed in future work that might provide additional insights. For instance,
utilizing game theory to formalize DRT or conducting interviews of decision-makers that
assess foreign countries’ resolve could, potentially, add additional nuance to DRT and the
conditions under which it is more likely to hold .
Finally, whereas this project focused on how fighting rather than backing down could
harm a country’s reputation for resolve, future research could analyze alternative ways in
which fighting rather than backing down can undermine a state’s foreign policy goals.85
For example, as Crescenzi (2018) and others demonstrate, fighting can cause a state to
develop a reputation for aggression, which can then cause states to balance against it (Walt
1990). Examples abound from Napoleonic France to Nazi Germany and Imperial Germany.
This implies that there may be an inverted-U relationship between a state’s reputation
for resolve and its deterrence efficacy. Low levels of reputation for resolve are harmful for
deterrence efficacy because they make a state an appealing target, but extremely high levels
of reputation for resolve may also be damaging if they imply a state is overly aggressive.
Consequently, the optimal or Goldilocks level of reputation for resolve may lie somewhere
between the vice of deficiency—cowardice and timidity—and the vice of excess—aggression
and belligerence (Aristotle 2009). Another possibility that has been underexplored is that,
in some cases, fighting could undermine a state’s reputation for military effectiveness (e.g.,
Jervis 1991). The most salient example of this dynamic is the current Russia-Ukraine War,
as Russia’s (so far) lackluster and relatively incompetent invasion of Ukraine has ostensibly
lowered foreign observers’ assessments of the Russian military. Since at the start of the
invasion most analysts expected Russia would be able to depose the Ukrainian government
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Other ways in which fighting rather than backing down could enhance a state’s reputation should
also be explored. For instance, doing so could bolster a state’s reputation for reliability among allies
(Gibler 2008; Miller 2011; Crescenzi et al. 2021).
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and occupy Kiev (at least temporarily), their failure to do so was surprising and thus may
have hurt Russia’s reputation for military effectiveness. Consequently, it is possible that
choosing to fight rather than not fight in a conflict could harm a state’s reputation across
multiple dimensions.

240

Appendices
Appendix A: Chapter 3
Survey Text
Pre-Treatment Covariates
Note: Lucid collects basic demographic data on respondents.
Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Strong Republican

⃝

Moderate Republican

⃝

Lean Republican

⃝

Lean Democrat

⃝

Moderate Democrat

⃝

Strong Democrat

⃝

Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Very liberal

⃝

Liberal

⃝

Slightly liberal

⃝

Moderate, middle of the road ⃝
Slightly conservative

⃝

Conservative

⃝

Very conservative

⃝
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Did you vote in the last presidential election in 2016?

Yes

⃝

No, but I usually vote

⃝

No, I usually don’t vote ⃝

Has a close friend or family member served in the military?

Yes

⃝

No

⃝

This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with
problems in other parts of the world.

Strongly agree

⃝

Agree

⃝

Lean towards agreeing

⃝

Lean towards disagreeing

⃝

Disagree

⃝

Strongly disagree

⃝
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Please select the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Strongly Somewhat
Disagree Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

The best way to ensure world
peace is through American
military strength.

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

Going to war is unfortunate,
but sometimes the only solution
to international problems.

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

The use of military force
only makes problems worse.

Treatment Introduction
The following article describes a situation the United States could face in the future.
Read the article carefully and imagine how you would feel about these events if they were
happening today.
Remember to read closely and pay attention, as you will be asked questions to check your
memory and comprehension.
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Backed Down Treatment
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Least-Likely Case for Backlash Treatment

245

Most-Likely Case for Backlash Treatment
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Manipulation Check
How many American soldiers died in the United States’ conflict with Yemen?

None, the U.S. decided not to take any military action

⃝

400

⃝

4,000

⃝

40,000

⃝

Humanitarian Crisis Treatment
Now, in 2030, a different foreign country was found to be forcibly removing, and in some
cases killing, ethnic minorities from their homes in an effort to drive them out of the country.
The foreign country has modest military capabilities compared to the United States and
does not possess nuclear weapons.

Invasion of an Ally Treatment
Now, in 2030, a different foreign government has invaded an ally of the United States.
The foreign country has modest military capabilities compared to the United States and
does not possess nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Proliferation Crisis Treatment
Now, in 2030, a different foreign country, hostile to the United States, was found to possess
a secret nuclear weapons facility.
The foreign country has modest military capabilities compared to the United States and
does not possess nuclear weapons.

247

Dependent Variable
To what extent would you oppose or support military action against this foreign country?

Strongly oppose military action

⃝

Oppose military action

⃝

Somewhat oppose military action

⃝

Neither oppose nor support military action

⃝

Somewhat support military action

⃝

Support military action

⃝

Strongly support military action

⃝

Mechanisms
Do the benefits of intervening militarily in this conflict outweigh the costs?

The costs greatly outweigh the benefits

⃝

The costs outweigh the benefits

⃝

The benefits and costs are about equal

⃝

The benefits outweigh the costs

⃝

The benefits greatly outweigh the costs ⃝
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How costly do you think it would be to win this conflict in terms of American lives lost and
money spent?

Enormous amount

⃝

Substantial amount ⃝
Moderate amount

⃝

Very little

⃝

None at all

⃝

To what extent is resolving this conflict in the American national interest?

Not at all

⃝

Slightly

⃝

Moderately

⃝

Very

⃝

Extremely

⃝
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How much do you think backing down from this conflict would harm America’s reputation
for toughness and firmness in the eyes of our enemies?

Enormous amount

⃝

Substantial amount ⃝
Moderate amount

⃝

Very little

⃝

None at all

⃝

How likely is it that the United States would achieve its military objectives if it got involved
in the 2030 conflict?

Very likely

⃝

Likely

⃝

About 50-50

⃝

Unlikely

⃝

Very unlikely

⃝
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Robustness
Table A.1 illustrates that using a binary measure of resolve to analyze the impact of
the type of mission Crisis II involves leads to results broadly similar than when the full 7point measure is employed. Note that in a regression with the full 7-point dependent variable,
there is no significant interaction involving the most-likely case for backlash and invasion of
an ally condition relative to the humanitarian and nuclear proliferation conditions.

Table A.1: Does War-Weariness Vary with the Nature of the Follow-Up
Mission?
Action in
Previous
Conflict

Support for
Subsequent
Military Action (%)

Difference from
Backed Down
(Percentage Points)

Backed Down

38.7%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

43.9%

5.2

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

32.0%

-6.7

Backed Down

47.3%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

50.0%

2.7

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

25.0%

-22.3***

Backed Down

45.9%

—

Fought, Least-Likely
Case for Backlash

34.4%

-11.4*

Fought, Most-Likely
Case for Backlash

40.5%

-5.4

Humanitarian Crisis

Invasion of an Ally

Nuclear Proliferation Crisis

Note: Results depict percentage support for engaging in military action to alleviate
a humanitarian crisis, protect an ally, or combat a nuclear weapons program. * =
p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is
statistically different than 0.
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Appendix B: Chapter 4
Table A.2: Coding Inter-State Wars
War

Country

Russo-Finnish

Finland

World War II

Australia;
Belgium; Canada;
Finland; France;
Netherlands; New
Zealand; Norway;
United Kingdom;
United States

Arab-Israeli War

Israel

Korean War

Australia;
Belgium; Canada;
France;
Netherlands;
Turkey; United
Kingdom; United
States

Sinai War

France; Israel;
United Kingdom

Policy
Objective
Not Internal
Political Change.
Finland was
invaded by the
Soviet Union and
so was restraining
foreign policy
aggression.
Not Internal
Political Change.
These countries
were either
directly attacked
or were
combatting the
foreign policy
aggression of the
Axis powers.
Not Internal
Political Change.
Israel was trying
to defend its own
(declared)
territory from
external attacks
by a coalition of
Arab states.
Not Internal
Political Change.
These countries
were primarily
attempting to
restrain the
foreign policy
aggression of
North Korea.
Internal Political
Change. One of
the primary goals
was to overthrow
Nasser.
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Security
Interests
High. Direct
threat to
Finland’s
territory.

High. Direct
threats to the
territory and/or
autonomy of these
countries.

High. Direct
threat to Israel’s
territory.

Medium.
Defending an ally
(South Korea)
from attack.

Medium.
Financial interests
were involved with
the
nationalization of
the Suez Canal.

Table A.2: Coding Inter-State Wars, Continued
War

Country

Six-Day War

Israel

War of Attrition

Israel

Vietnam War

Australia; United
States

Yom Kippur War

Israel

Turco-Cypriot

Turkey
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Policy
Objective
Not Internal
Political Change.
Israel was trying
to defend its own
territory from
external attacks
by a coalition of
Arab states.
Not Internal
Political Change.
Israel was trying
to defend its own
territory from
external attacks
by a coalition of
Arab states.
Internal Political
Change. The
United States and
Australia were
attempting to
transform the
internal politics of
Vietnam.
Not Internal
Political Change.
Israel was trying
to defend its own
territory from
external attacks
by a coalition of
Arab states.
Internal Political
Change. Turkey
launched a
counter-coup to
try and affect the
domestic politics
of Cyprus.

Security
Interests
High. Direct
threat to Israel’s
territory.

High. Direct
threat to Israel’s
territory.

Low. Vietnam
was a strategically
insignificant
country that
posed no real
threat to the
homeland.
High. Direct
threat to Israel’s
territory.

Low. Turkey was
the aggressor.

Table A.2: Coding Inter-State Wars, Continued
War

Country

Falkland Islands

United Kingdom

War Over
Lebanon

Israel

Gulf War

Canada; France;
Italy; United
Kingdom; United
States

Azeri-Armenian

Armenia

Azeri-Armenian

Azerbaijan

War for Kosovo

France; Germany;
Italy;
Netherlands;
Turkey; United
Kingdom; United
States
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Policy
Objective
Not Internal
Political Change.
The United
Kingdom was
responding to a
direct attack on
their territory.
Internal Political
Change. Ariel
Sharon wanted to
install a new
regime in
Lebanon.
Not Internal
Political Change.
These states were
acting to restrain
Iraq’s foreign
policy aggression
against Kuwait.
Internal Political
Change. Armenia
wanted
independence for
the Armenia
Christian
population in
NagornyyKarabakh.
Not Internal
Political Change.
Azerbaijan was
defending against
an attack on their
territory.
Not Internal
Political Change.
Humanitarian
intervention.

Security
Interests
High. Direct
threat to the
United Kingdom’s
territory.

High. Israel’s
homeland was
directly attacked.

Medium.
Defending an ally
(Kuwait) from
attack.

Medium. Aiding
close ethnic kin.

High.
Azerbaijan’s
homeland was
directly attacked.
Low.
Humanitarian
intervention.

Table A.2: Coding Inter-State Wars, Continued
War

Country

Policy
Objective
Not Internal
Political Change.
Yugoslavoa was
attacked by a
coalition of states.
Internal Political
Change. The goal
of the intervention
was to overthrow
the Taliban
regime.

War for Kosovo

Yugoslavia

Invasion of
Afghanistan

United States

Invasion of
Afghanistan

Australia;
Canada; France;
United Kingdom

Invasion of Iraq

Australia; United
Kingdom; United
States

Internal Political
Change. The goal
of the intervention
was to overthrow
the Taliban
regime.
Internal Political
Change. The goal
of the intervention
was to overthrow
the Iraqi regime.
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Security
Interests
High. Yugoslavia’s
homeland was
directly attacked.
High. The United
States’ homeland
was directly
attacked on 9/11
by terrorists
harbored in
Afghanistan.
Medium.
Defending an ally
(United States)
from attack.
Low. These
countries were the
proximate
aggressor.

Appendix C: Chapter 6
Study 1 Survey Text
Pre-Treatment Covariates
Note: Lucid collects basic demographic data on respondents.
Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Strong Republican

⃝

Moderate Republican

⃝

Lean Republican

⃝

Lean Democrat

⃝

Moderate Democrat

⃝

Strong Democrat

⃝

Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Very liberal

⃝

Liberal

⃝

Slightly liberal

⃝

Moderate, middle of the road ⃝
Slightly conservative

⃝

Conservative

⃝

Very conservative

⃝
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Please select the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Strongly Somewhat
Disagree Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

The best way to ensure world
peace is through American
military strength.

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

Going to war is unfortunate,
but sometimes the only solution
to international problems.

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

The use of military force
only makes problems worse.

Treatment Introduction
The following text will describe a scenario about two countries engaged in a territorial
dispute. The countries are labeled Country A and Country B for purposes of generality.
Read the scenario carefully and then tell us your beliefs about Country B’s likely future
behavior.
Remember to read closely and pay attention, as you will be asked questions to check your
memory and comprehension.

Background
County A is currently involved in a dispute with Country B over a small, contested piece of
territory currently controlled by Country A.
What you know about Country B is that it is a democracy and its military forces are about
equally as strong as Country A’s. Neither country has nuclear weapons

No Previous Conflict Treatment
[Respondent immediately asked the dependent variable measure.]

Backed Down Treatment
According to most impartial observers, during its most recent major international crisis with
a country other than Country A, Country B backed down and failed to achieve its aims.
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Fought/Won Treatment
During its most recent major international crisis with a country other than Country A,
Country B did not back down and the crisis led to war. According to most impartial
observers, Country B did achieve its aims.

Fought/Lost Treatment
During its most recent major international crisis with a country other than Country A,
Country B did not back down and the crisis led to war. According to most impartial
observers, Country B did not achieve its aims.

Fought/Won/War-Weariness Treatment
During its most recent major international crisis with a country other than Country A,
Country B did not back down and the crisis led to war. According to most impartial
observers, Country B did achieve its aims, though the war led to the deaths of tens of
thousands of B’s soldiers and cost Country B a humongous amount of money. According to
public polling, about 70% of Country B’s people believe that the war was not worth it and
that the experience should make Country B more cautious about using military force in the
future. Country B’s new leader––who was elected after this conflict––has also said the war
was a “mistake” and that the country should focus more on domestic issues going forward.

Fought/Lost/War-Weariness Treatment
During its most recent major international crisis with a country other than Country A,
Country B did not back down and the crisis led to war. According to most impartial
observers, Country B did not achieve its aims, and the war led to the deaths of tens of
thousands of B’s soldiers and cost Country B a humongous amount of money. According to
public polling, about 70% of Country B’s people believe that the war was not worth it and
that the experience should make Country B more cautious about using military force in the
future. Country B’s new leader––who was elected after this conflict––has also said the war
was a “mistake” and that the country should focus more on domestic issues going forward.
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Dependent Variable
What is your best estimate, given the information available, about whether Country B will
back down in this dispute?

Country B is very likely to back down (about an 80% or greater chance of backing down)

⃝

Country B is likely to back down (about a 60% to 80% chance of backing down)

⃝

Country B is somewhat likely to back down (about a 51% to 60% chance of backing down)

⃝

It is unclear whether country B will back down or not (about a 50% chance of backing down) ⃝
Country B is somewhat unlikely to back down (about a 40% to 49% chance of backing down)

⃝

Country B is unlikely to back down (about a 20% to 40% chance of backing down)

⃝

Country B is very unlikely to back down (about a 20% or less chance of backing down)

⃝

Mechanisms/Confounding
To what extent do you think Country B’s citizens would support a military conflict against
Country A?

Strongly oppose a military conflict

⃝

Oppose a military conflict

⃝

Neither support nor oppose a military conflict

⃝

Support a military conflict

⃝

Strongly support a military conflict

⃝
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How likely do you think it is that Country B would achieve its objectives if it got involved
in a military conflict with Country A?

Very likely to achieve its military objectives

⃝

Likely to achieve its military objectives

⃝

About 50-50

⃝

Unlikely to achieve its military objectives

⃝

Very unlikely to achieve its military objectives

⃝

Attention Check
How many American soldiers died in the United States’ conflict with Yemen?

None, the U.S. decided not to take any military action

⃝

400

⃝

4,000

⃝

40,000

⃝
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Study 1 Robustness
Tables A.3, A.4, A.5, and A.6 further show that the results related to H2 and H3 remain robust to using the full 7-point measure of reputation for resolve, excluding respondents
that failed the attention check, weighting data to population demographics (Hainmueller
2012; Hainmueller and Zu 2012), and controlling for covariates like partisan identification
and militant assertiveness.

Table A.3: Full 7-Point Measure of Reputation for Resolve
Action in Previous
Conflict

Reputation for
Resolve

Difference from
No Previous Conflict

Difference from
Backed Down

No Previous Conflict

3.61

—

—

Backed Down

2.78

-0.83***

—

Fought; Lost;
War-Weariness

2.67

-0.93***

-0.10

Fought; Won;
War-Weariness

3.06

-0.54***

0.29

Fought; Lost

3.78

0.18

1.01***

Fought; Won

4.89

1.28***

2.11***

Note: Results depict percentage support for the statements. * = p<0.10, ** =
p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is statistically
greater than 0.
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Table A.4: Excluding Respondents that Failed the Attention Check
Action in Previous
Conflict

Reputation for
Resolve

Difference from
No Previous Conflict

Difference from
Backed Down

No Previous Conflict

3.85

—

—

Backed Down

2.59

-1.26***

—

Fought; Lost;
War-Weariness

2.65

-1.20***

0.06

Fought; Won;
War-Weariness

2.82

-1.03***

0.23

Fought; Lost

3.89

0.04

1.30***

Fought; Won

5.09

1.24***

2.50***

Note: Results depict percentage support for the statements. * = p<0.10, ** =
p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is statistically
greater than 0.

262

Table A.5: Weighting Data to Population Demographics
Action in Previous
Conflict

Reputation for
Resolve

Difference from
No Previous Conflict

Difference from
Backed Down

No Previous Conflict

3.53

—

—

Backed Down

2.67

-0.86***

—

Fought; Lost;
War-Weariness

2.47

-1.06***

-0.20

Fought; Won;
War-Weariness

3.25

-0.28

0.58***

Fought; Lost

3.80

0.27

1.13***

Fought; Won

5.14

1.61***

2.47***

Note: Results depict percentage support for the statements. * = p<0.10, ** =
p<0.05, and *** = p<0.01, where p-values indicate whether support is statistically
greater than 0.
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Table A.6: Holding Constant Other Factors
Reputation for Resolve
(1)
Backed Down Relative to
No Previous Conflict

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Fought/Lost/War-Weariness
Relative to No Previous Conflict

−0.99∗∗∗
(0.21)

Fought/Lost/War-Weariness
Relative to Backed Down

−0.11
(0.21)

Fought/Won/War-Weariness
Relative to No Previous Conflict

−0.60∗∗∗
(0.21)

Fought/Won/War-Weariness
Relative to Backed Down

0.29
(0.23)

Fought/Won Relative to
No Previous Conflict

1.29∗∗∗
(0.26)

Fought/Won Relative to
Backed Down

2.15∗∗∗
(0.28)

Fought/Lost Relative to
No Previous Conflict

0.12
(0.23)

Fought/Lost Relative to
Backed Down
Republican

(9)

−0.93∗∗∗
(0.21)

1.14∗∗∗
(0.24)
0.57∗∗
(0.24)

0.17
(0.23)

0.06
(0.24)

0.62∗∗
(0.24)

0.46∗
(0.25)

0.39
(0.29)

0.35
(0.30)

0.12
(0.27)

0.01
(0.29)

−0.30∗∗
(0.14)

−0.16
(0.13)

−0.04
(0.14)

−0.35∗∗
(0.14)

−0.13
(0.15)

−0.33∗
(0.17)

−0.18
(0.17)

−0.13
(0.15)

−0.02
(0.16)

Female

0.36∗
(0.21)

0.17
(0.21)

0.40∗
(0.22)

0.63∗∗∗
(0.22)

0.79∗∗∗
(0.23)

0.14
(0.27)

0.39
(0.28)

0.05
(0.24)

0.35
(0.25)

Education

0.07
(0.06)

0.02
(0.06)

0.05
(0.06)

−0.07
(0.06)

0.003
(0.07)

−0.03
(0.08)

0.002
(0.08)

0.06
(0.07)

0.12
(0.07)

Age

−0.05
(0.09)

−0.10
(0.09)

−0.21∗∗
(0.10)

0.20∗∗
(0.09)

0.06
(0.10)

0.24∗∗
(0.11)

0.11
(0.11)

0.16
(0.11)

0.01
(0.12)

Income

−0.14∗
(0.08)

−0.06
(0.08)

−0.11
(0.08)

0.09
(0.08)

0.01
(0.09)

−0.10
(0.10)

−0.18∗
(0.11)

−0.09
(0.08)

−0.17∗
(0.09)

White

0.42
(0.32)

0.28
(0.29)

0.20
(0.36)

0.08
(0.29)

0.01
(0.35)

0.07
(0.35)

0.16
(0.43)

0.24
(0.34)

0.22
(0.44)

Black

0.08
(0.42)

−0.12
(0.43)

−0.31
(0.48)

0.37
(0.45)

0.14
(0.48)

0.05
(0.56)

−0.11
(0.57)

−0.32
(0.43)

−0.52
(0.50)

Perceived Chance of Victory

−0.17
(0.13)

−0.13
(0.12)

−0.02
(0.12)

−0.06
(0.12)

0.05
(0.12)

−0.23
(0.16)

−0.04
(0.15)

−0.67∗∗∗
(0.13)

−0.46∗∗∗
(0.14)

Constant

4.62∗∗∗
(0.66)

4.56∗∗∗
(0.69)

3.30∗∗∗
(0.68)

3.68∗∗∗
(0.67)

2.16∗∗∗
(0.68)

4.86∗∗∗
(0.85)

3.17∗∗∗
(0.83)

5.51∗∗∗
(0.70)

3.84∗∗∗
(0.72)

211

202

205

201

204

201

204

Militant Assertiveness

Observations

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

209
∗∗

p<0.05;

212
∗∗∗

p<0.01

Study 2 Survey Text
[Some Demographic Information Collected by Lucid]

Informed Consent86
[Standard Consent Form]
I have read the consent form, and
I want to continue with this study

I do not want to participate
in this study

⃝

⃝

Age Eligibility & Attention Screener
• Are you eighteen years of age or older?87
- Yes
- No
We’d like to know how you feel about local news coverage. Please read this short article.
On the next page, we will ask you a few questions about your reactions to this article
MAN ARRESTED FOR STRING OF BANK THEFTS
Columbus Police have arrested a man they say gave his driver’s license to a teller at a bank
he was robbing.
According to court documents, Bryan Simon is accused of robbing four Central Ohio banks
between October 3 and November 5, 2018.
During a robbery on November 5 at the Huntington Bank, the sheriff’s office says Simon
was tricked into giving the teller his drivers’ license.
According to court documents, Simon approached the counter and presented a demand note
for money that said “I have a gun.” The teller gave Simon about $500, which he took.
Documents say Simon then told the teller he wanted more money. The teller told him a
driver’s license was required to use the machine to get out more cash. Simon reportedly
then gave the teller his license to swipe through the machine and then left the bank with a
total of about $1500, but without his ID.
Detectives arrested him later that day at the address listed on his ID.
86

If respondents answer “No” to the consent, then they are removed from the study.

87

If respondents answer “No,” then they are removed from the study.
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• Do you think this article is typical of local news coverage?
- Yes
- Maybe
- No
• Do you think there is too much coverage of crime in local news coverage?
- Yes
- Maybe
- No
• How was Simon identified by police for the crime he allegedly committed?88
- From video surveillance
- Because he left his ID
- He turned himself in
- None of the above
• How much money did Simon allegedly steal in total?89
- About $500
- About $1,500
- About $25,000
- About $1 million
- None of the above

Pre-Treatment Questions90
• Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a...
- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other

88

If respondents answer anything other than “Because he left his ID,” then they are removed from the
study.

89

I do not remove respondents that answer this question incorrectly, but can this question to measure
respondents’ general level of attention pre-treatment.

90

The order of questions in this section is randomized.
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• Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not so strong Democrat?91
- Strong Democrat
- Not so strong Democrat
• Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not so strong Republican?92
- Strong Republican
- Not so strong Republican
• Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or Republican Party?93
- The Democratic Party
- The Republican Party
- Neither
- Not sure
• In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?
- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Moderate
- Conservative
- Very conservative
• The best way to ensure peace is through American military strength
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree
• Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems.
- Strongly Disagree
91

This question is only presented to respondents who chose “Democrat” for the first question in this
section.

92

This question is only presented to respondents who chose “Republican” for the first question in this
section.

93

This question is only presented to respondents who chose “Independent” or “Other” for the first
question in this section.
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- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Baseline Scenario94
Imagine the following situation, which takes place in 2027:
- Your country––the United States––is involved in a dispute with Country B
- The dispute began with a collision between a US shipping vessel and a ship
registered to Country B
- During the collision, injuries were reported on both sides
- Additionally, both countries maintain that their ship was carrying sensitive military technology and are suspicious of the motives of the other side, leading to
a tense standoff at sea
- The US president is a Democrat
- The United States’ military forces are estimated to be about 2.5 times stronger
than Country B’s
- Country B is a democracy
- During its most recent major international crisis, Country B did not back down
and the crisis led to war. According to most impartial observers, Country B did
not achieve its aims

Baseline Dependent Variable Measure

94

All respondents are presented with this scenario.
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Backed Down Scenario95
Now, we would like to ask you a question about a different, alternative version of the
scenario you just read. Suppose the basic details remain the same:
- Your country––the United States––is involved in a dispute with Country B
- The dispute began with a collision between a US shipping vessel and a ship
registered to Country B
- During the collision, injuries were reported on both sides
- Additionally, both countries maintain that their ship was carrying sensitive military technology and are suspicious of the motives of the other side, leading to
a tense standoff at sea
- The US president is a Democrat
- The United States’ military forces are estimated to be about 2.5 times stronger
than Country B’s
- Country B is a democracy
But this time, suppose that...
During its most recent major international crisis, Country B backed down and failed to
achieve its aims

Backed Down Dependent Variable Measure

95

Half of respondents are randomly assigned to this scenario.
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War-Weariness Scenario96
Now, we would like to ask you a question about a different, alternative version of the
scenario you just read. Suppose the basic details remain the same:
- Your country––the United States––is involved in a dispute with Country B
- The dispute began with a collision between a US shipping vessel and a ship
registered to Country B
- During the collision, injuries were reported on both sides
- Additionally, both countries maintain that their ship was carrying sensitive military technology and are suspicious of the motives of the other side, leading to
a tense standoff at sea
- The US president is a Democrat
- The United States’ military forces are estimated to be about 2.5 times stronger
than Country B’s
- Country B is a democracy
But this time, suppose that...
During its most recent major international crisis, County B did not back down and
the crisis led to war. According to most impartial observers, Country B did not achieve its
aims, and the war led to the deaths of thousands of Country B’s soldiers and cost Country
B a significant amount of money. According to public polling, about 70% of Country B’s
people believe that the war was not worth it and that the experience should make Country
B more cautious about using military force in the future. Country B’s new leader––who
was elected after this conflict––has also said the war was a "mistake" and that the country
should focus more on domestic issues going forward.

War-Weariness Dependent Variable Measure

96

Half of respondents are randomly assigned to this scenario.
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Open-Ended Question
Please explain why your estimates of Country B’s probability of standing firm did or did
not differ between the first and second scenario.
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Appendix D: Chapter 7
Survey Text
Baseline Scenario97
Imagine the following situation, which could occur at some point in the future:
- Your country––the United Kingdom––is involved in a dispute with Country B
- The dispute began with a collision between a US shipping vessel and a ship
registered to Country B
- During the collision, injuries were reported on both sides
- Additionally, both countries maintain that their ship was carrying sensitive military technology and are suspicious of the motives of the other side, leading to
a tense standoff at sea
- The United Kingdom’s military forces are estimated to be about 2.5 times
stronger than Country B’s
- Country B is a democracy
- During its most recent major international crisis, Country B did not back down
and the crisis led to war. According to most impartial observers, Country B did
not achieve its aims

Baseline Dependent Variable Measure

97

All respondents are presented with this scenario.

272

Backed Down Scenario98
Now, we would like to ask you a question about a different, alternative version of the
scenario you just read. Suppose the basic details remain the same:
- Your country––the United Kingdom––is involved in a dispute with Country B
- The dispute began with a collision between a US shipping vessel and a ship
registered to Country B
- During the collision, injuries were reported on both sides
- Additionally, both countries maintain that their ship was carrying sensitive military technology and are suspicious of the motives of the other side, leading to
a tense standoff at sea
- The United Kingdom’s military forces are estimated to be about 2.5 times
stronger than Country B’s
- Country B is a democracy
But this time, suppose that...
During its most recent major international crisis, Country B backed down and failed to
achieve its aims

Backed Down Dependent Variable Measure

98

Half of respondents are randomly assigned to this scenario.
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War-Weariness Scenario99
Now, we would like to ask you a question about a different, alternative version of the
scenario you just read. Suppose the basic details remain the same:
- Your country––the United Kingdom––is involved in a dispute with Country B
- The dispute began with a collision between a US shipping vessel and a ship
registered to Country B
- During the collision, injuries were reported on both sides
- Additionally, both countries maintain that their ship was carrying sensitive military technology and are suspicious of the motives of the other side, leading to
a tense standoff at sea
- The United Kingdom’s military forces are estimated to be about 2.5 times
stronger than Country B’s
- Country B is a democracy
But this time, suppose that...
During its most recent major international crisis, County B did not back down and
the crisis led to war. According to most impartial observers, Country B did not achieve its
aims, and the war led to the deaths of thousands of Country B’s soldiers and cost Country
B a significant amount of money. According to public polling, about 70% of Country B’s
people believe that the war was not worth it and that the experience should make Country
B more cautious about using military force in the future. Country B’s new leader––who was
elected after this conflict––has also said the war was “mistake” and that the country should
focus more on domestic issues going forward.

War-Weariness Dependent Variable Measure

99

Half of respondents are randomly assigned to this scenario.
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Open-Ended Question
Please explain why your estimates of Country B’s probability of standing firm did or did
not differ between the first and second scenario.
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